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Within the academic field ethnic conflict studies and resolution, this research investigates the 
phenomenon of violent ethnic mobilization in the Niger-Delta region of Nigeria.  
Using the Kaufmanian ethnosymbolic approach to the study of ethnic violence as a theoretical 
and analytical guide, the project examines why violent ethnic mobilisation has continued to 
persist in the aforementioned region despite governmental efforts at eradicating it. This is the 
core issue around which the project’s research questions articulate. The principal argument 
presented and defended here is that existing causal explanations for violent ethnic mobilization 
and its persistence in the Niger-Delta region are inadequate and incomprehensive. They are 
merely some narrow and isolating extrapolations of the classical modernist constructivist and 
instrumentalist doctrines which have been judged inadequate in accounting for why violent 
ethnic mobilizations occur and persist. Arguing within the ethnosymbolic paradigm, the thesis 
contends that a robust theory of ethnic violence ought to be the sort that creatively and 
purposively combines, rather than isolate, relevant logics of existing theoretical explanations 
of ethnic violence. Only in this way would it be capable of proffering a more adequate and 
comprehensive framework for examining, explaining, and resolving the conundrum of violent 
ethnic mobilization, particularly in the aforementioned region under investigation. 
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This thesis is an ethnosymbolic investigation into the reasons for the occurrence and persistence 
of violent ethnic mobilisations in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Using the Kaufmanian 
ethnosymbolic theoretical framework as a guide, the project seeks to offer a robust explanation 
for why violent ethnic mobilisation has continued to persist in the aforementioned region 
despite governmental efforts to eradicate it.  
The project is set within the academic discipline of ethnic conflict studies and resolution where 
it contributes more specifically to the literature on violent ethnic mobilisation.  
The field of ethnic conflict studies has come a long way. Until recently, Horowitz (1985; 2000) 
notes, this academic field of enquiry has been disparagingly spoken of as the backwaters of the 
Social Sciences. Some of its potent critics, such Brubaker and Laitin (2004:92), expressed 
doubts that the discipline had either a clearly demarcated subject matter, or an agreed-upon set 
of assumptions, or an organised body of literature. These putative shortcomings are equally 
among the reasons why Gilley (2004) made a case for abandoning the field of ethnic conflict 
studies outright.  All these notwithstanding, the discipline has made tremendous progress over 
the years, to the point that it can no longer be reasonably or validly regarded as a backwater of 
social sciences. There is now an explosion of serious literature on the subject of ethnicity and 
its relationship to politics, distributive justice and violent conflicts. Now, more than ever, 
scholars are highly aware of ethnicity’s potency as a community-building force in moderation; 
and as a community-destroying momentum in excess (Horowitz 2000: xvi). Ethnic conflicts, 
scholars in this area of study assume, embody some regularities and recurrent patterns, and 
could therefore be studied for the purpose of understanding why and how they occur, so as to 
be able to effectively address them with a view to creating and advancing the atmosphere of 
peace that is so earnestly needed in our present world. Horowitz’s (1985) ground-breaking 
seminal work in the field, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, is a significant effort in this direction. 
Nnoli (1989; 2008) accomplishes a similar feat, but with a more tailored focus on Africa and 
Nigeria. The current thesis, which focuses on the phenomenon of violent ethnic mobilisation 
in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria is another useful addition to this academic field of study, 




Traditionally, scholars of violent ethnic conflicts have studied their subject matter from a fairly 
wide range of theoretical approaches. These approaches, varying as they are, may, according 
to Horowitz (1998), be roughly categorised into hard and soft views. On one hand, there exist 
scholars who conceive of ethnic conflict, theoretically, as rooted in biological, unconstructed, 
fixed, non-rational or emotional impulses. Proponents of the primordialist doctrine of ethnic 
conflict belong to this camp. Primordialism as an approach is now considered obsolete and has 
been historically superseded. On the other hand, however, those other scholars who conceive 
of violent ethnic conflicts as rationally and strategically constructed realities aimed at obtaining 
some pre-conceived benefits belong to the soft camp. Constructivist and instrumentalist 
theorists of ethnic violence, such as the economic inequality theorists, manipulative elite 
theorists, resource curse theorists, rational choice theorists, and security dilemma theorists 
amongst others, fall under this category – the soft camp (Horowitz 1998).  
More recently however, an increasing number of scholars has come to acknowledge that the 
phenomenon of violent ethnic conflict is rather more complex than is normally thought, and 
that none of the above-mentioned theoretical leanings is capable, individually, of offering a 
comprehensive and robust explanation for the occurrence and persistence of ethnic violence. 
Because of this there is now a gradual shift towards ethnosymbolism – an approach that is 
regarded as more comprehensive due to its ability to creatively and purposively synthesise the 
relevant logics of existing theories of ethnic violence in order to robustly account for why 
ethnic violence occurs and persists. Although ethnosymbolism was initially introduced as an 
approach for studying national violence, Smith (2009) does acknowledge that it may also be 
meaningfully employed in studying violent ethnic conflict situations. In 1985, in his work 
Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Horowitz made the first laudable attempt to develop, based on the 
principles of ethnosymbolism, a more comprehensive and universalizable explanation of why 
ethnic violence occurs and persists. In 2001 and 2006, Kaufman's more tailored use of 
ethnosymbolism offered a persuasive explanation of extreme violent conflicts in the Balkans. 
In recent times, literature on ethnosymbolism has been on the rise, and understandably so, 
because it is currently the most thoroughgoing and comprehensive approach for explaining the 
phenomenon of violent ethnic conflict. It is equally for this reason that the current thesis has 
adopted it as the framework for examining the enigma of violent ethnic mobilisation in the 




Research Problem  
Violent ethnic mobilisation is one of the major security challenges of our time. Though 
prevalent in many young and emerging states of Asia and Africa, this phenomenon is by no 
means limited to these continents alone. It is a globally pervasive problem, even if most 
countries of Europe and America have made substantial progress in checking it (Horowitz 
2000, Wolff 2006; Cordelle and Wolff 2010). The focus of the current research, however, is 
Nigeria and its Niger Delta region.   
The commitment to eradicate, or at least minimise, the spread of ethnic related conflicts is 
constantly renewed at every level of the Nigerian federation. However, the country’s Niger-
Delta region remains one of the loci where the positive impacts of these conflict resolution 
efforts are yet to be fully and durably experienced – for violent ethnic mobilisation continues 
to persist in that region, notwithstanding a series of governmental efforts to eradicate it. It is 
with this puzzling observation that this research began.   
The Niger-Delta region is situated in the oil rich South-southern part of Nigeria, covering about 
70,000 square kilometres (Ploch 2013). The region contains the largest oil deposit in Africa, 
which is considered one of the world’s best and highly sought-after oils due to its low sulphur 
content (Watt et al 2004). The oil produced in the region accounts for more than 93 percent 
(some reports peg it at 95 percent) of Nigeria’s economy. Because of this, the economic and 
geo-strategic significance of the Niger Delta region is not in doubt. Paradoxically however, this 
region, although extremely rich, is still, by all parameters of measurement, one of the poorest 
and most polluted human habitats, not only in Nigeria, but across the entire globe (Ikein et al. 
2008; Ikein 1990; Khan 1994; Watts 2009). The existence of poverty and outdated or 
dilapidated infrastructures, and poor educational and healthcare facilities are, when compared 
with most other regions of the country, significantly high in the Niger Delta region. The 
apparent injustice and socio-economic inequalities existing between this oil-rich but poor 
region and other parts of the country have been thought to provide a fertile ground for the 
mobilisation of violent ethno-regional organisations such as the Egbusi Boys, Niger Delta 
People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Niger Delta Vigilantes (NDF), and the Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), amongst others. Gilbert (2013), argues that MEND 
is the most organised and sophisticated, and best-armed ethnic militia group in the country. 
Created in 2005, the group came into the limelight in 2006 when it launched an attack on Shell’s 




US Dollars to compensate the people for the years of accumulated environmental degradation 
in the Niger Delta, due to the careless and unethical oil exploration methods used in the region 
(Akpan 2010; Asuni 2009: 17-18). This mode of operation is not limited to MEND alone. In 
the region under review, it is fairly normal for ethnic militia groups to intermittently mobilise 
violently as a means of pressurising the Nigerian government to address, not only the socio-
economic imbalance between the Niger Delta area and other constituent regions of the country, 
but also the unique environmental challenge faced by the region due to the unethical extraction 
of crude oil by multinational oil companies.     
Over the years, the Federal Government of Nigeria has employed several policy-informed 
strategies to end the problem of ethnic violence in the region. These strategies include, but are 
not limited to, the following: military repression, increment of revenues allocated to the Niger 
Delta region, and the presidential amnesty programme, which is similar to the United Nation’s 
DDR (disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration) conflict mitigation and resolution 
strategy. The use of DDR in some of the conflict-ridden countries of the world such as Congo, 
Rwanda, Uganda, Guatemala, Colombia, Cambodia and India, amongst others, has proven to 
be effective, and its positive impact has recently been confirmed by Kofi Annan, then Secretary 
General of the United Nations Organisation (United Nations 2000).  The Nigerian version of 
the DDR is the ‘Presidential Amnesty Programme’ which was introduced in the year 1999 in 
view of resolving the problem of violent conflicts in the Niger-Delta region.  
In retrospect, researchers have observed that these government interventions and strategies 
have not fully succeeded in delivering the desired positive result; for mobilisation to ethnic 
violence still persists in the Niger Delta. This startling observation brings up a fresh question 
about why the government’s strategies have not been entirely successful. Such a question 
cannot however be fully addressed without first and foremost examining the robustness of the 
theoretical underpinnings of the conflict resolution strategies implemented by the government 
in the region. The analysis presented in this thesis reveals that the government’s conflict 
resolution interventions in the Niger Delta have not been able to effectively resolve the regional 
conundrum principally because of the inadequacy of the theories that inspired them. The 
dominant perspective, drawn on extensively in the formulation of these government policy 
strategies, has been economic inequality theory. For example, the government’s decision to 
increase the revenues allocated to the Niger Delta region stems from its narrow understanding 
of the causes of regional turmoil as economic. It was therefore hoped that increasing the 




is equally true of the presidential amnesty programme in the region which was designed to 
demobilise and economically empower the Niger Delta ex-militants.     
This thesis argues, however, that economic inequality or marginalization, imagined or actual, 
in the Niger-Delta region, is not a sufficient causal explanation for the persistence of violent 
ethnic mobilisation there. If it were, one would expect that all other ethno-regional groups in 
Nigeria, who also complain about being economically marginalised, would also mobilise 
violently, just like the Niger Deltans. This however has not been the case; and their grievances 
have not transformed into full-scale violent upheavals. It is for these reasons that the current 
thesis is led to posit that there is more to the Niger Delta violent conflict than can be 
satisfactorily explained by the economic inequality argument that has formed the theoretical 
basis of the government’s interventions in the region all these years.  
This thesis does not deny that there is an economic dimension to the regional conflict. It clearly 
acknowledges this, and has devoted a whole chapter (Chapter 4) to explaining and affirming 
the role of interest, economic and otherwise, in the provocation and persistence of the regional 
conflict. This said, seeking to resolve the Niger Delta conflict solely from an economic angle 
will always miss the mark, because the regional conflict is more complex than is usually 
thought. A number of other factors such as the roles of chauvinist and opportunist elites, ethnic 
myths, passion and solidarity are equally relevant in understanding and explaining the 
mechanism of violent ethnic mobilisation and its persistence in the Niger Delta. So, any 
theoretical approach capable of robustly explaining and finding solutions for the problem of 
ethnic violence, particularly in the Niger Delta region, must be able to take all these 
contributory factors into consideration. At the moment only ethnosymbolism does so. Hence 
the reason for its selection as the theoretical guiding thread for the current research project.     
 
Research Gap  
Prior to the rise of Ethnosymbolism as a preferred intellectual paradigm for researching 
extreme ethnic violence, Primordialism, and modernist Constructivism and Instrumentalism 
were, at different historical epochs, predominantly used. Before the second half of the 20th 
century for instance, Primordialism constituted the principal theoretical framework within 
which the phenomenon of violent ethnic conflicts was investigated.  As a naturalistic theory, 




natural or biological differences in ancestry or identity which cause individuals to take sides 
with their own ethnic group when violent conflicts occur between ethnic groups (Shills 1957; 
Geertz 1963). According to this perspective, ethnic identity is seen as congenitally acquired 
and therefore to naturally and inevitably bind people of the same ancestry, separating them and 
their ways of life from those of different ancestral stocks. Going forward, Geertz (1963:109-
10; 1973) notes that one is bound to one’s kinsmen and one’s neighbour as a result, not merely 
of interest, or incurred obligation, but in great part, by the virtue of some unaccountable 
absolute import attributed to the very tie itself. In other words, there is something impulsive, 
rather than rational, about aligning with and seeking to advance the interest of that ethnic group 
from which one is biologically or ancestrally believed to originate. Primordialists’ basic 
submission here is that ethnic differentiation, as well as the conflicts that arise as a result, are 
natural rather than rationally constructed, and therefore inevitable and ineradicable. It is part 
of human nature. So long as people are biologically different, violent conflicts are bound to 
occur. This is, broadly speaking, the view of Primordialism.  
This position has however been intensely criticised by scholars of the modernist tradition for 
failing to give serious consideration to the place of rationally conceived and strategically 
pursued competing interests (economic or otherwise), which are often associated with ethnic 
violence, or to the fact of variations in and dormancy of ethnic sentiments and conflicts over 
time (Glazer and Moynihan 1963: Greenberg 1980; Collier and Hoeffler 2000;  Hoeffler 2012; 
Bayart 1993:51).  
As the understanding and acknowledgement of the constructivist and instrumentalist 
dimensions of ethnicity and ethnic violence has grown, thanks to the increased use of more 
reliable historical and empirical modern social sciences research methods in the 1960s and 
beyond, the primordialist view has now come to be regarded as obsolete and superseded.  
The overarching claim of Modernism is that ethnicity and ethnic violence, rather than being 
natural phenomena, are actually socially constructed, and susceptible to being instrumentalised 
for the attainment of some preconceived objectives (Bates 1974; 1983; 1997; Hechter 
1986;1995; Fearon 1994; Chandra 2006). The so-called violent ethnic conflicts are, according 
to the modernist scholars, in fact, not ethnic at the very core. They are rather interest driven, 
rational, and socially constructed for the attainment of some preconceived objectives (Fearon 
1994; 2003). Although ethnic violence may correctly be said to be constructed, there is always 




arbitrarily fabricated in the present and with the full ‘conscious intentionality’ of ethnic conflict 
engineers, especially as the latter makes use of the pre-existing textures of popular and 
emotionally laden ethnic myths/symbols in arousing the ethnic population to collective violent 
action. These pre-existing textures of ethnic materials predate both the constructors of ethnic 
violence and the violent conflict that has been created; and by that very fact could not have 
possibly been wholly an outcome of their rational arrangement or construction. So, there is a 
limit to the hic et nunc construction of ethnic violence as modernist scholars suggest.     
Over-emphasising the rational and intentional construction of ethnic conflict, as modernist 
scholars do, ignores the role of the so-called ‘irrational’ (ethnic myth and passion) in the 
provocation of ethnic violence. Yet, the role of ‘ethnic myths’ in arousing the passion needed 
for the actual onset and persistence of ethnic violence is well known, and persuasively defended 
in the writings of ethnosymbolic scholars. In his article ‘Symbolic Politics or Rational Choice? 
Testing Theories of Extreme Ethnic Violence’, Kaufman (2006),  drawing on the writings of 
experts in cognitive and behavioural psychology, explained how passion, not rationality, 
disposes and motivates people to act; and how ethnic myth is required in arousing these 
sentiments in people, and impels them to act as a collectivity. Similarly, in their respective 
works, Conversi (1995:73-4) and Ozkirimili (2010:168) each acknowledge that although 
violent ethnic conflicts are constructed, their construction relies on the pre-existing textures of 
ethnic myths, memories, values and symbols, solidarity and passion.  So passion, as opposed 
to rationality alone, is required in mobilising ethnic groups to violent action; and any theory 
capable of satisfactorily explaining why violent ethnic conflicts occur and persist ought to be 
able to accommodate the role of ethnic myths and passion (the so-called irrationals) in the 
complex process of the evolution of ethnic violence. The mutually exclusive binaries presented 
by primordialism and modernism do not adequately capture the complex dynamics involved in 
ethnic violent conflicts. A robust theory of ethnic conflict should therefore be able to creatively 
synthesise and combine the relevant logics of existing theoretical explanations of ethnic 
violence in order to offer a more comprehensive account of why ethnic violence occurs and 
persists.  Only in this way could the complex phenomenon of ethnic violence be better 
understood, leading eventually to the development of more adequate conflict resolution 
policies and strategies. Ethnosymbolism accomplishes this objective better than any other 
existing theoretical perspective of ethnic conflict. As Smith (1996:362) observes, 
ethnosymbolism does more than other approaches in explaining the power of myths, values 




in collective ethnic action. Quite unfortunately however, within the context of intellectual 
debates and policy formulations in the Niger Delta, ethnosymbolism is not being used. It is 
missing (research gap) and therefore needs to be introduced (intended research contribution).  
Building on the Kaufmanian ethnosymbolic tradition, this thesis puts forward ethnosymbolism 
as a superior perspective for understanding and solving the problem of violent ethnic 
mobilisation in the Niger Delta.  
Ethnosymbolism as a theoretical approach was initially developed by Young (1976), but 
became increasingly associated with the works of Smith (1980, 1991), Connor (1994) and more 
recently Kaufman (2001; 2006); it is now increasingly preferred as a framework for examining 
violent ethnic conflict scenarios.  
 
Aims and Objectives  
This research project aims primarily to offer a robust explanation of why violent ethnic 
mobilisation has continued to persist in the Niger Delta region despite governmental efforts at 
eradicating it. It seeks to uncover the weaknesses of the strategies hitherto employed in solving 
the problem of ethnic violence in the Niger Delta region, and makes recommendations on how 
these weaknesses may be corrected in order to effectively resolve the regional turmoil.  
The thesis contends that the conflict resolution strategies  hitherto employed the government 
in solving the problem of violent ethnic conflict in the Niger Delta have not been entirely 
successful in delivering the anticipated positive outcomes mainly because they (the strategies) 
derive from inadequate and lopsided theories of ethnic violence that are simply narrow and 
isolating extrapolations from the modernist constructivist and instrumentalist doctrines which 
individually are incapable of adequately explaining or solving the phenomenon of ethnic 
violence. Hence the persistence of ethnic violence in the Niger Delta.  As a way forward, this 
thesis puts forward and defends Ethnosymbolism as the most theoretically appropriate and 
adequate framework for understanding and resolving the enigma of violent ethnic conflicts, 
particularly in the Niger Delta. This is because ethnic conflicts are very complex phenomena 
that are hardly explained or resolved by individually isolating, rather than complementing, 
theories of ethnic violence. A robust theory of violent ethnic conflict ought to combine the 
relevant logics of existing theoretical perspectives of ethnic violence in order to proffer a more 




that policies formulated in accordance with the ethnosymbolic theory proposed here will be 
able to address more effectively and sustainably the problem of violent ethnic mobilisation that 
currently rocks the Niger-Delta region of Nigeria. 
 
Relevance 
Nigeria (the Niger Delta is an integral part of Nigeria) was selected as the focus of our study 
for the following reasons. First, Nigeria is representative of multi-ethnic oil producing states. 
With over 250 identifiable ethnic groups co-habiting within its physical boundaries, albeit 
sometimes uneasily, Nigeria provides a good model for the study of resource-related violent 
ethnic mobilisation in deeply divided societies. Secondly, because of its representativeness, the 
outcome of our investigation can be meaningfully applied both in other African countries and 
beyond them, in countries that have similar concerns or dynamics. Thirdly, the relevance of 
the thesis extends to highlighting the need, not only to recognise the possible impact of 
ethnicity in violent ethnic mobilisation, but also the need to make provisions for this. 
Governments of ethnically divided societies, including Nigeria, tend quite frequently to 
understand ethnic conflicts as rooted only in clashes over interests (economic or otherwise), 
while ignoring the role of ethnicity (ethnic myths, solidarity, passion) as a mobilisation 
principle. This tendency or attitude accounts for why many conflict resolution strategies in 
Nigeria, and in some other African countries, fail to achieve their intended results. Part of the 
relevance of this project therefore lies in its ability to bring this issue to the centre of academic 













The central question that the thesis asks is:  
How may one explain the persistence of violent ethnic mobilisation in the Niger Delta despite 
the Nigerian government’s efforts at eradicating it? 
To properly address this key question, the following sub-questions, which guide the project’s 
investigation, are also raised: 
• Have competing interests played any role in the onset and persistence of the Niger Delta 
violent conflict? (Chapter 4) 
• Have elites played any role(s) in the generation, escalation, and persistence of the Niger 
Delta violent conflict? (Chapter 5)  
• Might have ethnicity, especially ethnic myth/symbol complexes, causally contributed 
to the spiralling and persistence of the Niger Delta violent conflict?  (Chapter 6) 
These sub-questions have been formulated in keeping with the Kaufmanian ethnosymbolic 
theory which inspires and guides the current research project.  According to Kaufman (2001), 
for violent ethnic conflict to occur, the following three conditions are required: clash of 
interests, manipulative elites and ethnic myth-symbol complexes (ethnicity). These elements, 
according to him, interact in a very complex manner to generate and sustain ethnic violence. 
This research upholds this view as valid, and has therefore formulated its research sub-
questions and interview questions accordingly. Ethnosymbolism, as well as the Kaufmanian 
version of it, is discussed throughout the thesis, and in greater detail in the theoretical chapter.  
In this thesis, ethnic conflict is understood as a situation in which two or more actors pursue 
incompatible, yet, from their individual perspectives, entirely just goals. Ethnic conflict is one 
such circumstance - in which the goals of at least one party to the conflict are defined in 
(exclusively) ethnic terms, and in which the primary fault line of the confrontation is one of 






The thesis comprises six substantive chapters. In addition to these are the introduction and 
conclusion which, without doubt, are also essential and integral parts of the entire monograph. 
Below is a brief outline and overview of each chapter.  
 
Thesis title 
Why violent ethnic mobilisations occur and persist: A case study of violent ethnic mobilisation 
in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. 
 
Introduction 
The introductory section of the thesis presents the research overview, problem, question(s), 
aims and objectives, and research gaps, as well as how these will be filled.  
The thesis may be described as an ethnosymbolic investigation into the reasons for the 
occurrence and persistence of violent ethnic mobilisation in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. 
Using the Kaufmanian ethnosymbolic theoretical framework as a guide, it critically examines 
the mechanisms by which ethnic tensions metamorphose into full scale violent confrontations. 
It is in so doing that a more comprehensive understanding of why, to date, governmental efforts 
at eradicating the regional crises have not fully yielded the desired outcomes.   
The principal claim that the thesis makes is that existing explanations for the mobilisation and 
persistence of ethnic violence in the Niger-Delta region of Nigeria are incomprehensive and 
inadequate. They are merely narrow and isolating extrapolations of the modernist constructivist 
and instrumentalist doctrines which individually have been judged insufficient to explain 
holistically why violent ethnic mobilisations occur and persist in the region under study. The 
project contends that a robust theory of violent ethnic conflict ought to combine the logics of 
existing theories in order to proffer a more adequate explanation and solution of this regional 
violent conflict. Ethnosymbolism, the chosen theoretical framework for this project, enables us 
to accomplish just that. Understanding the complex dynamics of politically salient intra-state 
violent conflicts is a necessary precondition for designing appropriate conflict resolution 
strategies. The project therefore makes a positive contribution to political peace processes in 





Chapter 1: theoretical perspectives on violent ethnic mobilisation  
This chapter presents both the conceptual and the theoretical frameworks of the entire thesis. 
Content-wise, it commences by appreciating the fact that violent ethnic mobilisation is one of 
the issues that has gained a great deal of interdisciplinary attention. Psychologists, sociologists 
and political theorists have not only expressed concerned over the enormity of damage done 
and still being perpetrated on humanity by ethnic violence; but have also come up with 
variegated theoretical views on its origins, as well as proposals for its resolution.  Such 
perspectives include ancient hatred, manipulative elites, economic inequality, rational choice 
and instrumentalism amongst others. In this chapter, these doctrines are discussed according to 
the intellectual traditions they fall under, namely, primordialism, modernism and 
ethnosymbolism. An important argument presented in this section is that the ideas championed 
by both the primordialist and modernist schools regarding the causes of ethnic violence tend to 
be mutually polarizing, rather than complementary. However, to attain an adequate 
understanding and explanation of the phenomenon of violent ethnic mobilisation, a theory that 
combines the meaningful logic of already-existing theories is needed. It is for this reason that 
the project adopts the ethnosymbolic theoretical approach which combines the relevant logics 
of existing traditions in order to proffer a more adequate and comprehensive theory of ethnic 
violence in the Niger-Delta region.    
 
Chapter 2: research methodology 
This is the methodology chapter of the thesis. It presents the research method chosen for the 
current project, some justification for the choice, as well as its ethical implications and benefits.    
A case study research design has been chosen for this project. As opined by Yin (2013), this 
method is appropriate for studying real-life situations. The phenomenon of violent ethnic 
mobilisation in the Niger-Delta is one such circumstance. Hence the propriety of the chosen 
case study research design. Within the framework of the chosen methodology, a semi-
structured interview method is favoured as a means of data collection. As opposed to the fixed 
and rigid nature of structured interviews, the semi-structured alternative preferred in this 
project is more flexible. It outlines beforehand the specific questions to be posed, but also 
allows some room for discussing other related and relevant matters that might arise during the 





Chapter 3: the context of violent ethnic mobilisation in the Niger Delta 
This section, which constitutes the background chapter, presents the context of violent ethnic 
mobilisation in the Niger-Delta region, as well as a selective tabular chronological timeline of 
Niger Delta events.  
The Niger-Delta region is situated in the oil rich South-southern part of Nigeria, covering about 
70,000 square kilometres (Ploch 2013). The region contains the largest oil deposit in Africa, 
which is considered one of the world’s best and highly demanded oils due to its low sulphur 
content (Watt et al, 2004). The oil produced in the Niger-Delta region accounts for more than 
93 percent (some would peg it at 95 percent) of Nigeria’s economy. In view of this, the 
economic and geo-strategic relevance of the region is beyond doubt. Paradoxically however, 
this region that is so rich is still, by all parameters of measurement, one of the world’s poorest 
human habitats (Ikein et al 2008; Ikein, 1990; Khan 1994; Watts 2009). The apparent economic 
inequalities between this oil-rich but poor region and other parts of the country have been 
thought to provide, among other factors, a fertile ground for the mobilisation of violent ethnic 
organisations. This chapter presents a narrative of the evolution of a series of ethnic violence 
that has rocked the Niger Delta region for decades, including the efforts hither-to made by 
Nigerian government to eradicate it. The chapter further examines whether or not these efforts 
have yielded the desired results. However, the conclusion reached here is that these efforts have 
not succeeded in yielding the anticipated results, for violent ethnic mobilisation continues to 
occur in the region even after the implementation of the said government strategies.  
 
Chapter 4: interest as a generator of conflict in the Niger Delta 
In any intellectually compelling discourse on violent ethnic mobilisation, ‘interest’ is a very 
important, if not an entirely indispensable concept. Rigorous academic investigations by 
modernist scholars reveal that ‘interest’ plays a vital role in the mobilisation and escalation of 
violent ethnic conflicts (Collier 2002; Horwitz 2000). Kaufman (2001) also does not hesitate 
to affirm that ethnic violence cannot occur unless there is some sort of interest at stake. The 
current chapter not only recognises the validity of these assertions, but equally uses them as a 
guide in its journey towards discovering the main interest at stake in the Niger-Delta’s violent 




main stake in the regional turmoil. This opinion is further strengthened by referring to other 
regions in Nigeria without oil, which in spite of being poor and claiming to be marginalised, 
have not violently mobilised, mainly because there are no valuable resources(interests) worth 
fighting over in their territories.      
 
Chapter 5: manipulative elites and violent ethnic mobilisation in the Niger Delta 
In various scholarly analyses of the mechanisms by which ethnic tensions metamorphose into 
violence, the role of elites is frequently taken into consideration. Proponents of the elite 
manipulation theory of ethnic violence hold that elites are very pivotal in both the escalation 
and de-escalation of violent ethnic conflicts. As observed by Horowitz (2000) and Kaufman 
(2001) amongst others, elites, through some carefully fabricated ethnic rhetorics, arouse 
negative and hostile sentiments in the masses, causing them to violently rise in pursuit of some 
preconceived ethnic interests. Between interest and the escalation of ethnic violence is the 
mediated role of elites. Relying on the credibility of this theory, this chapter critically evaluates 
major violent ethnic conflicts in the Niger-Delta region in order to discover where the actions 
or the inactions of elites have led to the escalation of ethnic violence.  
 
Chapter 6: Ethnicity: a causal factor in the Niger Delta violent conflict? 
One of the most eloquent characteristics of modernist scholars of ethnic violence is their 
tendency to over-emphasise the constructivism, instrumentalism, and rationalism of ethnic 
violence, while downplaying or entirely negating the causal relevance of ethnicity in provoking 
and sustaining ethnic violence. This chapter considers that although the modernist perspective 
is valid, it fails to give a robust account of why ethnic violence occurs and persists, particularly 
in the Niger Delta. Its inability to take seriously the fact that ethnicity is a relevant, and 
indispensable causal factor in violent ethnic mobilisation renders it weak and insufficient to 
explain and provide solutions to violent ethnic conflicts. Following Kaufman (2001) this 
chapter contends that ethnic conflict is a complex phenomenon, and that neither primordialism 
nor modernism (constructivist and instrumentalist arguments), in isolation, is able to 
adequately account for why it occurs and persists. Hence the reason for the chapter’s upholding 
of ethnosymbolism – a theoretical perspective that recognises not only the constructivist and 




ethnic mobilisation. This chapter argues, with concrete historical examples, that ethnicity is 




The primary aim of this project, as earlier stated, was to respond adequately to the question of 
why violent ethnic mobilisation has continued to persist in the Niger-Delta region of Nigeria 
despite governmental efforts to eradicate it. This section presents a synthetic summary of how 
this question has been addressed.  The thesis’ conclusion is that ethnic violence persists in the 
Niger Delta area because of the weakness, lopsidedness and inadequacy of the modernism-
inspired policy strategies hitherto applied in addressing the regional turmoil. It is for this reason 
that the thesis maintains that policies capable of effectively resolving the Niger Delta 
conundrum ought to be inspired by Ethnosymbolism - a theory which combines the relevant 
logics of existing theories of ethnic violence in order to offer a more comprehensive theoretical 
base for understanding, explaining and finding solutions to the problem of violent ethnic 







THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ETHNICITY AND VIOLENT ETHNIC 
MOBILISATION 
 
This section presents both the conceptual and theoretical frameworks for the project.  
I begin here with critical definitions of some of the key concepts employed in the research, 
including ethnicity, ethnic conflict, ethnic mobilisation, and tribe. To reduce semantic 
ambiguities and fully appreciate the purview of the thesis, a proper understanding of the 
meanings of the above-mentioned concepts, as well the senses in which they are employed in 
the research, is necessary and worth elaborating in detail. Before delving fully into the 
conceptualisation of the term ethnicity - a concept that is central to this project, it has been 
judged worthwhile to begin with the clarification of the difference that exists between it 
(ethnicity) and another closely related but biased term: ‘tribe’. Not infrequently, several 
unsuspecting writers, as well as members of the public, use these concepts interchangeably. 
This is due largely to their close definitional resemblance. However, the concepts are not 
identical (Wright 1999; Jenkins 2008; Hounet 2010). In this chapter, I have tried to identify the 
biased, ideological and unscientific origin of the term ‘tribe’ and argued for its replacement 
with a more adequate concept: ethnicity.   
Following the clarification of concepts is a critical evaluation of some of the relevant existing 
theories of violent ethnic mobilisation. This is done in order to carefully select a theory, or 
combination of theories, that best suits the research purpose. As mentioned in the introduction, 
the theoretical approach adopted for the project is Ethnosymbolism - the strand developed by 
Kaufman. This choice is based on its increased acceptance and use in academia as a framework 
that offers a more comprehensive and balanced account of ethnicity and ethnic violence, as 
well as on its ability to clearly and successfully explain the mechanism by which ethnic tensions 
evolve into full scale violent turmoil.  
I turn now to the next section to evaluate the concept of ‘tribe’, presenting an argument for its 





From Tribalism to Ethnicity  
The term ‘tribe’ is a concept that is commonly employed in the analysis and interpretation of 
socio-political affairs in Africa. Its use has become so pervasive and entrenched that many 
Africans now innocently and uncritically speak about themselves in tribal terms. The aim of 
this section is to critically review the term, identify its many biases, and then make a case for 
its jettisoning. 
Etymologically, the term tribe comes from the Latin word tribus , meaning  “[a] group of 
persons forming a community and claiming descent from a common ancestor” (Oxford English 
Dictionary, IX 1933: 339, as cited by Fried 1975: 7). As a concept, it emerged around the period 
of the early formation of the Roman empire.  In its original sense, there is nothing overtly 
troubling or suspicious about it. However, when employed in descriptions of socio-political 
affairs in Africa, the term is rather provocative and objectionable.   
In Africa, the concept of tribe has a colonial origin and is intricately linked with the project of 
colonialism (Nnoli 1978; Thomson 2010; 2016). As rightly observed by Berman (1998), 
colonialism was a bureaucratic apparatus of socio-political and economic domination and 
exploitation, rather than a school of democracy. This was the primary objective of colonialists, 
who did not hesitate to employ whatever measure aided its realisation, no matter how base. 
Describing the colonised people in tribal terms was one of those measures. During this time, 
the term ‘tribe’ was emptied of its original meaning and given a new and derogatory 
connotation that specifically described Africa and their way of life as primitive, uncivilised, 
uncritical and barbarous; as opposed to the European way of life. Franz Fanon (1963: 210) 
notes that such bastardisation of the collective self-image of a people through the perverted 
colonial logic turns to the past of the oppressed people, distorts, disfigures and destroys it. The 
correlation between the bastardised people’s self-worth (collective low self-esteem) and the 
lack of human development and progress is evident in the work of some contemporary scholars 
such as Charles Taylor (1994) and Will Kymlicka (2000) among others.   
Because this thesis recognises that the concept of tribe is a heavily and passionately contested 
concept when speaking or writing about Africa, I have decided that it should be entirely done 
away with in this project. The decision to do so is not entirely new. Earlier, Mamdani (1976) 
had for instance wondered why a small collection of Norwegians and Icelanders were referred 
to as peoples or nations, while larger African collectivities, such as the Hausa-Fulanis or the 




reason. From the time when the use of this term was first challenged, by Franz Fanon in 1966 
and Mamdani in 1979, to date, a host of other scholars such as Wright and et al. (1999),  Jenkins 
(2008) and Thomson (2010) have also joined hands to advocate for the total deletion of the 
concept, especially when speaking or writing about Africa. Understandably, there might still 
be a number of individuals who innocently employ the term in its original and non-ideological 
sense; and who may still want to retain the intellectual liberty to continue to use it. However, 
in order to avoid semantic ambiguities and unnecessary tensions associated with the term, it is 
preferable to abandon its usage altogether. There was certainly a time, as Mamdani (1976: 3) 
observed ‘…when the word possessed a scientific content, when it characterised those social 
formations that did not possess a state - the communal, classless societies, as for example, the 
Germanic tribes’. But today, with the twisted and ideological use of the term by the colonialists 
or neo-colonialists in derogatorily describing African affairs and people, the term has lost its 
‘scientificity’, and there is now a good case for jettisoning and replacing it with a more 
scientifically appropriate concept: ethnicity. The latter, unlike the term ‘tribe’, is deemed more 
appropriate because it is bound neither by space nor time. It non-discriminatorily captures the 
socio-political and cultural dynamics that are universally observable among peoples. Inter-
group conflict, which was one of the reasons why Africans were once disparaged and labelled 
as tribal by the colonialists, is equally empirically observable in the France’s Basque, amongst 
the Catalans of Spain and in the uneasiness existing between the Welsh, Scottish and English 
in the United Kingdom, but the term tribe has for instance not been extended to descriptions of 
these European groups and their states of affairs. For this reason, the use of the term tribe is 
worth abandoning, and will in fact not be used in this project, which investigates the drivers of 
violent conflicts in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.  
Having presented in the foregoing some arguments in favour of the concept of ethnicity rather 
than tribe, it is worthwhile that the next section be preoccupied with the elucidation of the 
concept of ethnicity.  This concept is central to the project, and therefore deserves elaborate 
consideration.  
 
Ethnicity: etymology and usage 
The term ethnicity has a very rich history. Its most visible academic relevance emerged in the 
early 19th century (Gabbert 2006). Etymologically, the concept comes from the Greek word 




nation (Stone 1996) or a collectivity of human beings living and acting together (Hutchinson 
and Smith, 1996). In French, the Greek noun ethnikos and its adjective ethnos survive as ethnie 
and ethnique respectively. The English language has no corresponding terms for ethnos 
(ethnie), but scholars commonly translate it as: ethnic community or ethnic group (Hutchinson 
and Smith 1996: 3) – and this is the sense in which it is used in this thesis. The term ethnicity  
is relatively recent. Its first recorded appearance in English was in the Oxford Advanced 
Learners Dictionary of 1953 (Hutchinson and Smith 1996: 4; Mann 1983). One of the earliest 
articles in this category states: ‘ethnicity seems to be a new term’ (Glazer and Moynihan 1975: 
1). Although the term itself is quite new, the idea of common kinship, group solidarity and 
common culture to which it refers is old.  Ethnicity has always been, and still remains, one of 
the basic modes of human association and interaction (Hutchinson and Smith 1996: 3).  
The sense in which the term ethnos (ethnic group) is used has evolved radically throughout 
history. In ancient Greece, it was originally used to refer to non-Jewish pagans or non-
Christians. At the same time, it was also used in other senses, to refer for instance to hetarion: 
a band of friends; ethnos Lukion: a tribe of Lycians; and ethnos melisson: a swarm of bees or 
birds (Hutchinson and Smith, 1996: 4). In the nineteenth century, ethnos acquired some racial 
characteristics, and was used in the twentieth century to refer to immigrants to the United States 
of America other than people of Northern or Western European descent (Eriksen 2010: 3-4), 
although the reason for this lacuna is unclear. Obviously, explanations for this are likely to vary 
from one individual to another. But for the sake of scientificity, and in keeping with Mamdani’s 
argument above, one would have anticipated that the use of the term be extended to these others 
as well, that is, immigrants who were not of Western European descent.  
The 1960s was also a period marked by the consolidation of the process of decolonisation in 
Africa and Asia as numerous new nations were created.  Ethnos or ethnie became, during this 
epoch, a novel vocabulary used to designate a socio-political unit whose members were related 
by kinship ties.  It was the efforts of anthropologists, mostly Europeans, to make sense of types 
of socio-cultural formations in Africa and Asia, that led to the term’s rise in prominence within 
the disciplines of the social sciences (Eade 1996: 58).  
From the foregoing, it is evident that the term has been employed in a plurality of senses. Not 
even in the Greek setting from where the concept originated was it employed in a univocal 
sense; and scholars do not hesitate to acknowledge this definitional conundrum. Kiwuwa 




concept. Tonkins et al (1989: 11) also points out that the term suffers from conceptual elasticity 
covering a wide range of ideas, thus rendering it a catch-all phrase for social features and 
organisations such as language, religion, customs, castes, culture and race. Currently, the 
concept languishes between both polysemy- a multiplicity of definitions - and synonymy – 
enjoying a similarity of meaning to other terms such as ‘race’ and ‘caste’ (Green 2006:2). All 
this makes the concept semantically ambiguous. For this reason, it is important to delimit how 
the term is understood and employed in this thesis.    
This research project does not pretend to be capable of immediately resolving the definitional 
enigma that has existed for centuries. Although meaningful attempts in this direction will not 
be entirely excluded, the primary task at this point is to carefully examine various academic 
definitions of the concept and in carefully selecting one, or some combination of them, that is 
most suitable for our research purposes. In the pages that follow, some important competing 
definitions of the concept of ethnicity will be presented.  
 
Ethnicity: academic definitions 
There is a fairly large number of definitions of the concept of ethnicity. However, I shall 
commence here by presenting and comparing some of those that are widely used in academic 
literature, beginning with the most influential definition, that of Max Weber. For the latter, 
‘Ethnic groups are those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common 
descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories 
of colonization or migration; this belief must be important for the propagation of group 
formation; conversely, it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists’  
(Weber 1968: 389, cited in Hutchinson and Smith 1996:35). 
For Horowitz, ‘ethnicity is based on a myth of collective ancestry, which usually carries with 
it traits believed to be innate. Some notion of ascription, however diluted, and affinity deriving 
from it are inseparable from the concept of ethnicity’ (Horowitz 1985: 52).  
For Smith and Hutchinson (1996: 6), an ethnic group is a named human population with myths 
of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more elements of common culture, a 




Fearon and Laitin (2000: 20) define an ethnic group as ‘a group larger than a family for which 
membership is reckoned primarily by descent, is conceptually autonomous, and has a 
conventionally recognised natural history as a group’.  
Some of the key elements that figure in the above definitions are common ancestry or descent, 
collective historical experience and memories of it, common culture, conceptual autonomy. Of 
all these, however, the idea of common ancestry or descent seems to be the most important, 
and all the definitions above felt the need to capture it. What varies only relates to how this 
combines with other elements in defining the concept of ethnicity. Now, given the apparent 
pertinence of this notion of common ancestry, it is important to clarify how it is understood 
and employed in this project.  
Does common ancestry simply mean the traceability of members of an ethnic group to the same 
biological ancestral stock? From what we currently know about ethnic groups, this is unlikely 
to be the case, for ethnicity incorporates a wide range of individuals far too large and complex 
to make it possible to trace them back to a single ancestral tree. In the US and UK for instance, 
blacks are grouped as an ethnicity, even though the designation incorporates individuals from 
Nigeria, Ghana, Jamaica, and the Caribbean (amongst others) with far distant ties (Chandra 
2006). To this effect, common ancestry ought not to be understood in the strict sense of 
consanguinity as primordialist scholars such as Shills (1957) and Gertz (1963) do. This is 
perhaps why the addition of the term ‘myth’ by Horowitz (Horowitz 1985: 52) and Smith and 
Hutchinson (1996:6) in their definitions of ethnicity presented above is very important. It at 
least shows that imagined, rather than historically factual, common descent or ancestry is a 
more reasonable way of understanding this feature of an ethnic group or ethnicity.   
The importance of origin or descent lies in the fact that it helps us, together with another closely 
related concept – culture -  to distinguish an ethnic group from association with class, which 
has to do with the economic position of individuals in the process of production. The main 
criteria for class membership, for instance, is neither origin nor culture, but one’s position in 
the complex system of production (Gabbert 1992: 32-44). In this project, the concept of 
ethnicity does not imply the idea of class, although I do appreciate the fact that occasionally, 
both ethnicity and class could coincide in an ethnically plural society. Here, however,  they are 
treated as distinct concepts.   
Another concern that deserves some attention here concerns how ethnicity can be distinguished 




common descent as an indispensable feature of their definitions. To clarify this, I have found 
the opinion of Gabbert (2006: 88) quite helpful, at least in initiating the discussion. The latter 
opines that ‘only categories that are related to the idea of common descent, and integrate several 
families and kin groups should be referred to as ethnic’. However, the problem with this view 
is that the concept of nation also incorporates these. Like ethnicity, nations are imagined 
communities (Anderson 19991; 2016). They both incorporate smaller socio-cultural categories 
such as extended families and kinship groups and local communities. This therefore brings up 
a fresh need to further contradistinguish the concepts of nation and ethnic group.  One 
distinguishing feature, and perhaps the only one that is widely alluded to in influential scholarly 
definitions of the concept of nation, is the idea of a people desiring political autonomy for and 
by its members. Nationalism is a political project of self-determination. As Mill (1861) states 
(among other things) nationalists desire to be under the same government which is ruled either 
‘by themselves or a portion of themselves’. This import is equally present in definitions given 
by Haas (1986), Smith (1991), Nodia (1994), and Barrington (1997). An ethnic group on the 
contrary does not seek political independence from the state, of which it is a constituent part. 
In this lies the difference between a nation and an ethnic group. In this thesis, this is the sense 
in which the difference between a nation and an ethnic group is understood and communicated.     
In the foregoing, I have dwelt much on clarifying the manner in which the concept of ethnicity 
is understood and employed in this thesis; as well as how it differs from other similar concepts 
such as nations, kinship groups and class. In what follows, I determine which of the definitions 
of ethnicity above, or combination of them, will be adopted as the most suitable for the project.  
Of all the definitions of ethnicity outlined above, the one put forth by Smith and Hutchinson 
has been selected as the most appropriate in the context of this research. This is because it 
embraces and integrates all the important elements found in other definitions. But unlike them, 
it goes further to include the following features which capture and describe the characteristics 
of the ethnic groups of the Niger Delta (which this research project investigates) such as: name, 
culture, myth of common origin, homeland, sense of solidarity. The ethnic groups we are 
investigating have definite names, myths that make reference to common descent, and some 
collective historical experiences, including the socio-political and economic marginalisation 
they have collectively endured. All these contribute to giving them a sense of solidarity as a 
people, making it easier for them to mobilise more easily for collective ethnic action. This 
ability to mobilise is further facilitated by the fact that they occupy a specific geographical 




mobilisation to occur. No other definition captures these features better than the one produced 
by Smith and Hutchinson (1996: 6). This therefore renders it more comprehensive. It is because 
of its comprehensiveness and ‘greater completeness’ that it has been chosen as the standard 
definition of ethnicity for this project.   
Another important concept worthy of consideration at this point is that of ‘ethnic conflict’. This 
concept is defined in the next section, and the sense in which it is employed in this project is 
explained.  
 
Ethnic Conflict   
The term ‘ethnic conflict’ is at the centre of the project. Following Horowitz (2000), this thesis 
recognises that although ethnicity is community-building on the one hand, it could also be a 
source of tension and conflict within an ethnically plural and deeply divided society such as 
Nigeria on the other. However, the interest at this point is not in the positive impact of ethnicity 
(though this is not entirely ignored), but rather in the polarization and conflicts that it 
sometimes enables.   
Before proceeding with the elucidation of the concept of ‘ethnic conflict’, it is important to 
clear up some confusions often associated with the term. Ethnic contestations are not 
necessarily about ethnicity. By this I mean that ethnicity is not the ultimate irreducible 
generator of conflicts of an ethnic sort (Brubaker and Laitin 1998: 425). Although ethnicity 
often forms part of the explanation for any conflict rightly considered as ethnic, there is hardly 
any turmoil that is entirely reducible to ethnicity as its ultimate and sole cause. Analysis of civil 
wars that took place between 1945 and 1999 has shown that ethnic or religious diversity does 
not necessarily render a society susceptible to large scale violence (Fearon and Laitin 2003; 
Esman 2004: 6). This corroborates the hypotheses that ethnic plurality is not an indispensable 
condition for conflict. Most inter-ethnic relations have been and continue to be conducted 
peacefully. Even when ethnies harbour grievances against one another, governments and 
political leaders have often tried to manage the situations in a very pacific manner, so that 
tensions do not escalate into violent confrontations between ethnic groups. Instances from 
Tanzania, Switzerland and Canada, amongst other ethnically plural societies, testify to the fact 




that does not terminate in violent confrontations or civil wars (Esman 2004). We now turn to 
the definition of the term ‘ethnic conflict’. 
The term conflict, generically speaking, denotes a situation in which two or more actors pursue 
incompatible, yet, from their individual perspectives, entirely just goals. Ethnic conflict is one 
of such circumstances - that in which the goals of at least one conflict party are defined in 
(exclusively) ethnic terms, and in which the primary fault line of confrontation is one of ethnic 
distinctions (Cordell and Wolff 2010). A similar definition is found in Crawford and Lipschutz 
(2000) who state, though in a loose sense, that ethnic conflicts are political or social violent 
confrontations involving one or more groups that are identified by some marker of ethnic 
identity. In ethnic conflicts, at least one of the conflicting parties refers to its distinct ethnic 
identity as being the reason for marginalisation, exclusion, or denial of rights and privileges. 
Hence ethnic conflict is a form of group conflict, except that at least one party in the conflict 
expresses its dissatisfaction in ethnic terms (Cordell and Wolff 2010). In political science 
discourses, conflict is generically understood to refer to competition among groups for power, 
resources, opportunities, status, or respect, competition that is usually pursued and adjusted by 
peaceful means, but may under some circumstances turn violent (Esman 2004: 6; Varshney 
2007). Accordingly, a distinction is therefore made between violent and nonviolent conflicts. 
Our concern here however is with violent ethnic conflict; that is, those ethnic tensions that have 
evolved into violence. This is the sense in which the term will be employed throughout the 
project, and the thesis will look at why and how ethnic groups in the Niger Delta region of 
Nigeria have resorted to systematic, strategic, and sustained use of violence to pursue their 
objectives. This precludes random riots, even if they are intense and demonstrate the grievances 
of a particular ethnic group.  
The foregoing has dwelt extensively on conceptualising, analysing and defining some of the 
major concepts employed in the research. In the next section, the question of whether or not 
ethnicity matters is briefly examined.  
 
Does Ethnicity Matter?  
There is a close relationship between ethnicity and politics (Thomson 2010). In Africa, but also 
in many other parts of the world, ethnicity often intrudes into politics. In contemporary Nigeria, 




than in national terms.  Such identification carries a number of political consequences, as both 
children and adult are socialised or simply taught to give preference to people of the same 
ethnic background, not only during elections, but also in other social and bureaucratic dealings, 
over those of different ethnic origins (Osaghae and Suberu 2005; Price 1973: 470-75; Klineberg 
and Zavalloni 1969: 131; Horowitz, 2000: 6). In deeply divided societies such as Nigeria, 
ethnic allegiances have an enormous impact on a number of issues such as employment, 
political appointments, development plans, and education and business polices, amongst others 
(Horowitz 2000: 8).  This discrimination on the basis of ethnicity poses a number of challenges 
to the internal cohesion of the state as well as to citizens’ relationships with one another 
(Diamond 1988). This line of argument is discussed in more detail in chapters 5 and 6, below. 
In view of all these, one cannot but say that ethnicity does matter. This said, there is however 
a need for some clarification. Although ethnicity, as has just been mentioned, does matter, it 
should not be seen as an independent variable. As rightly observed by Brubaker and Laitin 
(1998: 425), and later by Cordell and Wolf (2010), there is hardly any ethnic action, individual 
or collective, that is entirely reducible to the fact of ethnicity itself, even if the latter generally 
forms part of the explanation. This clarification is important for this project, to avoid focusing 
entirely on ethnicity, as if it is all that matters. Other variables, such as interests and 
manipulative elites, are equally relevant in explaining political affairs. Chapters 4 and 5 deal 
with this issue in greater detail. In the work of Mugabane (1969), Sklar (1967), Diamond (1988) 
and more recently Chabal and Daloz (2000) the role of ethnic elites in the construction and 
instrumentalisation of ethnicity for personal gain is well explained. This leaves us with the 
conclusion that ethnicity matters, but alongside other variables, in explaining a wide range of 
political issues, of which violent ethnic mobilisation in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. 
Having explained some of the relevant key concepts, and considered in what ways ethnicity 
may be said to matter, this chapter next examines theories of violent ethnic mobilisation. The 
aim is to assess the extent to which each offers an adequate explanation, in order to determine 
which theory, or which combination of theories, is best suited for the purpose of this research.  
 
Competing Theories of Violent Ethnic Mobilisation 
Following Olzak (1983), this thesis defines violent ethnic mobilisation as the process through 
which groups organise around some features of ethnicity such as custom, myths of common 




proceeding, it might be helpful to mention that Olzak’s original definition does not include the 
word ‘violent’. I have added it. Olzak’s original intention, it seems, was simply to define 
mobilisation in a generic way and there is nothing wrong with that. However, for research 
whose primary interest is to investigate the subject of violent ethnic mobilisation in the Niger 
Delta region of Nigeria, the inclusion of the qualifying adjective ‘violent’ will help, even if 
marginally, to focus the definition on the current context. It is for this reason that the qualifying 
adjective ‘violent’ has been purposively inserted in the definition.  Furthermore, although the 
term ‘mobilisation’ has also been defined by other scholars such as Johnson (2007) and 
Vermeersch (2010; 2011), amongst others, analysis of their definitions shows that they do not 
differ in any substantial way from that provided earlier by Olzak. I have therefore chosen to 
retain the above-stated definition, which draws almost entirely on Olzak’s.  
Having provided a quick definition of what is meant by mobilisation, in what follows, I will 
outline prevalent academic theories of violent ethnic mobilisation which include, but are  not 
limited to the following: ancient hatred, manipulative elites, economic inequality, rational 
choice and instrumentalism, amongst others. These are discussed below, under the categories 
of the schools of thought they fall into. The core argument presented here is that ideas 
championed by the primordialist and modernist schools regarding the causes of ethnic violence 
tend to be mutually polarizing, rather than complementary. But for an adequate understanding 
and explanation of the phenomenon of violent ethnic mobilisation, a theory that combines the 
meaningful logics or elements of existing traditions is needed. It is for this reason that this 
project adopts Ethnosymbolism - a theoretical approach that combines the logics of hitherto 
existing traditions to proffer a more adequate and comprehensive theory of ethnic violence. 
The following section is devoted to the appraisal of competing theories of violent ethnic 
mobilisation with the aim of selecting the one, or the combination, most appropriate for this 
research investigation.  
 
Primordialism (Ancient Hatred) 
The earliest theoretical attempt to explain the phenomenon of violent ethnic mobilisation is the 
ancient hatred doctrine which holds that ethnic groups fight one another due to some firmly 
established, fixed and inflexible differences based on biological descent or ancestry (Varshney 




The overarching claim of primordialism is that ethnic identity is congenitally acquired. It is a 
given over which an individual has no power as it is supposedly based on the fact of nativity 
and not on social construction. According to the logic of this claim, ethnicity, naturally and 
inevitably, links people of the same ancestry, separating them and their way of life from those 
of different ancestral stock and the reason for this centripetal tendency is attributed to nature 
itself and not to social engineering. As Geertz (1963: 109-10) observes, one is bound to and 
cares for one’s kinsmen, one’s neighbours, one’s fellow believers as a result not merely of 
interest, or incurred obligation, but in great part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute 
import attributed to the very tie itself. It is therefore argued that this natural tendency to stick 
with and care for those of the same blood relationship (ingroup) inevitably generates the 
awareness of another group or groups (outgroup) to which it stands in opposition, and with 
which it clashes, as these groups pursue or try to protect their overlapping interests. In the final 
analyses, the basic submission here is that ethnic differentiation as well conflicts that arise as 
a result, are natural, inevitable and ineradicable (Geertz 1963).    
Before the second half of the 20th century, Primordialism was the dominant intellectual 
approach for studying the subject of ethnicity and its related conflicts. Although Shills (1957) 
and Geertz (1963) are among the prominent and easily identified scholars of the primordialist 
tradition, elements of this trend of thought are equally present in the writings of earlier scholars 
such as Hobbes (1651), Rousseau(1762) and Sieyes(1789). The primordial notion of the 
naturalness and ineradicability of ethnic conflict is for instance captured in Leviathan where 
Hobbes (1651) inductively locates the roots of politically salient violence, ethnic or otherwise, 
in the very nature of man. For him, human beings (whether as individuals or as groups) are 
selfish by nature, and always clashing with one another over overlapping selfish interests. 
Where violent conflicts have not escalated, it is simply because of the existence of a strong 
state which represses the natural human inclination to violence, Hobbes argues. Undoubtedly, 
the propriety, or not, of Hobbes’ opinion could be still further explored; the important thing at 
this stage is merely to point out how pervasive and dominant was the naturalistic or primordial 
view of conflict prior to the second half of 20th century. Although neither Hobbes (1651), 
Rousseau (1762) nor Sieyes (1789) conspicuously identified as primordialist, the primordialist 
notion that favours the formation of political blocs on the basis of natural or ancestral contiguity 
is particularly expressed in the writings of the last two. Both advocated for humanity’s return 
to the original or primordial state of nature as a way of fleeing urban corruption and recovering 




conflicts and the restoration of socio-political calm. In his work Le Tiers Etat, Sieyes (1789) 
expressly mentioned that nations (ethnic groups) are natural and primordial communities, 
which obviously precludes the idea of nations or ethnic groups as socially constructed realities 
as the modernist scholars hold. By 1790, this primordialist idea was already being used to 
justify both the absolute sovereignty of the people’s will and of the inward-looking crude and 
extreme right-wing form of nationalism that set ethno-nationalist groups against one another 
in Europe (Smith 2001).  
Similarly, the earliest scholarly approach to the study of interethnic relations and conflicts in 
Africa before the advent of modern historical research methods in the last six decades was 
predominantly primordialist. It is perhaps quite normal to anticipate this, as the crop of scholars 
writing on the subject at the time were European anthropologists who were heavily influenced 
by the prevalent primordialist tradition of their time (Berman 1998; Ukiwo 2005). Ethnic 
groups or ‘tribes’, that is, the presumed basic political units in Africa were, according to the 
colonial anthropologists, formed on the basis of natural ancestral descent. They claimed that it 
is that natural and irrational instinctual pull that impels one to care more for blood relations 
that causes Africans to violently mobilise along ethnic lines and not on the basis of some 
rational calculus (Berman 1998; Thomson 2010; 2016). The implication of this baseless claim 
is that ethnic group rivalry in Africa (Nigeria and its Niger Delta region inclusive) are ancient, 
immemorial, and naturally part of who Africans are. Media or popular reports on inter-ethnic 
confrontations in Africa are therefore supposed to be self-explanatory. No further reason is 
required, for it is quite natural and normal to expect that ethnic groups will clash from time to 
time. This project is not satisfied with this over simplistic, biased and unfounded speculation 
that is easily refuted by simply making reference to more reliable, empirically-based modernist 
historical research, which reveals that struggles over interests were always a key factor in 
premodern African interethnic violent confrontations, just like anywhere else in the world 
(Berman 1998; Nnoli 1980; 2003).  The limitations of primordialism and its ancient hatred 
doctrine is manifold. Below I shall outline and briefly discuss some of the primary issues for 
which they are criticised and derided. The first concerns the fallacy of consanguinity or 
biological common ancestry. The second has to do with the assumed fixity and ineradicability 
of ethnic conflict. The third relates to the claim that ethnic passion and solidarity originate from 
natural instincts, rather than from rational calculus or social construction.  
First, primordialism gives the impression that members of an ethnic group are traceable, even 




know about ethnic groups does not support this. Many ethnic groups contain people whose 
population is far too large and diverse to be traced to single ancestry (Johnson 2005; Chandra 
2006; Gabbert 2006). In the US and in the UK for instance, the word ethnicity is used to refer 
to immigrants, such as blacks, even if they have, for instance, originated from Jamaica, Nigeria, 
Haiti or the Caribbean. Even if all of them did originate from a single ancestral stock, there is 
at the moment no way of establishing that. It remains a baseless myth. For this reason, it is 
therefore better to avoid affirming with certainty, as primordialists tend to do, that which is yet 
to be verified.  Anderson (1983; 1991; 2006) quite understands this enigma and has chosen to 
refer to an ethnic group as an imagined community. It is perhaps also for a similar reason that 
Smith and Hutchinson (1996), whose definition of ethnicity we are using, refer to the idea of 
common ancestral ethnic descent as a myth.  
The second issue with primordialism, which relates to the eternal presence or ineradicability of 
ethnic violence, can also be refuted and rejected for its inability to offer reasonable 
explanations, either for the dormancy and variety of ethnic sentiments and conflicts over time, 
or for the complete disappearance of many ethnic identities and conflicts within most modern 
and advanced societies (Bayart 1993: 51). A large number of inter-ethnic relations has been, 
and continues to be, conducted peacefully in many ethnically plural modern societies. Even 
when ethnies harboured grievances against one another, governments and political leaders have 
in many instances managed the situations in a very pacific way (Esman 2004). So, ethnic 
violence as understood in this thesis is not ineradicable. Logically speaking, violence 
presupposes the existence, previously, of peace.  
Another problem with primordialism relates to its claim that peoples’ desire for solidarity with 
their ethnic group (especially when a collective ethnic action, such as violent mobilisation is 
deemed necessary) has its basis in that natural human instinct which impels them to unite with 
and care more for those of a blood relationship, as opposed to those who are not, rather than in 
interests or rational calculus. This claim has long been heavily criticised for neglecting the 
economic and political interests that are often associated with ethnic sentiments, practices and 
conflicts (Glazer and Moynihan 1963; Greenberg 1980). Some critics have argued that ethnic 
feelings in fact arise out of specific historic-social conditions; and that primordial sentiments 
have to be elicited by some sort of experience, and are therefore tied rationally to 
circumstances, which means that they could change as the circumstances to which they are tied 
change (Kiwuwa 2012:11).  The conclusion of the World Bank funded investigation carried 




(intended and potentially realizable interests), rather than grievance (mere passion), has more 
explanatory power in accounting for why people mobilise violently along ethnic lines.  Even if 
Collier and Hoeffler’s research has been criticised for making a universal claim based on 
limited empirical investigation, it is still widely acknowledged as credible research 
corroborated by common experiences in ethnic violence scenarios.    
 
Modernist Theories (Instrumentalism and Constructivism) 
With the increased use of more reliable modernist social science research methods during the 
1960s, the focus of academic debates shifted towards questioning the relationship between 
ethnicity and modernisation. The dilemma during this period was to determine whether 
ethnicity, and its related conflicts were primordial, immemorial and even altruistic 
(MacLaughlin 2001:5); or socially constructed and functional. Modernist scholars conclude 
that ethnic identities, boundaries, and ethnic conflicts, are neither natural, fixed nor unalterable 
realities as the primordialists hold. They are rather malleable, and quite frequently readapt to 
socio-political and economic pressures. This view is well articulated by Billig (1995) who 
states that ethnicity and ethnic violence are constructed realities of modern times that serve 
some preconceived beneficial ends of ethnic elites.  Implicit in Billig’s assertion are two 
distinct elements: constructivist and instrumentalist features, corresponding to the following 
schools of thought: Constructivism and Instrumentalism respectively.  
Instrumentalism, as the name implies, is the view that ethnicity is an instrument or a strategic 
tool for the attaining benefits of some sort (Duran 1974: 43; Lonsdale 1992; Kiwuwa 2012: 
12).  According to Glazer and Moynihan (1979), ethnicity is not just a mix of affective 
sentiments, but like class and nationality, is a means of political mobilisation for advancing 
personal and group interests. The influential empirical research carried out by Collier and 
Hoeffler (2001) goes in the same direction. Its findings suggest that people mobilise to violence 
along ethnic lines due more to the economic benefits accruable than from sheer grievance, and 
that countries with lootable natural resources run more risk of ethnic violence than those that 
have none.   
Instrumentalism is closely linked with Constructivism. Following Chandra (2004), this thesis 
argues that it is simply a question of which of the two should be given greater emphasis. The 




(constructivism) lays greater emphasis on ethnicity and ethnic conflicts as actively and 
humanly constructed realities. But a reality so constructed, it should be noted, is not just for its 
own sake. It is always in view of some other ends.  In this sense, there may be a case for 
subsuming instrumentalism under constructivism. This is what Chandra (2004) has done, even 
if some authors still keep the distinction, perhaps for the sake of increased clarity. In any case, 
a deduction from the foregoing shows that for both the constructivist and instrumentalist 
schools, ethnic conflicts are the outcome of rational human operations (construction) and are 
functional (Bates 1974; 1983; 1997; Hechter 1986; 1995; Fearon 1994; Chandra 2004).   
Over the years, modernist scholars have, in an attempt to shed more light on the origins of 
violent ethnic mobilisation, come up with a number of competing theories. Some of these are 
considered below, beginning with economic inequality theory.  
The economic inequality explanation for violent ethnic conflict, which is often associated with 
the work of Hechter (1975), holds that violent ethnic conflicts result from socio-economic 
inequalities existing between different ethnic blocs within an ethnically plural society. This 
unevenness, perceived or actual, generates grievances within the disadvantaged ethnic 
community, and when not properly managed spirals into violence. Some of the well-researched 
documents on the causes of violent ethnic mobilisation in the Niger Delta make reference to a 
long-standing economic marginalisation of the region as the main driver of conflict in the area. 
But this claim does not explain why ethnic violence has not spiralled in other economically 
disadvantaged ethnic groups within the country. Nigeria has over 300 identifiable ethnic groups 
(Salawu 2010), most of which complain about being economically marginalised, yet, unlike 
the Niger Delta region, have not mobilised to ethnic violence despite their grievances. In view 
of this, this thesis assumes that there is more to the question of violent ethnic mobilisation in 
the Niger Delta region than can be adequately answered using the economic inequality 
argument. Hence the need for a more suitable theoretical framework for the research. 
Manipulative elite theory represents another explanatory effort. This theory, which rightly 
belongs to the instrumentalist school of thought, holds that ethnic conflict is the outcome of 
elites’ instrumentalisation and strategic manipulation of ethnicity for egoistic political and 
economic ends (Bates 1974; 1983; Hechter 1986; Chandra 2004). In fact, elites and ethnic 
entrepreneurs actively orchestrate violent ethnic conflict insofar as it is politically and 
economically rewarding for them (Brass 1997:26). That elites usually play significant 




especially for their own selfish interests, is not usually questioned among scholars. This, 
however, does not immediately explain why followers are drawn into the struggle if benefits 
flow only to the elites (Horowitz 1998). It might be suggested that followers are not aware that 
they are being manipulated. But again, this needs proof. Some have argued that it abnormal to 
expect rational adults to become part of extreme violent contestations, if they occasionally risk 
their own lives in doing so, without any particular objective or interest. For this reason, elite 
manipulation theory has been criticised for wrongly painting a picture of ‘evil politicians and 
innocent masses’ (Kakar 1996: 150) without taking into consideration the fact that individual 
participants in a conflict might also be doing so for some personal gain (Pandey 1992: 41). This 
theory is therefore not sufficient to explain the involvement of masses in the Niger Delta’s 
violent mobilisation. A more comprehensive one is there needed.   
Institutionalism is another dominant perspective on the origins of violent ethnic conflicts. This 
perspective holds that the form of administrative design used in the governance of a state is of 
paramount importance in explaining why some ethnically plural societies have conflicts and 
others do not (Varshney 2005). The administrative pattern suitable for governing non-
ethnically divided societies might prove ineffective in administering those that are. Arbitrary 
replication of institutional forms, Berman (1998) suggests, is one of the reasons why ethnic 
conflict is still prevalent in Africa (of which Nigeria is part). Most African countries, he claims, 
have not been able to successfully change colonial administrative structures which, far from 
being democratic, were veritable instruments for the economic exploitation of the colonized 
countries. But then, Nigeria as a country has tried different institutional designs, starting from 
Westminster parliamentary style, to the American presidential system of governance that it 
currently practices. Not to mention the fact that it has also been ruled with the iron fists of 
military dictators. Through all these regimes, the Niger Delta region has remained a zone of 
conflict. Not even the despotic military rulers succeeded fully in eradicating regional violent 
conflict. Currently, there are agitations by the Niger Deltans for an institutional design that 
allows each region to control their own resources. This, they believe, would bring an end to the 
conflict. Experts are however not fully convinced that this would be the case unless corruption 
and clientelism are stamped out - as these misdemeanours are capable of rendering even the 
most suitable institutional design ineffective. Faulty Institutional design is therefore not 
entirely to blame for the eruption and persistence of violent ethnic conflict in the Niger Delta. 
Even if the institutional design were faulty, it could still be reformed without necessarily 




Another explanatory perspective on the origins of ethnic violence is the ‘security dilemma’ 
theory. This view, associated with Posen (1993), is a version of rational choice theory. 
Generally, the latter holds that people mobilise to ethnic violence or war by calculating its 
profitableness. The assumption that profit maximisation is the reason for group’s action fills 
inter-ethnic relations with suspicions, insecurity and fear that arise from not being certain about 
the real motive behind an ethnic group’s action. Psychologically, this uncertainty forces each 
group to become vigilant, readying itself to ward off any unprecedented form of oppression, 
exploitation or assault. Sometimes, this need to remain vigilant may necessitate some pre-
emptive attacks. Such mutual hyper-alertness and obsessive reinforcement of ethnic security 
measures heightens interethnic tensions and eventually, the spiralling of ethnic violence (de 
Figueiredo and Weingast 1999; Fearon 1994; Hechter 1995; Lake and Rothchild 1996; Posen 
1993). The Nigerian government’s threat to use military action to enforce tranquillity and order 
in the Niger Delta region has contributed to the increase in the number of sophisticated 
ammunitions hoarded by the Niger Delta militants. They do this in order to stand a good chance 
of resisting the federal forces should they insist on using repressive military might as a means 
of resolving the conflict. Although it could reasonably be contended that the security dilemma 
theory offers some useful explanations of the escalation and persistence violent ethnic 
mobilisation in the region under review, it also has flaws. Its critiques have for instance argued 
that feelings of insecurity or fear are not sufficient to trigger an organised and sustained violent 
confrontation; not even the most extreme form of fear is capable of so doing. For violence to 
ensue, the strategic, organisational and motivational roles of elites are required. The public 
needs to be convinced, through strategic, provocative and purposive elite discourses, that their 
lives as a people are in real danger of being completely obliterated, and that war, or an 
organised military-like collective ethnic response, is therefore necessary as a means to 
withstand external aggressors (Kaufman 2001; 2006). Because of its limitations, this theory 
has not been considered a sufficient theoretical base for this research, even if its partial 
relevance is still acknowledged.    
 
The Insufficiency of Existing Theories and the Adequacy of Ethnosymbolism 
One thing that comes out clearly in the evaluation of the explanatory powers of the theories of 
violent ethnic conflict discussed above is that each of them has something useful to offer, but 




constructivism and instrumentalism, have been found to offer substantive or entirely sufficient 
and comprehensive accounts of why violent ethnic mobilisation occurs. What is lacking, and 
therefore required, is a theory that combines the explanatory logics of all these theories in order 
to offer a more robust and comprehensively adequate explanation for why violent ethnic 
confrontations occur and persist.  This thesis agrees with Kaufman (2001; 2006), that ethnic 
conflict is a complex phenomenon and requires a more dynamic and a more encompassing 
theoretical approach.  
Enquiries into the locus of our research: the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, reveal the existence 
of a similar conundrum; for the theories hitherto employed in explaining and resolving the 
problem of violent ethnic mobilisation in the region are relevant but individually isolating and 
insufficient. Scholars, international NGOs and other agencies charged with the task of 
formulating policies on violent ethnic conflict resolution in Africa are, to a very large extent, 
culpable for the subsistence of this problem; the policy guidelines and directions they provide 
draw extensively on the modernist tradition (constructivism and instrumentalism) and quite 
frequently neglect, just like the tradition they draw on, the importance of primordial ethnic 
myths in the generation of violent ethnic conflict. In the rare instances where this has been 
taken into consideration, it is usually brief and in passing. For instance, in their analyses of the 
causes of violent conflicts in Africa, the DFID (2001) and the United Nations Commission for 
Africa (2015) briefly recognise the role of ethnic myths and symbols in violent ethnic 
mobilisation. However, of all the conflict management recommendations they put forward, 
none stipulates how the contribution of the ethnic myth-symbol complex to conflict generation 
may be effectively addressed. Their proposed solutions addressed other factors such as 
economic inequality, manipulation by political elites’, etc.; but no effort is made to address the 
ethnic myth-symbol complexes that provoke and justify collective ethnic violence. This again 
reveals the modernist tendency to neglect or ignore the ethnic dimension of ethnic conflict. 
Commenting on the reality of ethnic conflict in Nigeria and also in the Niger Delta, Nnoli 
(1978; 2003) opines that mobilisation to ethnic violence in the region is the outcome of 
carefully constructed socio-political and economic frameworks that favour the North (majority) 
ethnic group more than the South-South (minority) ethnic groups, in whose territory Nigerian 
oil is located. His approach is largely modernist.  For Osaghae (1998), Douglas (2003), Watts 
et al (2004),  and Osaghae (2007),  among  others, poverty is to blame for the escalation of 
conflict in the region. The poverty alluded to here is supposedly the outcome of bad 




is equally modernist, and does not sufficiently take into consideration the possible roles of 
hostile ethnic myth and symbols in provoking ethnic violence in the region.  In the final 
analysis, all these boil down to the basic belief that violent ethnic conflict and mobilisation in 
the Niger Delta of Nigeria are humanly constructed and can be deconstructed and resolved if 
the political will is present. This has been the dominant approach to analysing and resolving 
the problem of ethnic conflict in Nigeria, and for a long time has also been the basis for the 
formulation of government policies aimed at eradicating violent conflict in the Niger Delta 
region.  
Years have passed but these policies have not fully succeeded in yielding the anticipated 
positive results. There is therefore a need for a re-examination of the modernist theoretical 
framework that has for long been the dominant intellectual approach inspiring the policy efforts 
that aim to solve the problem of ethnic violence in Nigeria, especially in its Niger Delta region.  
A key hypothesis of this project is that inadequate theories  lead logically to the formulation of 
inadequate policies, which, quite naturally, lead to inadequate solutions, and hence the 
persistence of ethnic violence in the region. To forestall this, our research project earnestly 
seeks to formulate a theory that meaningfully combines the explanatory logics of existing 
theories in order to fashion a more comprehensive and adequate theory that informs policies 
that can successfully resolve the problem of violent ethnic mobilisation in the Niger Delta 
region. The name of this adequate theory, as has already been mentioned in the introduction 
above, is Ethnosymbolism – the variant developed by Stuart Kaufman. A discussion of 
ethnosymbolism and what it consists of, follows. 
  
 Ethnosymbolism 
In the 1980s, the modernist view of ethnic conflict has been challenged and criticised as being 
too lopsided by a moderate position called Ethnosymbolism.  This was initially developed by 
Young (1976), but became increasingly associated with the works of Smith (1980, 1991), 
Connor (1994) and more recently also with Kaufman (2001; 2006).   
Ethnosymbolism as an intellectual position which contends that ethnic violence is neither 
‘wholly’ an exclusive outcome of the intentional and strategic fabrications of elites in the 
modern era, as the instrumentalist and constructivist scholars both suggest; nor is it purely 




exclusive binaries presented by primordialism and modernism do not adequately capture the 
complex dynamics involved in ethnic conflict. For ethnosymbolists, ethnic conflicts, while 
being a social construction of modern times, rely on a pre-existing texture of myths, memories, 
values and symbols (Conversi 1995: 73-4; Ozkirimli 2010: 168). In other words, there is always 
something ancient, immemorial, and surviving about modern ethnicity and ethnic conflicts that 
predates modernist constructivism. Modern nations, but also ethnicities, are founded on what 
Anthony Smith (2009) refers to as ‘ethnic core’ which provides a people with symbolic 
resources such as memories, myths, traditions and values that provide an ethnic community or 
nation with a sense of identity and direction (Larin 2010). To discover this, one needs to go 
further back and look at the pre-modern socio-cultural antecedents and contexts that have 
furnished the materials used in the creation of modern ethnicities and nations (Smith 2000: 69-
70; 2009). But modernist scholars such as Gellner (1996) ignore the fact that the past furnishes 
modernism with material for the construction of modern ethnicity and conflict. Modernism 
does not take into consideration the place of passion and ethnic myth in the spiralling and 
persistence of ethnic violence. 
When it comes to arousing the sentiments of an ethnic or national population for collective 
action, violent or otherwise, ethnic myths and symbols play a very important role. Ethnic myths 
and symbols communicate narratives about peoples’ collective descent, customs and traditions, 
heroic exploits, and provide a system whereby an ethnic group’s contemporary attitudes and 
actions are ordered and validated (Calhoun, 2002; Darvill, 2009; Baldick, 2015; Vivanco, 
2018). As Smith (1984) notes, myth plays an important role in nourishing the sense of ethnic 
identity, solidarity and in mobilising ethnic communities for political action. When chauvinist 
elites stir a national or ethnic population to violence, they tap into some pre-existing popular 
myths. These are not wholly constructed in the present, otherwise they would be totally alien 
to the people, and ipso facto lose their ability to emotionally sensitise them to collective action. 
Ethnic entrepreneurs rather reinterpret and readapt already-existing myths for the attainment 
of some beneficial preconceived objectives. Modern ethnic conflicts are therefore, in this sense, 
partially ancient, and not entirely modern. This is the critical contribution that ethnosymbolism 
makes relative to modernism. Smith (1996:362) argues, and this thesis shares his view, that 
ethno-symbolism does more than other approaches to explain the power of myths, values and 
collective memories in generating emotional widespread popular support and participation in 




and Wolff (2010), who affirm that Ethnosymbolism is one way of achieving a more robust, 
reliable and encompassing synthetic theory of violent ethnic mobilisation.  
Regrettably however, literature on violent ethnic mobilisation in Nigeria still lacks a work that 
creatively synthesizes and theoretically organises the logics of existing theories of ethnic 
violence in order to produce a more robust theoretical base for understanding and explaining 
violent ethnic mobilisation in the Niger Delta. This is the gap that the current research project 
aspires to fill through the ethnosymbolic theoretical framework it adopts. Approaches hitherto 
employed by scholars and policy makers in Nigeria have not fully succeeded in delivering the 
anticipated positive outcomes. This, I argue, is due largely to the fact that the theoretical 
approaches they have employed tend to be mutually isolating rather than complementary. This 
weakens their theoretical potencies and further renders them insufficient. The ethnosymbolic 
approach proposed here is more robust, comprehensive, and indeed more promising with 
regard to shaping policies that can more effectively address the issue of violent ethnic 
mobilisation in the region in question.   
Ethnosymbolism as an approach has been criticised for underestimating the fluidity and 
malleability of ethnic identity, and the fact that the forces of nationalism can fundamentally 
transform pre-existing ethnic identities and bestow new significance on cultural inheritance 
(Ozkirimir 2000: 187; Kedourie 1994: 141). To counter this view, it is helpful to recognise that 
the transformation of pre-existing ethnic material is neither arbitrary nor occurs in a vacuum. 
It is always constrained by the cultural contexts in which it occurs. The new must somehow 
fuse with the old before gradually transforming it. Otherwise, people would hardly become 
emotionally attached to some novel, historically and culturally deracinated and forcefully 
imposed ethnic identities. And if this passionate ethnic attachment is missing, people would 
hardly be mobilised along ethnic lines in the context of violence (Gurr and Harff 2003). 
Therefore, an adequate account of violent ethnic mobilisation in modern society ought to take 
into consideration la longue durée, that is, ‘a time dimension of many centuries’ of the 
formation of ethnic identity (Armstrong 1982:4). This is exactly what ethnosymbolism does.    
In addition to situating and pursuing this research within the ethnosymbolic paradigm, I would 
like to quickly mention that I have found the theory developed by Kaufman (2001) very useful 
as an action plan (analytical framework). His theory speaks to the current research project in a 





Kaufman’s Theory, an Overview 
In 2001 Stuart Kaufman published an influential work: Modern Hatreds. In line with the basic 
tenets of ethnosymbolism, the work develops a theory of ethnic war or violence that combines 
a wide range of disparate theoretical perspectives on ethnic conflict to explain why ethnic wars 
and violence occur, but also why for the most part they do not.   
Compelling neuroscientific findings, which according to Kaufman (2001; 2006) form the basis 
of his theory, reveal that emotions, rather than rational calculations, arouse people to action. It 
helps them set priorities and disposes them to act (Long and Brecke 2003: 24).  When ordinary 
people are presented with competing values, they usually made their choices on the basis of 
emotions (Edelman 1971). Myths and symbols are very powerful at evoking such emotions.  
Symbols enshrine and represent (via objects) popular myths that give meaning to actions or 
events. In the presence of these emotionally laden objects, historical facts become redundant; 
and it is the potency of the symbols that readily provides the basis and justification for extreme 
collective ethnic actions ( Kaufman 2001; Evans-Kent 2001). The claim that Kaufman makes 
here about symbols is not merely an abstract adumbration. The way this plays out in history 
can easily be confirmed. Nations and ethnic groups have been provoked to violence simply by 
tampering with or denigrating symbols that represented their collective identity. In the Niger 
Delta, land and its inherent resource are instances of such ethnic symbols. The series of ethno-
religious violence that spiralled in many countries following the perceived symbolic 
denigration of Prophet Mohammed by a Norwegian cartoonist in 2010 is a good case in point. 
In 2012, violence broke out in Afghanistan after US soldiers burnt the Holy Koran, a religious 
symbol of the collective identity of a people. In the south-western part of Nigeria, the felling 
of the statue of Awolowo in 2008 caused some violent stirrings amongst the vast majority of 
Yoruba for whom Awolowo was an icon of ethnic unity. A host of other instances that confirm 
the power of ethnic symbols in arousing ethnic passion and actions, violent or otherwise, 
abound in world history. The foregoing demonstrates that myth-symbol complexes are 
important elements in the spiralling of ethnic and national violence; yet this aspect has been 
for a long time neglected by most modernist scholars.  
For ethnic war or violence to evolve, the following three conditions are, according to Kaufman, 
required: myth-symbol complexes, a clash of interests, and manipulative elites. Ethnic 
myth-symbol complexes are tools used by manipulative elites to mobilise an ethnic population, 




feelings of hostility that can be tapped-into via ethnic symbols (Kaufman 2001:13).  The elites 
interpreted these myth-symbol complexes to arouse strong feelings of hate, anger, insecurity 
and fear, convincing the public that their collective peril was imminent if they did not rise up 
in arms to defend themselves and actively ward off their fatally dangerous ethnic opponents. 
Although symbols are constructed, the meaning they enshrine and mediate derives from pre-
existing popular myths which are then interpreted to excite and mobilise people to act violently. 
In this way, Kaufman combines the relevant explanatory logics of the ‘ancient and immemorial 
origins’ of ethnicity and ethnic conflicts, instrumentalism ( Duran 1974; Lonsdale 1992; Bates 
1974, 1983; Hechter 1986; Brass: 1997) and  constructivism (Young 1993; Sollors 1989; Nagel 
1994, 1996; Blauner 1972) in order to fashion a more robust theoretical explanation for violent 
ethnic mobilisation, namely the ‘Symbolic politics’  doctrine, which, according to him, offers 
a more satisfactory explanation for the complex ethnic atrocities that have occurred in the 
Balkans.  
Although Kaufman’s theory was developed with a view to understanding and explaining the 
motivation for collective violent ethnic actions in the Balkans, it still remains a relevant 
doctrine that can be applied meaningfully in the current research, which investigates why 
violent ethnic mobilisation has persisted in the Niger Delta of Nigeria. Just as in Kaufman’s 
research context, the theoretical inadequacy of the modernist theories hitherto employed by 
scholars to explain the origins and causes of violent ethnic conflict in the Niger Delta compels 
us to think of a more adequate and comprehensive alternative: the ethnosymbolic perspective 
that we now use.   
This thesis is aware of the complex dynamics involved in the Niger Delta ethnic conflict, which 
the existing modernist literature lacks the power to explain. This project therefore represents 
an advance - for unlike existing academic work on the subject of violent mobilisation in the 
Niger Delta, it is more encompassing, seeking to take into consideration the following 
elements: the emotionally laden myth-symbol complexes that may have been peddled to 
arouse hostile ethnic sentiments, the issue of the interests at stake in the regional imbroglio, 
and finally the roles played by ethnic elites in the mobilisation and persistence of ethnic 
violence in this region. In so doing, this thesis creatively combines the relevant logics of 
existing theories in order to produce a more theoretically comprehensive and adequate 
explanation for the spiralling and persistent regional violent situation it studies. Within the 
narrow academic niche of violent ethnic mobilisation in Nigeria in general, and of the Niger 




potentials are yet to be fully explored. I therefore anticipate that its introduction will be of great 
use in the future.     
 
 A More Critical Look at Kaufman’s Theory of Ethnic Violence 
Since 1995 at least, Stuart Kaufman has been among the leading thinkers on the subject of 
violent ethnic mobilisation. His major work of 2001, Modern Hatred, apart from winning the 
prestigious Grawemeyer Award for creative “Ideas Improving the World Order” in 2003, has 
also been widely extolled within academia for advancing the way we understand the causality 
and persistence of ethno-national violence. Chaim Kaufmann (2002) describes Kaufman’s 
work as making a ‘serious original contribution’ to knowledge – a contribution which 
according to Evans-Kent(2001), is clearly seen in the author’s ingenuity, not only in explaining 
the mechanism by which ethnic tensions metamorphose into full-scale violent conflicts, but 
also in creatively synthesising the relevant logics of hitherto-existing theoretical explanations 
of ethnic violence to produce a more robust and comprehensive alternative.   
Despite this recognition, Kaufman’s ethnosymbolic theory has been subject to a number 
criticisms, some of which may be found in the works of Chaim Kaufmann (2002), Young 
(2002),  Tang (2015) and, James and Mohammadian (2017) amongst others. These criticisms, 
it is worth mentioning from the outset, are usually very minor and do not, in general, raise 
serious questions about the core validity of Kaufman’s ethnosymbolic theory. Concerns raised 
usually articulate around issues of minor omission that are easily fixed, and do not violate the 
integrity and validity of his theory. Let us, for instance, consider the criticism levelled against 
Kaufman(2001) by Chaim Kaufman (2002). The latter criticises him for not setting operational 
limits to some of the key concepts employed in his work. Chaim obviously expected that 
Kaufman (2001) should have defined, for example, exactly what may be classified as ‘ethnic 
symbols’. What sort of myths, beliefs or facts are they? This, for him, is very important because 
what Stuart Kaufman (2001) refers to as ‘symbolic grievances’ may quite easily be understood 
by another scholar as grievances over material stuff - real material grievances. There is 
therefore some sense of ambiguity, Chaim Kaufman (2002) claims, in the way Kaufman 
employs the concept – an observation that Janos (2002) also makes in his evaluation of 
Kaufman’s work. In awareness of Kaufman’s failure to provide operational definitions of some 




should have been provided in order to eliminate ambiguities and facilitate comprehension. 
Having said that, I would like to quickly add that Kaufman’s theory, despite all that, is not 
incomprehensible. One caveat is that any individual working with Kaufman’s key texts should 
be aware of these minor definitional weaknesses, and be ready to make up for them while 
reading or working with them. This is exactly what this project has done by providing 
operational definitions (especially in Chapters 1, 4 and 5) of some key concepts such as interest, 
ethnicity, and manipulative elites, among others, which have been employed, but not 
sufficiently defined by Kaufman.  
Further criticisms come from Young (2002) and Chaim Kaufmann (2002), who both describe 
Kaufman’s Modern Hatred as an ambitious piece that seeks to formulate a universalizable 
theory of extreme ethnic violence – one that is applicable in any part of the world, whereas 
nearly all his data and case-studies derive from one region, the Balkans. It is therefore 
problematic, Chaim Kaufmann (2002) suggests, to formulate a universalisable theory on the 
basis of the limited data obtained from a very small region of the world - the Balkans. Hence, 
the need for Kaufman to expand his case study/data collection bases. Young’s and Chaim 
Kaufmann’s observations are accurate, and this thesis agrees with them that Kaufman would 
have benefited more from increasing and diversifying his case studies and data collection bases. 
This, without doubt, would have strengthened his arguments. Having said that, it would be 
equally helpful to observe that this criticism is not a very fundamental one. For it does not in 
any way nullify the credibility and validity of the ‘symbolic politics theory’ proposed by 
Kaufman (2001). His theory remains valid – pending the discovery of other cases of ethno-
national violence that counter or invalidate it.   So, while there are some valid criticisms of 
Kaufman’s work, it is important to note that these are often quite minor, and do not alter the 
core validity of his theory of ethnic violence. Considered from this angle, Kaufman’s work, it 
seems to me, resembles any other good literature within the domain of the social sciences – for 
there is hardly any academic publication within this domain that cannot be criticised, even if 
only slightly. As Popper (1963) and Garcia (2006) among others opine, falsifiability is a normal 
characteristic of good scientific production. Otherwise, it may well be regarded as dogma – a 
mere article of faith. What should therefore matter viz-a-vis social science theories is not 
whether possible criticisms of them exist, but rather, how serious the criticisms are. In the case 
of Kaufman, none has been able to come up with criticisms that convincingly invalidate the 




The usefulness of Kaufman’s ethnosymbolic theory in furthering the way we think 
about/analyse ethno-national violence is not in doubt; and many scholars within the discipline 
of ethnic violence such as Evans-Kent(2001), Young (2002), Janos (2002), Ayres (2016),   
attest to this, in some ways, as well. They, for instance, agree with Kaufman that existing, 
individually isolating, classical modernist instrumentalist and constructivist doctrines of ethnic 
violence do not adequately account for why ethnic violence occurs and persists; and that what 
is required is a theory that that creatively combines the relevant logics of all these in order to 
provide a more comprehensive and robust explanation of the causality of ethnic violence. 
Similarly, none of these critics has been able to convincingly argue that Kaufman’s 
ethnosymbolic theory, which obviously builds on Edelman (1971)’s theory of political 
mobilisation, is wrong in upholding the contributory roles of ethnic myth-symbol complexes 
in the generation, spiralling and persistence of politically salient ethno-national violence. This 
central element of Kaufman’s theory has not been convincingly refuted till date. On the 
contrary, it is actually becoming increasingly accepted within academia.   
Since 2001 when Kaufman first published Modern Hatreds, the author has published further 
works, of which Nationalist Passion (2015) and ‘War as Symbolic Politics’ (2019) which re-
echo and strengthen, rather than fundamentally alter or contradict his ethnosymbolic theoretical 
stance on the contributory role of ethnicity (ethnic myth-symbol complexes) in the generation 
and persistence of extreme ethnic violence. Ethnosymbolism, especially the Kaufmanian 
version of it, is still a current and valid way of examining and resolving the problem of 
politically salient violent ethnic mobilisation around the globe.   
 
Theoretical Relevance of Kaufman in the Niger Delta  
A number of questions that a critical mind is likely to raise regarding the Kaufmanian 
ethnosymbolic theoretical framework that guides the current research project might look a bit 
like the following: what is the relevance of Kaufman context of violent mobilisation in the 
Niger Delta? Is there anything new in the theory that did not already exist in the literature on 
violent mobilisation in the Niger Delta? If yes, what is it? If not, what use is his theory in the 
region? This section aims to address such concerns by rapidly reviewing some of the key 




First, I begin by acknowledging that the context within which Kaufman’s ethnosymbolic theory 
evolved is similar to that of the Niger Delta - a world challenged not only by the phenomenon 
of violent ethnic mobilisation, but also a world where scholarly efforts to address the crisis 
lopsidedly draws on the valid, but insufficient, classical modernist theories of constructivism 
and instrumentalism. The constraints that these theories of ethnic violence impose on conflict 
resolution efforts, due largely to their insufficiency, are well-highlighted in ethnosymbolic 
literature. Scholars of the ethnosymbolic tradition contend that any theory of ethnic violence 
capable of robustly accounting for why violent ethnic mobilisations occur and persist, and of 
providing a comprehensive and effective conflict resolution plan, ought to be of the type that  
goes beyond the rational calculus of ethnic violence and incorporates the often-ignored roles 
of ethnicity (ethnic myth-symbol complexes) in the orchestration and persistence of violent 
ethnic conflict. Ethnosymbolism, Kaufman argues, is that robust theory. This theoretical 
perspective is, quite unfortunately, not yet being fully explored and utilised by major scholars 
with an interest in the Niger Delta conflict. In the few instances where there are indications of 
the likely existence of the notion of ethnosymbolism (as a theory) in the literature about this 
geographical area, the idea is usually presented only sporadically and not properly teased out 
theoretically – a deficiency that this project aspires to make up for.  
Agitations in the contemporary Niger Delta region started taking a violent turn in the 1990s 
(Ikelegbe, 2005). Earlier information available on the issue during this period came 
predominantly from journalists whose principal aim was to render an ‘objective’ account of 
the Niger Delta turmoil as it occurred, rather than delve into the ‘hermeneutics’ of the regional 
conflict. It was not until a few years later that proper academic reflections on the regional 
violence started to emerge. Osaghae (1995) is among the earlier scholars to have written about 
the causes of Niger Delta violence in the 1990s. In his widely disseminated article: ‘The Ogoni 
Uprising: Oil Politics, Minority Agitation and the Future of Nigerian State’, Osaghae identifies 
environmental degradation, and the socio-economic and political marginalisation of the Ogoni 
people by the majority ethnic groups as the major causes of the Ogoni violent uprising, in which 
the indigenes violently demanded that these injustices be addressed. Osaghae’s work is rich in 
its presentation of the historical facts of this violent conflict. What is however unclear is the 
theory with which his investigation worked. Although he did not clarify this question, his work 
seems to have drawn to some extent from the ‘greed versus grievance theory’ of ethnic 
violence, but even then, he neither sufficiently discussed nor critically engaged with the theory. 




may have played some roles in the generation and persistence of this regional conflict, but these 
were, again, not theoretically articulated or critically engaged with. In general, although it is 
impressive in terms of its presentation of historical facts, Osaghae’s work is not theoretically 
well-informed – a weakness that this thesis, guided by Kaufmanian ethnosymbolic theory, 
aspires to make up for.      
Ogbogbo (2005), a bit like Osaghae, carefully presents what some scholars have come to 
recognise as an impressive historical account of the Niger Delta turmoil. While Osaghae (1995) 
concentrated on the Ogoni people, Ogbogbo (2005) aimed to produce a more ambitious account 
of the phenomenon of violent conflict across the entire Niger Delta region – covering both the 
ancient and contemporary phases of the regional turmoil. An important difference between 
these writers is that while Osaghae (1995) did not make explicit the framework within which 
his research was conducted, Ogbogbo (2005) is clear that his investigation is historical. Viewed 
from that angle, Ogbogbo’s work does, to a very laudable extent, fulfil its objectives as a piece 
of historical research. That notwithstanding, when it comes to a more systematic, and 
theoretically illuminated, analyses of the roles of ethnicity (ethnic myth-symbol complexes), 
and manipulative elites in the spiralling and persistence of violent ethnic mobilisation in the 
region, Ogbogbo’s work leaves some gap which therefore needs to be supplemented – a task 
that this thesis also endeavours to accomplish also.   
Other scholars worth considering are those who are in the habit of simply enumerating, rather 
than theoretically debating, what they believe to be the causal factors of violent ethnic 
mobilisation in the Niger Delta. Although many such scholars exist, the work of Salawu seems 
to be quite representative of this tendency. In Salawu (2010) one encounters an effort to outline 
the causal factors that drive violent mobilisations of an ethnic and religious sort, not only in 
the Niger Delta, but across Nigeria. Among the major factors he identifies are socio-economic 
discrimination and marginalisation, unemployment, ethnicity, poverty, and the failure of 
leadership. Although there is some evidence that these factors may have contributed to the 
spiralling of violent ethnic mobilisation in the Niger Delta, Salawu (2010) does not offer 
theoretically informed arguments to back up his claim. Much more than just providing us with 
a list of possible causal factors, and furnishing us a fairly good chronological list of ethno-
religious conflicts across Nigeria, one would normally anticipate that a serious academic 
publication on the topic of ethnic and religious violence in Nigeria, including the Niger Delta 




patron-client networks, and ethnic myth-symbol complexes that contribute to the spiralling and 
persistence of the crisis. This thesis also seeks to make up for this absence.   
Later writers on the topic of ethnic violence in the Niger Delta, unlike some of the earlier ones 
examined above, now make genuine efforts, it seems, to correct what may be described as the  
tendency to neglect, or ignore the relevance of theoretically informed research investigations 
in the Niger Delta. In the works of Watts (2004,2007), Obi (2009; 2010; 2011), Ikelegbe 
(2005), Omeje (2005),  Ifeka (2006), Idemudia (2006; 2009), Ako (2011), Ukiwo (2011) 
Ahonsi (2011), Anugwom (2007;2014), Adunbi (2016), Iwilade (2017), Nwokolo (2018), 
Babatunde (2019) and Courson & Odijie (2020) among others, one encounters a more rigorous 
crop of scholars who are not just sufficiently familiar with relevant theories of ethnic violence, 
but who also deploy them to examine and offer solutions to the problem of violent ethnic 
mobilisation in the Niger Delta. This modus operandi represents an advance – for it enables 
scholars to provide a more systematic and reasonably critical evaluation of the complex 
dynamics of the  context of the Niger Delta violence.  This said, it is nonetheless worth noting 
that being grounded in theories does not make scholarly opinions immune from flaws. For this 
reason, I shall, in what follows, examine the works of the aforementioned scholars a bit more 
closely in order to identify their merits and demerits, and indicate a way forward. 
Obi (2009; 2010) contends that the crisis is rooted in the inequitable distribution of the oil 
wealth deriving from the Niger Delta which disadvantages the people of the area, causing them 
to make violent demands for total control of both their region and their resources. He 
understands this problem from the perspective of the economic inequality theory of ethnic 
violence. Although Obi’s observation is valid, seeking to explain the Niger Delta conflict solely 
from economic inequality or resource deprivation theories of ethnic violence is quite 
constraining. Anyone familiar with the context of  the violence in the Niger Delta will agree 
that it is a very complex zone of conflict whose drivers are much more than just economics, 
and therefore requires a more complex conflict analysis and approach to resolution. Obi (2014) 
would later take cognisance of this fact in his criticism of the resource curse theory of ethnic 
violence, a theory he compellingly rejects as an adequate framework for assessing the Niger 
Delta crisis. There, he suggests that a good alternative should be a theory that addresses the 
complex issues involved in the Niger Delta crisis. Although this thesis affirms and upholds this 
opinion, it is however still a bit startling that Obi (2014) does not go further to develop, or 




ethnosymbolic theory used in this research makes up for what is lacking in Obi (2009; 2010; 
2014). It provides more details about the nature of the ethnosymbolic theory adopted for the 
research.  
Ikelegbe (2005) locates the problem of violence in the Niger Delta in a number of factors, 
including contestation over perceived injustice over the distribution of resources, ethnicity, the 
weakness of the Nigerian state and its failure restructure the country, the vested interest of 
elites, and the grievances of both youth and the ethnic population over socio-economic and 
political marginalisation. In this piece, Ikelegbe is able to make a good case for why these 
factors are important triggers of conflict in the region. What is however lacking is his inability 
to go beyond merely outlining factors and theoretically furnish us with a mechanism that 
explains how these factors or elements interact with one another in a complex way to generate 
and cause violence to continue to persist. Addressing a complex scenario of violence such as  
that of the Niger Delta requires an elaborately developed theoretical framework that should 
guide investigation and analyses – because theoretical frameworks assist researchers to 
systematically evaluate previous research efforts, discover what is lacking, and how what is 
missing could be supplied. Merely outlining some supposedly causal factors of the Niger Delta 
conflict does not accomplish this objective. An overarching theory, or some combination of 
theories, is needed; and this is what the ethnosymbolism used in this research aims to 
accomplish.  
Omeje (2005) suggests that oil wealth, as well as the patrimonial accumulation of it, is the main 
driver of violence in the Niger Delta. This opinion has features of both the resource curse 
theory, and the greed versus grievance economic theory of ethnic violence. One of the 
weaknesses of such theories is seen in their inability to explore and affirm the power of 
ethnicity (ethnic myth-symbol complexes) in the generation, spiralling and persistence of 
ethnic violence. Like these theories, Omeje (2005)’s opinion on the causal relevance of oil and 
patrimonialism in the Niger Delta conflict is accurate, however his work ought to have engaged 
more with the role or contribution of ethnicity (ethnic myth symbol complexes) in the 
generation and persistence of the Niger Delta conflict. Again, Omeje does not explain the 
mechanism of ethnic violence in the Niger Delta; that is, how the conflict actually occurs – an 
issue that Kaufman’s theory helps us deal with more effectively.   
Ukiwo (2007) makes a case against the use of the resource curse theory, rejecting its validity 




have tried to do. Drawing on available historical evidence on the origins of the Niger Delta 
conflict, Ukiwo is able to compellingly demonstrate that insurgency in the Niger Delta: 
 is the consequence of longstanding experiences of political and social-
cultural marginalization. Militant groups emerged as a result of the failure 
of the state and oil companies to respond to peaceful protests in previous 
decades. 
 Ukiwo’s position on this is hardly ever reasonably controverted – for nearly every writer on 
the phenomenon of violent mobilisation in the Niger Delta agrees that years of socio-political 
and economic marginalisation of the region are among the reasons for sustained violence 
occurring in the region. Despite this, Ukiwo (2007) did not explain how this violent 
mobilisation actually occurs – its mechanism. Is it elite-led, or mass led? Are there other 
necessary factors, such as ethnic myth-symbol complexes, that may have contributed to the 
regional crisis? He did not explore these issues further. Yet, a robust understanding of the 
complex issues involved in the region ought to address these questions.    
Nwokolo (2018:1)’s analyses of his in-dept interviews with stakeholders in the Niger Delta 
peace process reveals the impact of elite corruption/manipulation and patron-clientelism on the 
regional conflict. A major consequence of this is that the 
post-conflict peace-building mechanisms of amnesty and DDR programs 
designed to build peace through youth empowerment have been captured 
and corrupted by power elites. In their do-or-die struggles for power 
positions and oil revenues, the elites have criminalized some ex-militants by 
mobilizing them as thugs, kidnappers, and oil thieves, thus posing a huge 
threat to sustainable peace and democratic consolidation in the region. The 
study indicts political desperation, systemic corruption, poor policy 
execution, and weak public institutions for the impunity of the elites and 
criminalized youths. It recommends value re-orientation and strengthening 
of public institutions to mitigate corruption and social violence among 
leaders and followers alike. 
Nwokolo’s analyses and recommendations are reasonable, but incomplete. Anyone familiar 
with the context of violence in the Niger Delta will agree that ethnicity is quite frequently 
implicated in various claims being made in the region’s conflict. However, Nwokolo neither 
sufficiently engages with this aspect in his work, nor provided an analyses of how popular 
ethnic myths/symbols complexes may have contributed to violent mobilisations within the 




theory, accounts for the roles of corrupt and manipulative elites in regional conflict, as well as 
the underlying impetus of competing egoistic or sectional interests and the impact of ethnicity 
in the whole crisis. It thus provides us with a more comprehensive knowledge of the Niger 
Delta problem, as well as insights into how to contain it.  
Watts (2004; 2007) is another scholar who provides us with a rich and intellectually compelling 
analyses of the Niger Delta violence. His primary objective is to demonstrate, beyond Collier 
(2000), and other resource curse theorists of ethnic violence, that the Niger Delta’s oil is much 
more than just a lootable resource. It is, on the contrary, a complex (Watts speaks about the ‘oil 
complex’) in the sense that it enables the creation of different forms of ‘governable spaces’ or 
regimes which sometimes stand in direct contradiction to one another. In the end, Watts 
concludes that although the Niger Delta’s oil may be a curse, at least in the sense suggested by 
the resource curse theorists, its turbulent history, as well as its ability to generate conflicts can 
only be properly understood by paying attention to the complex character of the oil itself,  and 
also to the actions of those corporate institutions and states that focus on this oil for wealth 
accumulation. A careful reading of Watts (2004; 2007) reveals his understanding and 
recognition of the complex issues involved in the crisis. Like both Kaufman’s theory and the 
current thesis, he acknowledges the contributory roles of competing interests in oil wealth,  and 
of manipulative and corrupt elites, and ethnicity, in the regional crisis. However, what Watts 
has not done is develop a theory that explains the mechanism of this regional turbulence; that 
is, how these factors, especially ethnic myth-symbols, interact with one another to generate and 
sustain violent mobilisation. This is the point at which this thesis goes beyond Watts. It not 
only explains the mechanism of ethnic violence in the region, but also makes a case for why 
ethnosymbolism is a superior framework for examining and finding solutions to the problem 
of violent mobilisation in the Niger Delta. These aspects are missing in Watts’ work.  
Idemudia (2006) is one of the very few scholars who have not only acknowledged the 
complexity of the Niger Delta crisis, but who have also tried to propose theories appropriate  
for understanding and resolving the regional crisis. He proposes what he describes as an 
‘integrated explanation’ of the various factors responsible for the Niger Delta conflict. 
Idemudia’s use of the phrase ‘integrated explanation’ acknowledges that there are many drivers 
of violent conflict in the Niger Delta. Hence, the need for a theory that integrates the logics of 
these drivers. The integrated approach suggested here by Idemudia looks a bit like 




of the regional conflict. The problem is that Idemudia neither develops the theory further, nor 
provides details of what it consists in. This thesis, unlike Idemudia’s (2006), not only identifies 
and names this theory, but also provides details about its nature, as well as why it is most 
suitable for examining and finding solutions to the problem of violent ethnic mobilisation in 
the Niger Delta. Unlike this thesis and Kaufman’s theory (on which it draws),  Idemudia (2006) 
did not explore the roles of ethnic myth-symbol complexes in violent ethnic mobilisation in the 
Niger Delta – an aspect often neglected by many theories of ethnic violence in this region.  
Among the handful of thinkers to have seriously considered and explored the role of ethnic 
myth-symbol complexes in the Niger Delta conflict are Ifeka (2006), Anugwom (2011), and 
Adunbi (2015). Their work is considered important because they focus, a bit more 
systematically, on the often-ignored contribution of ethnicity, particularly the so-called ethnic 
myth-symbol complexes, in the violent mobilisation of youth. These myths/symbols range 
from ethnic narratives to objects of religious belief and myths of collective ancestry, among 
others. These – the so-called ‘non-rationals’, as opposed to just rational calculus alone, have 
also been found by these scholars to play some mobilisational roles in the regional crisis under 
study.     
For instance, Ifeka (2006) shows how numerous ethnic militia organisations in Nigeria, 
constituted primarily of youths, draw on pre-existing ethnic myths for violent mobilisation. 
The emphasis here is on the potency of ethnic myths/symbols as mobilisational tools in Nigeria, 
rather than on the pervasive rational choice explanations alone.  Anugwom (2011) and Courson 
and Odijie (2020) develop this idea a bit further in their work, but with a tailored focus on the 
issue of youth mobilisation in the Niger Delta. Both present some interesting reflections on 
how the Egbesu deity of the Ijaw ethnic group has played some roles in the youths’ violent 
mobilisation against the unjust activities of both the Federal government of Nigeria and the 
Multinational oil companies in the region. Among the Ijaw ethnic group of the Niger Delta, 
Egbesu is a divine being who is traditionally believed to offer protection to fighters of just 
wars. According to Omeje (2017: 8), Egbesu is a spiritual instrument that vaccinates fighters 
against bullets. Contemporary Ijaw ethnic militants are said to tap into this ethnic myth to draw 
courage, strength and motivation for their fight against the injustices of the state and the oil 
companies. While Courson and Odijie (2020: 2) still entertained some modicum of doubt 
regarding the total veracity and reliability of ‘Egbesu just war ethics’ and assumptions, 




emboldening and empowering the youths for the wars they fight in the Niger Delta. In her 
words 
While other scholars may perceive the invocation of the occult represented 
by the Egbesu deity of the Ijaw ethnic group in the region as representing 
the normative pattern and religious beliefs of the people, I see its crucial role 
in emboldening, empowering and engendering the struggle of the youth as 
being facilitated by the marginalisation of the region within the Nigerian 
federal system. (Anugwom 2011: 6)  
It is interesting to observe, especially in the light of the foregoing, that claims about the causal 
contribution of ethnic myth-symbol complexes in mobilising an ethnic population, or a portion 
of it, to violence were to some reasonable degree already present in the Niger Delta literature. 
Before now, Ifeka (2006), Anugwom (2011), and Adunbi (2015) amongst others have all, in 
some ways, reached this conclusion. However, it is not clear whether these scholars had access 
to Kaufman’s earlier works. Perhaps they did, but there is not sufficient evidence to 
unequivocally demonstrate that this happened, especially as they did not reference Kaufman in 
their work. Whatever is the case, the idea that ethnic myth/symbols contribute to violent 
mobilisation already existed in the writings of some contemporary writers on the subject of 
violent ethnic mobilisation in Nigeria and in the Niger Delta prior the publication of Kaufman’s 
major work on the topic. The pertinent question now is: if this idea already existed in literature 
on the Niger Delta, then of what use is Kaufman’s theory in the region – for he seems to be 
proposing what in some way is already present?   
Regarding the causal roles of ethnic myths/symbols in violent mobilisation, there are a few 
differences between Kaufman’s work and those of Ifeka, Anugwom, and Adunbi. These 
scholars seem to have focused almost entirely on youths. Their pre-occupation has been with 
showing that the Niger Delta militia groups or youths tap into pre-existing ethnic mythologies 
to draw inspiration and courage for collective violent action. The problem with this lopsided 
focus is that it causes them to lose sight of the far more important issue of how elites (and not 
just the youths) also tapped into this source (ethnic myth/symbols) to stir ethnic populations to 
violence. Although Anugwom (2011) did very briefly mention that elites occasionally 
instrumentalise ethnic myths/symbols to incite ethnic violence, she did not develop this idea 
further, not even to explain the mechanism of this violent mobilisation. Unlike the theories 
outlined above, Kaufman’s theory not only provides a more detailed discourse on how both 




mobilisation, but also goes further  to formulate a coherent theory that explains the mechanism 
of such violent mobilisations – how they actually occur. Drawing on Kaufman’s theory, this 
thesis discusses (in both chapters 5 and 6), how ethnic myths/symbols causally contribute to 
the generation and persistence of violent conflict in the Niger Delta – a task which, according 
to Iwilade (2016), Adunbi (2015)’s work failed to accomplish, despite his claim that it would.  
The above assessment shows that Kaufman’s perspective on the role of ethnicity (ethnic 
myths/symbols) in conflict generation is more comprehensive – a good reason to favour it over 
others. Again, of all the literature reviewed up to now, only Kaufman’s work provides details 
of how to creatively combine the relevant logic of existing explanations of ethnic violence in 
order to construct a more comprehensive, unified, coherent and robust general theory of violent 
ethnic mobilisation in  Niger Delta scholarship - exactly what this thesis intends to achieve  by 
putting forward the Kaufmanian ethnosymbolic theoretical framework as a superior alternative.  
 
A General observation  
A remarkable feature of all the scholarly perspectives presented above is that they are all 
relevant in a number of ways – for, on an individual basis, even if isolated, they each tell us 
something factually correct about the causality of violent mobilisations taking place in the 
Niger Delta. The problem is that none of them has been able to theoretically organise the logic 
of existing explanations to capture the complex issues involved in the regional violence under 
investigation. It is at this point that this thesis inserts itself and advances the area study literature 
at bit further, thanks to the Kaufmanian ethnosymbolism that it upholds as a more adequate 
framework for analysing and finding solutions to the problem of violent ethnic mobilisation in 
the Niger Delta region. The potency of Kaufmanian ethnosymbolism lies not only in its ability 
to creatively and effectively combine the relevant logic of existing explanations of ethno-
national violence in order to proffer a more comprehensive and robust framework for the 
analysis and resolution of ethnic violence (that violence in which ethnic groups are implicated), 
but also in its ability to theoretically articulate its mechanism – that is, the process of its 
generation, occurrence, and persistence. This, without doubt, is different from the ‘integrated 
approach’ proposed by scholars such as Idemudia (2006; 2009). While the Kaufmanian 
ethnosymbolic framework articulates and explains the mechanism of ethnic violence, that is, 




violence, the integrated approach fails to go beyond acknowledging) and occasionally 
enumerating) that the drivers of the Niger Delta conflict are ‘many’, not ‘one’. So, when it 
comes to explaining the mechanism of violent ethnic mobilisation in the Niger Delta, thanks to 
the ethnosymbolic theory of ethnic violence developed by Kaufman, this thesis is ahead of an 
integrated approach. It meets all the objectives of the integrated approach and goes beyond it, 
offering a theoretically informed explanation of the complex mechanism of ethnic violence in 
the region. The conclusion of this thesis, drawing on Kaufman’s ethnosymbolic theory, is that, 
in pursuit of private or sectional interest, manipulative/corrupt elites tap into pre-existing ethnic 
myth-symbol complexes to generate extreme fears (security dilemma) that impel the people to 
mobilise for, and justify collective violent action (see also the footnote).1 
With ethnosymbolism one would nearly always be led to ask the right kinds of questions 
whenever ethnic populations, like those in the Niger Delta, are implicated in violent conflicts: 
what are the competing interests at stake in the violent conflict? What roles have the corrupt or 
manipulative elites played in the orchestration, spiralling and persistence of the conflict? In 
what ways might ethnicity, particularly ethnic myth-symbol complexes, have contributed in 
the brewing and escalation of the turmoil?  In fact, there is hardly violence in the Niger Delta 
that cannot be explained with reference either  to the roles of interest (socio-economic, political, 
 
1 Kaufman (as well as this thesis) is not unaware of the fact of youth involvement and resistance in violent ethnic 
conflict scenarios. In fact, he clearly takes this into consideration in his Modern Hatred (2001) when he writes 
about mass-led violent mobilisation, as opposed to elite-led ones. However, if Kaufman has decided not to 
seriously consider including youth-led violent mobilisation (unlike the manipulative elites) as a necessary factor 
for the persistence of violent ethnic mobilisation, it is mainly because he perceives it as subservient to, and largely 
dependent on the actions and inactions of corrupt and manipulative elites. When closely examined, it would 
quickly become evident how the so-called violent youth mobilisation or resistance is often a reaction to the unjust 
attitudes, actions, or inactions of corrupt or manipulative elites. Let us briefly consider the flip-side of the coin 
and imagine for a while that the Nigerian and the Niger Delta elites (rulers, leader, and influential others) were 
neither corrupt nor manipulative; that is, that they properly exercised their functions as ‘just’ leaders and  men of 
honour, the Niger Delta youths would not have had any cause to agitate or engage in any well-structured, organised 
and sustained violent mobilisation as is currently the case in the region.  If they tried, they would not only have 
had no moral justification for their violent activities, but the elites also have the necessary state apparatus at their 
disposal to contain, quell and disperse them. But this, unfortunately, is not the state of affairs in Niger Delta. On 
the contrary, what can be seen in the region is a scenario where manipulative and corrupt elites fuel the regional 
crisis through unjust and illegitimate actions and inactions; and these provide the youths with the moral grounds 
and impetus for violent resistance and agitation. So, if Kaufman did not consider it necessary to include mass-led 
mobilisation as part of the necessary conditions for extreme violent ethnic conflict, it is mainly because its viability 
is dependent on the attitudes, actions, and inactions of the elites. Injustice breeds rebellion. The youth resistance 
or rebellion in the Niger Delta is a natural consequence of the ‘unjustness’ of corrupt and manipulative elites both 
in Nigeria and in the region, rather than, strictly speaking, one of the necessary causalities of the regional crisis as 
some would like to have us believe. It is equally for this reason that the current thesis concentrates more on the 
examination of the roles of the elites than the violent activities of the youths. For it is in discussing the negative 
and provocative actions/inactions of the elites in the region that one better understands the place of youth 





or otherwise), or elites (manipulative, egoistic, corrupt or otherwise) and ethnicity (myth 
symbol complexes, solidarity, identity etc), or a combination of these. This is why Kaufman’s 
ethnosymbolism is a very fitting framework for examining and resolving the problem of violent 
mobilisation in the Niger Delta. It is comprehensive, rigorous, robust, and simultaneously 
concise and complex in its character.   
All these notwithstanding, I do however recognise that Kaufman probably does not know much 
about the context of violence in the Niger Delta and certainly has not written anything about it. 
But this does not mean that his theory is irrelevant vis-à-vis the region. While the theoretical 
framework he provides may be usefully applied in the Niger Delta (as has been demonstrated 
in both the theoretical and empirical parts of this research) details about the context of the 
regional crisis under review have been supplied by other scholars, as well as by the elites 
interviewed during the course of my fieldwork - not by Kaufman himself. These sources 
complement each other well to provide the foreground and guide needed by this research 
project to effectively pursue and attain its objectives.   



















This chapter presents the methodology for the thesis. I begin with brief information about how 
I gained access to the field. This is immediately followed by a description of the research design 
chosen for the project, as well as some justification for the choice.  After this comes a brief 
insight into the nature of my interviewees, as well as why this category of individuals were 
preferred to other possible informants on the topic being investigated. Following this is 
information about the analysis of the data. Some of the major challenges encountered during 
the research, ethical and otherwise, are also discussed, with the emphasis on how they have 
been successfully managed. The chapter concludes with a brief note on how the often-tricky 
decision about ‘when and how to exit the field’ was eventually made.       
 
Accessing the Field 
My empirical fieldwork research in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria commenced on the 5th of 
April 2017 and ended on the 25th of August 2017 – a period that spanned just over three and 
half months. 
Approximately 5 months prior to my departure for the fieldwork, I spent a great deal of time 
trying to locate my possible respondents. Internet sources such as LinkedIn, Google search, 
Twitter and Facebook were very useful in identifying some of them. This process of 
identification was not random; the prospective interviewees needed to meet certain minimum 
criteria such as being among the influential figures of the Niger Delta region (elites); being 
familiar with the subject of violent ethnic mobilisation in the Niger Delta region, and finally, 
to have made or be making some contribution to the wider conversation on the Niger Delta’s  
conflict mitigation and resolution.  
With the list of the possible interviewees finally drawn up, I began making phone calls and 
sending out pre-interview request letters and e-mails to these prospective interviewees. 
Fortunately, most of them responded positively, and their consent was secured well ahead of 
time. The bulk of the interviews took place in two major cities of the Niger Delta region - Port 
Harcourt and Yenagoa. Port Harcourt is the capital city of Rivers state, while Yenagoa is the 




advanced and sophisticated modus operandi of their violent militia organisations. So, when it 
comes to investigating the subject of violent ethnic mobilisation in the region, these two cities 
are very important zones for data collection.  Apart from my personal efforts throughout the 
entire data collection process, it is worth mentioning that my gatekeeper, a resident of Port 
Harcourt city, also contributed in no small measure to identifying and facilitating my access to 
some of the respondents. He is familiar with the terrain, and was very helpful in enabling me 
to get around the cities more easily.   
Shortly before my work formally started in the region, I felt the need to remind the gatekeeper 
once again of the purpose of the research project, as well as its core guiding ethical principles, 
among which  were confidentiality and anonymity of data. Eventually, I was successful in 
getting him to agree, in accordance with these core principles, that neither the data obtained, 
nor the identity of the respondents would ever be disclosed to any third party. For the safety of 
the respondents, Berg (2007) and Bryman (2009) advise that the confidentiality and anonymity 
of data and respondents must be prioritised and taken very seriously. These established, the 
fieldwork research in the Niger Delta region commenced as planned.  
 
Research Design 
The primary goal of the fieldwork was to obtain some original data on why violent ethnic 
mobilisation has persisted in the Niger Delta region despite government efforts to eradicate it.  
To attain this, a qualitative case study research design was chosen as an appropriate method.    
Robert Yin (2014: 16) defines a case study as ‘an empirical enquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are 
used’. From Yin’s definition, one learns that in the real social world, the demarcation between 
a phenomenon (a case) and context is not always clear. A researcher may therefore wish to   
embark on a case study investigation in order to gain a better understanding of a phenomenon 
in its real-life social context (Yin and Davis 2007). The same could be applied to my research 
situation. The issue of violent ethnic mobilisation in the Niger Delta is a real-life incident. 
However, what is unclear is why it has persisted, and continues to persist despite a series of 
government efforts to eradicate it. Scholars and policy makers have come to a variety of 




the demarcation between phenomenon and context is, in the case of Niger Delta, blurry and 
therefore needs further clarification; and this is exactly the task that this project aims at 
accomplishing through its chosen research methods.    
Because this research was interested in penetrating the façade of existing facts on ethnic 
violence in the region, raising pertinent questions aimed at uncovering meanings and motifs 
behind events, there is good reason to believe that the qualitative case study design employed 
was appropriate and capable of fulfilling the research aspirations. For as Tellis (1997) observes, 
a qualitative case study design is appropriate for answering the ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions in a 
research process. It goes beyond mere quantitative data in order to understand behavioural 
conditions from the point of view of those being researched.  
While the research design was still at its developmental stage, an academic peer suggested, 
during a private conversation, that Ethnography or Participant observation could be an equally 
good means of collecting the needed data. Initially, these alternatives appeared to be quite 
promising. However, on closer examination, their inadequacies were revealed, and they were 
dropped for the following reasons: first, the research demands of both approaches (ethnography 
and participant observation) necessarily require the immersion of the researcher within his/her 
research milieu for a longer period of time in order to meaningfully investigate his/her subjects 
(Crang and Cook 2007; Gille and Riain 2002).  This, by implication would entail my being 
physically present in the dangerous and volatile creeks of the Niger Delta where armed 
militants still actively operate. I was prepared to consider these options despite their inherent 
security challenges, but since there were no indications that using these approaches would 
certainly lead to the discovery of fresh data that would substantially differ from those reported 
in the ethnographic and participant observation investigations carried out on the subject by 
some other notable researchers such as Judith Asuni (2009), an American researcher who has 
spent decades researching the phenomenon of violent ethnic mobilisation in the region, there 
was no compelling reason to use those research approaches. Credible ethnographic and 
participant observation research information on the issue already exists. Replication of the data 
is of no intellectual relevance, and certainly was not worth the security challenges involved. 
Secondly, when compared with the case study research design chosen for this project, there is 
no substantial evidence that ethnography and participant observation are more suitable or 
capable of obtaining relevant information on the phenomenon of violent ethnic mobilisation. 




cost effective, and above all, very capable of meeting the research aims and objectives of this 
project.   
 
Data Collection Method 
As observed by Perecman and Curran (2006: 21), the case study approach is, more 
appropriately speaking, a research design rather than merely a data collection and analysis 
method, for it involves the utilisation of a wide range of data collection techniques including 
surveys, interviews, observation and questionnaires among others. Of all these techniques, the 
interview method (precisely, the semi structured qualitative interview method) was chosen as 
the primary means of eliciting original data from the field.   
‘Interviewing’ may be defined as a conversation aimed at gathering information (Berg 2007: 
89). The central idea conveyed by this definition is captured equally well in the works of 
Denzin (1978), Patton (2001) and (Babbie, 2003), among others.   
Within the social sciences discipline, three broad categories of interview method are usually 
recognised: the structured, semi-structured and the unstructured variants. The structured 
interview method is quite rigid. It contains some pre-drafted sets of inflexible questions that 
are posed to the respondents in a predetermined order. The process is usually closed, permitting 
little or no initiative on the part of the interviewees. Its opposite is the unstructured interview 
method. Both methods may have their merits, but given the nature of my research and the sort 
of primary information I aimed to obtain, the semi-structured interview method was preferred 
for the following reason. Unlike the fixed and rigid nature of the structured interview method, 
the semi-structured alternative used in this project is more flexible.  It outlines beforehand the 
specific questions to be posed, but also remains flexible enough to accommodate other related 
and relevant matters that may be raised during the interview process. For this investigation, 
which sought an in-depth understanding of why violent ethnic mobilisations occur and persist 
in the Niger Delta, there was a need for a data collection method that allowed the respondents 
to fully express their thoughts and sentiments, while not letting them veer off completely from 
the main issues being discussed. In this regard, the semi structured interview approach used in 





Research Location, Population and Triangulation 
The Niger Delta region comprises six of the states of the Nigerian Federation, but they are not 
all the same when it comes to the issue of violent ethnic mobilisation in the region. Rivers and 
Bayelsa states are among the most notorious in this regard. Their militants are not only well 
organised and active, but also incredibly sophisticated in their manners of operation. So, for an 
in-depth study into the nature of violent mobilisation in the region, these two states could 
sufficiently serve as representatives for other states. Hence the reason for concentrating on 
these two states for the bulk of my interviews. My respondents were drawn from the official 
representatives of the people, namely: local traditional rulers and politicians (members of the 
state Houses of Assemblies) who served as proxies for the ethnic militants. These individuals 
belong to that section of a society that could be rightly referred to as the elite. The term ‘elite’ 
may be simply defined as a group of persons exercising a substantial amount of authority or 
influence within a larger group, especially on the account of their wealth, privileges or status. 
The definition provided here carefully and creatively integrates various senses in which the 
term has been defined both in English dictionaries, as well as in the works of some notable 
scholars in the field of qualitative research, such as Zuckerman (1972), Burt (1992), Smith 
(2006) Stephens (2007) and Harvey (2011). In the light of the above definition, and given the 
nature and status of my interviewees, it is pretty obvious that my interviews in the region are 
elite - for my respondents belong to the influential segment, though in varying degrees, of the 
Niger Delta society.  
My data collection activities in the region occurred within a timeframe of approximately three 
and half months (05/04/2017 - 25/08/2017) of going back and forth between Bayelsa and 
Rivers state. Overall, I conducted a total number of 16 interviews. 9 of these took place in 
Yenagoa, the capital city of Bayelsa state, involving 3 traditional community rulers and 6 
politicians (Members of Bayelsa State House of Assembly); while the other 7 interviews 
occurred in Port Harcourt, the capital city of Rivers state, and involved 3 traditional rulers and 
4 politicians (Members of Rivers State House of Assembly). The number of these respondents 
would have been higher (up to 27) if not that some declined to participate at the very last 
moment. For that reason, I ended up with only 16 interviews.  
Reflecting on the possible reasons for their abstention, I was led to acknowledge that the subject 
of my investigation was indeed a very sensitive one. A portion of my interview questions for 




persistence of violent ethnic mobilisation in the region. In the pre-interview request letters sent 
to my respondents earlier, I had briefly stated the purpose and objective of the research. So, in 
some way, they already had some ideas about the sort of questions that might be posed. One 
could imagine that for them, such questions could be quite disconcerting, as they would require 
of the interviewees to provide information that could be potentially implicating.  This, as I was 
later informed by another individual who knows the region quite well, might explain why some 
of them quietly declined being interviewed.  Not even my promise of confidentiality and 
anonymity of data was able to make decide otherwise. This said, I am however satisfied and 
impressed with the richness of data obtained from those who complied.    
The decision to interview the elites is based on the fact that they are generally well-informed 
on the subject of violent mobilisation in the region as well as its ramifications. As leaders, 
policy makers, lawmakers, government executives, contract and developmental projects’ 
negotiators, alternative dispute resolution practitioners, and, to state the obvious, influential 
members of the society, the elites have access to privileged pieces of information that are not 
normally available to the general public. These are some of the reasons why it made sense to 
target them (elites) – for they are sources of ‘seriously useful’ information on the subject of 
violent ethnic mobilisation in the Niger Delta region. Eminent scholars such as Denzin (2009), 
Creswell et al. (2018), and Natow (2019) amongst others all agree on the uncommon ability of 
the elites to provide valuable information on pertinent issues from the perspective of power, 
authority and privilege.  
This notwithstanding, I am aware that some might want to question why elites, rather than 
militants, were preferred as the main focus for data collection. Since the militants are the actual 
fighters in the Niger Delta’s violent conflict, might it not have made more sense to focus on 
them, rather than the elites, as the main source of information? Again, wouldn’t direct 
interviews with them have yielded more reliable information than those obtained from the 
elites? These were some of the questions raised by an inquisitive colleague during the 
preparatory phase of my fieldwork. This sort of questions are not entirely out of place – for it 
does seems reasonable to conjecture that those who actively engage in violent conflict or wars 
would normally understand, better than anyone else, why they are actually fighting. However, 
with regard to the phenomenon of violent ethnic mobilisation in the Niger Delta, reality is a bit 
different. Although the militants have some knowledge about the sitz im leben, they are not as 
informed as the elites. It is therefore pertinent to understand the character and place of the 




research that Niger Delta militants are mostly young men who mobilise violently as a way to 
challenge, and possibly reverse the systemic injustices associated with oil exploitation, 
distribution and environmental degradation in their region. It is basically from this standpoint, 
albeit narrow, that the militants justify their involvement in violent mobilisation in the region. 
Valid information on this could be obtained from the militants themselves. But since this data, 
that is, all that could be known about the nature and the motifs of the Niger Delta militants, 
already exists in the public domain, this research did not consider it relevant to add to the 
already abundant information on the issue. Furthermore, there is also no guarantee, in the case 
of prioritising interviews with the militants, that they would be able to provide me with reliable 
information on what goes on in the secluded inner circles of elite interactions and 
conversations. On the other hand, however, elites have access to an incredibly large amount of 
information. There is basically no information that the militants could provide which could not 
be obtained from the elites. The elites control the institutional powers of the state, and their 
wealth and position generally allow them access to any information they might be interested 
in. There is also evidence that some of the elites actually control some of these militancy cartels 
and occasionally deploy them in pursuit of some personal objectives. In view of all these, it 
was reasonable to prioritise the path that was capable of providing a wider and deeper insight 
into the phenomenon of violent mobilisation being investigated in the Niger Delta. Hence the 
decision to focus on the elites as the main source of data collection. Even if some researchers 
might want to believe that more reliable information may have been obtained by directly 
interviewing the militants themselves, chances are high that a good number of militants may 
not be entirely aware of the complexity and ramifications of the regional conflict in which they 
are fighters. But unlike them, the official representatives of the people are usually very well-
informed, better educated, and capable of articulating complex issues in a nuanced and 
intelligible manner. During my interviews, I was able to confirm, just as anticipated, that my 
respondents (the elites) were generally smart and articulate individuals. Although their 
opinions slightly differed on some issues, the responses they provided were, in general, 
cognitively meaningful.    
 
Triangulation   
Although I was very impressed with the highly detailed and rich data obtained by interviewing 




interactions with the respondents, it is always good practice to triangulate research data. This, 
to say the least, always strengthens data’s credibility and reliability. The usefulness of 
triangulation in providing complementarity, clarity, richness, clarity, and robustness to research 
data is very well acknowledged amongst researchers (Faquhar et al. 2020; Morgan 2019; Noble 
et al. 2019). Triangulation is not just about verifying already existing data. Although this 
without doubt constitutes an important a part of its function, triangulation does a bit more. It is 
capable of providing fresh and thought-provoking insight into a piece of research, which in 
some way nudges a researcher into presenting a more critical, balanced and comprehensive 
account of the social reality being studied. This is the import one gets from a careful reading 
of Helen Noble. In her words ‘triangulation is also an effort to help explore and explain 
complex human behaviour using a variety of methods to offer a more balanced explanation to 
readers’ (Noble 2019:67). It was therefore in the light of these invaluable benefits of data 
triangulation that I decided to use a few other sources of primary data, not only to verify the 
elite interview data obtained during my fieldwork, but also to strengthen its credibility, 
reliability, and robustness. The materials used for triangulation (also known as supplementary 
sources) in this project were newspaper articles, television and newspaper interviews with 
technocrats, statesmen and ex-militants, official government documents, and relevant scholarly 
literature on the subject of violent ethnic mobilisation, particularly in the Niger Delta region.  
Twenty-three such materials were obtained and used.  
 
Data Analysis   
The semi-structured qualitative interviews yielded a fairly large amount of slightly unstructured 
text-based data. Making sense of the information obtained therefore required some data 
analysis, as well as tools by which this task would be accomplished. For this purpose, this 
project made use of a combination of manual text-analyses techniques and NVivo.   
Data analysis, in general, including in this research, entails the systematic search and 
arrangement of interview transcripts and notes in order to identify relevant and significant 
patterns, discover meanings, and subsequently construct a logical chain of evidence (Wong 
2008; Bogdan et al 1982; Patton 2002).  According to Wong (2008), coding the data is the most 
important aspect of the complex process of data analysis. It involves segmenting raw data and 
assigning them to appropriate themes or categories (Dey 1993). Traditionally, and before the 




performed the tasks of data coding and analysis manually. However, with technological 
advancements in the field, electronic methods of analysing data are now increasingly employed 
to assist researchers in their search for a more accurate and transparent picture of the data.  A 
few such electronic methods are ATLAS.ti, NUD.IST, NVivo and Leximancer amongst others. 
From these, NVivo was selected for this project. The decision to choose NVivo was influenced 
by the fact that it is often recommended in the academic literature referred to. For qualitative 
text-based in-depth data analysis, NVivo is generally categorised among the best software 
available. This opinion is reflected in the work of some prominent scholars such as Auld et al. 
(2007), Welsh (2002), Sotiriadou et al. (2014), as well as,  more conspicuously, in Stanford 
University’s ‘Social Science Data and Software Document’ of 2012 which describes NVivo 
as: ‘a comprehensive qualitative data analysis software package’.  Below is a brief description 
of how the data were analysed.  
First of all, the responses provided by the interviewees were transcribed, and then imported 
into NVivo where they were thematically sorted and coded in a way that facilitates 
identification, indexing and retrieval during analysis and interpretation.  Thereafter, all 
synonymous terms and expressions were coded under a node, in a manner that did not alter 
their contextual meanings. For instance, the terms benefits, gains, advantages, profits were 
coded, and understood as ‘interest’. Similarly, terms and expressions synonymous with, or, 
suggestive of ‘ethnicity’ such as ethnos, ethno, ethnic, etc, were coded as ‘ethnicity’. The same 
was done with terms and expressions that are synonymous with ‘manipulative elites’.  This was 
the second step in the data analysis process. 
Before proceeding, it is helpful to recall that ‘interest’, ‘manipulative elites’, and ‘ethnicity’ 
are the important variables specifically investigated by this research. The Kaufmanian 
ethnosymbolic theoretical framework guiding the research outlines them as necessary 
conditions for the occurrence and persistence of ethnic violence. The researcher accepted 
Kaufman’s view as valid. What however remained to be seen was what the interviewees had 
to say. Did they think that interest, manipulative elites, and ethnicity all played some roles in 
the spiralling and persistence of the Niger Delta violent conflict? It was in a bid to discover 
their opinions on these issues that I went to the field to interview them. The responses they 
provided on each of the variables were gathered under two broad categories or nodes: those 
who affirmed, and those who opposed. Those who, for instance, thought that interest has 
played some role in the spiralling of the regional conflict were grouped into an affirmative 




opposing node. This process was repeated with the responses obtained on the roles of the other 
variables (manipulative elites and ethnicity) in the onset and persistence of ethnic violence in 
the Niger Delta.   
It was then fairly straightforward to see how many individuals (interviewees) supported or 
opposed which views, as well as the reasons they provided in support of their opinions. After 
this, all the responses were carefully analysed in the light of the extant academic literature on 
the subject of ethnic violence (including Kaufman’s ethnosymbolism), as well as in the light 
of known historical incidents of violent ethnic mobilisation in the Niger Delta in order to 
establish the credibility and validity, or not, of these interview positions. Details about how this 
analysis was done may be found in the empirical chapters (Chapters 4, 5, and 6) of this thesis. 
Both NVivo, and manual textual analyses helped to better illuminate the data obtained from 
the interviews by revealing patterns and frequencies, and by facilitating the retrieval of the 
already coded and thematically sorted pieces of information.  
 
Ethical Considerations 
The need to conduct research in an ethically acceptable manner is not disputed. While all agree 
on this at least in principle, there have been instances, both famous and infamous, in which 
ethical research principles have been breached (Pittaway et al. 2010; Bryman, 2012:130).  
But then the question of what constitutes ethically right or permissible conduct in research is 
still, to some extent, subject to a plurality of views. To eliminate ambiguities, or at least reduce 
them, the British Sociological Association (BSA 2002) and University of Bristol Ethics 
Committee (2015) provide official guidelines to assist researchers. I read these guidelines and 
familiarised myself with their prescriptions. In line with their dictates, I carefully ensured that 
I obtained my respondents’ informed consent before the interviews. I also provided them with 
detailed information on the aims and objectives of the research, as well as about how the data 
would be used. All this was done in order to ensure that any form of deception was eliminated, 
and that participants’ privacy was not invaded. In addition, the pieces of information provided 
were also recorded in a manner that anonymised the identity of the individual, even after 
official publication of the research output. This notwithstanding, there were two instances in 
which respondents wished their names revealed. The reason for this desire was not entirely 




popularity among the people they governed, or as an avenue to overtly criticise their opponents. 
Whatever may have been the motif, I chose not to reveal their identities, especially as granting 
this wish might actually have exposed them to the wrath of those who held opposing views. 
Following Pittaway et al. (2010), I saw it as my responsibility to analyse my respondents’ 
requests in order to ensure that fulfilling them would not inadvertently place them at some 
unforeseen risk. This does not translate into paternalism. I was simply abiding by the 
reasonable and well-thought out principles, based on which the University of Bristol granted 
approval for the research.  
Another important element worthy of consideration concerns how this research project could 
benefit the individuals and communities researched. Pittaway et al (2010) presented a very 
cogent argument on the need for a piece of research to add value to the lives of those being 
researched, whenever possible. This, they argued, is a way of guarding against the reduction of 
the researched, that is, the human subjects participating in the research, to mere sources of data 
collection (simple objects used to accomplish research objectives). Because I share Pittaway’s 
view, this research was designed, not only as a part of the wider effort to understand the 
dynamics of violent ethnic conflict in the Niger Delta, but also with a view to the restoration 
of the atmosphere of peace in which indigenes and residents of the region could flourish and 
prosper, both individually and collectively; for there is a link between violence and lack of 
human progress. So, far from being exploitative, the research actually aims to contribute to the 
common good of the communities in which it was carried out.  
 
Other Challenges Encountered During the Fieldwork 
 
The Validity and Reliability Question      
One of the major challenges I encountered during the fieldwork relates to the question of 
validity and reliability. Like Watt (2007), I constantly asked myself the following question: 
how can I deal with my subjectivity in order that others may accept my research as credible? 
Beyond the current research context, it seems that this question is one of the major challenges 
confronting empirical researchers in the domain of the social sciences in general. In the natural 
sciences, whose object of investigation is fairly stable, measuring the ‘objectivity’, validity and 




convoluted when it comes to qualitatively researching the complex and constantly changing 
world of social phenomena.  In social science qualitative research, objectivity in the real sense 
of the term is impossible; especially as social researchers, having been shaped by their social 
and educational contexts, have their preferences, biases and inclinations (Gadamer 1976). The 
same point applies to me as a researcher. My fieldwork has been conducted within the 
interpretivist, not positivist, tradition. This being the case, I cannot therefore claim to be 
entirely immune from the risk of my subjectivity interfering with the research process. That 
notwithstanding, I can still confidently say of my investigation that it is valid and reliable. This 
bold claim, quite naturally, brings up the question of the criteria for validity. By what means 
have I been able to come to the assertion that my research is valid and reliable? To clarify this, 
I would like to quickly state that I carefully evaluated my research processes against the 
background of the ‘validity and reliability criteria’ put forward by Guba (1985), and by Guba 
and Lincoln (1994). These include, but are not limited to the following: credibility, 
dependability and confirmability criteria. Although these yardsticks resemble the validity 
criteria used in the positivist tradition, they actually differ in a number of ways.  
In qualitative research, the notion of credibility recognises the fact that people may interpret 
social realities in different ways. It is therefore the duty of the researcher to ensure that the 
interpretations reported reflect the opinions of the respondents (Bryman 2009: 132). During 
the interview process, I carefully took notes of the responses provided by the interviewees. At 
the end of every session, I always read back their replies to them so that they could confirm 
whether or not what had been scribbled down corresponded with what they had verbally 
expressed. Again, I always allowed my respondents the opportunity to make corrections 
whenever and wherever they felt their ideas had not been properly captured. All this was done 
because of my persuasion that the qualitative case study research method used should, as 
observed by Bryman (2009), describe and analyse social realities from the viewpoint of those 
being studied. At that material time, I was not particularly bothered about the issue of the 
universalisability, or not, of my findings. What mattered most for me was to ensure that the 
thoughts, social realities and details presented corresponded to the very social context and 
milieu from which they originated. This is the thick description that Geertz (1973) encouraged 
qualitative researchers to be more concerned about.  
Having done all this, I am confident that any third party interested in testing the validity and 
reliability of this research would eventually return with the report that it is credible (that is, it 




confidently refer to it in making further analyses and recommendations) and confirmable ( I 
have acted in good faith, and personal inclinations and biases have not unduly swayed the 
research processes and findings). 
Respondents’ Apprehension 
Another challenge I encountered during the fieldwork is what could be described as the 
“respondents’ apprehension”. By this I mean some form of suspicion or fear entertained by my 
interviewees regarding the possible implications of the information they were asked to provide. 
In the pre-interview request letters sent to the interviewees, I clearly stated that whatever 
information provided to me during the interview would not only be anonymised, but also 
treated as confidential. I hoped that this assurance would assuage their apprehensions, but this 
was really not the case; for most of the respondents still remained somewhat apprehensive – 
taking extra care to ensure that all traces of their having met with me was completely erased.  
For instance, in Yenagoa, the capital city of Bayelsa State where I conducted some of the 
interviews, one member of the state’s House of Assembly (an MP) that I interviewed declined 
to meet with me in his office as initially planned. He changed the venue just a couple of hours 
before the interview. The new venue was the frontage of a designated busy bank premises. 
Although we had previously not met each other, we were able to locate each other by phone 
calls. The scheduled interview eventually took place in my car at the designated spot. Similarly, 
another powerful traditional ruler who had earlier confirmed his availability for an interview 
with me declined at the last moment - just as I was already in his office. He met me, shook 
hands with me and welcomed me into his office, only to inform me that the interview would 
no longer take place. No genuine reason was given. Being closely observed by some of his 
heavily armed security guards, I dared not ask for further explanation on why our previously 
agreed interview schedule was suddenly cancelled. Furthermore, many of the interviewees who 
fulfilled their promise and granted me an audience did not allow me to record the interview. 
Only three consented to have the interview recorded, but on the condition that their identities 
be anonymised, and the information kept absolutely confidential.  So, in most cases, I resorted 
to note-taking. Although this was not as effective as voice recording, I made sure that the 
essence of the information provided was correctly captured. 
Eliciting information from such a sensitive population requires some level of familiarity with 
the art of qualitative interviewing; for simple errors in body language, tone, and manner of 




this reason that Brinkmann and Kvale (2015) advised researchers on the need to develop 
strategies that are meaningful and relevant to their particular research context or population. 
Given the apprehensive and super sensitive nature of most of my respondents, my overall 
strategy was to be as frank as possible regarding the purpose of the interview, what the data 
collected would be used for, and to give an unwavering assurance of confidentiality and the 
anonymity of the data, as well as of my vision of the positive contribution of the research to 
peace processes in the region. These pieces of information, simple as they might appear, 
actually made the interview atmosphere less tense. Fairly relaxed, the respondents were then 
able to present their opinions as honestly as they could, and this made my interviews with them 
a very successful exercise.  
 
Mobility 
Getting around cities and villages was another difficult challenge that I had to face. Apart from 
the lack of other basic infrastructures in some of the villages, the road networks were in really 
bad shape, and frequently flooded after rainfalls. Because of this, mobility by means of public 
transport was generally problematic. To get around the situation, I had borrowed a car to use. 
Although this was very helpful, movement did not get massively easier due to some obvious 
difficulties with navigating the bad and water-logged roads in the area. On a few occasions, my 
car got trapped in muddy soil, frequently needing the help of generous passersby to help me 
push it back on to a dry surface. Although these experiences were quite discomforting, they did 
not come entirely as a surprise. The University of Bristol’s ethics committee, relying on the 
information provided by the UK foreign office, had already forewarned me about such 
incidents. This warning predisposed me for the challenge, and I managed it very well. It had 
no negative impacts, neither on my research nor the results.  
 
Security Issues and Strategies 
Kidnapping and robbery are among the most disturbing security challenges that any researcher 
visiting the Niger Delta region should be mindful of. They are fairly common occurrences in 
the region. According to local news, there is usually a link between these crimes and poverty. 
Perpetrators of these nefarious acts often targeted those perceived to be financially well-off, or 




resistance. As a visiting researcher in possession of a high capacity laptop, mobile phones, 
digital camera, Dictaphones and money, the chances that I could become a victim were quite 
high. Being aware of this earlier helped me to figure out the best preventive measures to take, 
as follows:   
First, I changed my dress code to conform with what was normal in the neighbourhoods I 
visited. So, I wore mostly T-shirts and shorts, except on those occasions when I had 
appointments with my interviewees. My dressing strategy helped avoid attracting unnecessary 
attention to myself, and avoid being placed at a risk of becoming the victim of either armed 
robbery or kidnapping.  
The second strategy was to draw up a practical communication plan involving a trustworthy, 
responsible and responsive individual who served as my personal security contact person.   
Prior to every scheduled interview appointment, I provided this individual with very detailed 
information about my interview schedules, locations, respondents and the possible risks 
associated with the exercise. In addition to these, I also provided him with the University of 
Bristol contact details to be used in cases of emergency. Below is a brief description of my 
personal security plan and procedures.   
Before departing for any scheduled appointment, I always texted my personal security contact 
person to provide information about the venue, the person to be interviewed and the estimated 
duration of the exercise. Each interview session usually lasted for about 40 minutes on the 
average. We had arranged that if for any reason he did not hear from me within 15 minutes 
after the estimated end time of each interview, he should try to contact me to ensure that no 
extraordinary challenge was being encountered.  If he failed to reach me, and no response was 
received from me within an hour of repeated calls and text messages, then the local police 
authorities should be contacted, and other appropriate emergency response plans initiated; and 
this would have to include contacting and informing the University of Bristol authorities.  
What I have described above is just the emergency action plan that we had in place. However, 
I am very glad that nothing horrible or overwhelming occurred, and that we did not have to 





Leaving the Field   
For many researchers, deciding on the appropriate time to leave the field is not an easy one. 
Should such a decision be based on the quantity or quality of data already collected? These 
were the sorts of questions that I reflexively raised during my fieldwork. However, the view of 
Baker and Edwards (2012: 15) on this was very helpful in finding a way forward. For them, 
there is “no reasonable answer, no magic number you can do and then you’re out of danger. 
The only possible answer is to have enough interviews to say what you think is true and not to 
say things you don’t have that number for”.   
In the current research context, the key factor in determining when to exit the field was the 
‘saturation point’, rather than the quantity of data already amassed. In qualitative research, the 
saturation point, although quite difficult to define, is generally understood as the point when 
information gathered is believed by the researcher to be able to sufficiently answer the research 
questions (Bowen 2008; O’Reilly & Parker 2012; Walker 2012); and the ability to obtain 
additional fresh information has been reached (Guest et al., 2006). During my data collection, 
I knew I had attained the saturation point when pieces of information from my respondents 
started becoming repetitive, and I was obtaining no fresh insights on the subject of my 
investigation. That was the point at which I decided to conclude my investigation and exit the 
field. To justify this decision and affirm my confidence in the authenticity and credibility of 
the data collected, I further conducted a ‘triangulation’ exercise in which I interviewed a few 









THE CONTEXT OF VIOLENT ETHNIC MOBILISATION IN THE NIGER DELTA 
 
             Map of Nigeria   
 
                      Source: world-gazetteer.com 
 
It is normal to anticipate that a project like this whose primary objective is to furnish a response 
to the question of why violent ethnic mobilisation has continued to persist in the Niger Delta 
despite efforts to eradicate it, ought to include a contextual overview of the conflict scenario 
under examination in order to facilitate its comprehension. This is exactly what this chapter 
aims to accomplish. It is worth mentioning early on that the chapter will not be obsessed with 
providing a finely detailed chronological history of Nigeria and of the Niger Delta region, but 
will rather be limited to only those historical events that are relevant, either directly or 
indirectly, in helping one to make general sense of the regional conflict under review.     
This chapter commences with a brief description of the land and the people of the Niger Delta, 
its pre-colonial socio-political organisations and heritage, as well as the impact that colonialism 
has had on them and on the conflict dynamics in the region. Next, an effort is made to explain 




significantly since Shell’s discovery of commercial quantities of oil in the region in 1958. As 
will subsequently be seen, nearly all major politically salient violent confrontations within the 
Niger Delta post 1960, are linked, either directly or remotely, to grievances and agitations over 
oil exploitation and/or, the distribution of its revenue. It is also against this background that the 
rise of violent ethnic militias in the Niger Delta may be better understood. The chapter 
concludes with a tabular timeline of major historical events in the Niger Delta region.   
 
The Land and People of the Niger Delta 
 
Map of the Niger Delta region  
(numerically identifying its 9 constituent states) 
 
          
source: world-gazetteer.com 
(1) Abia,  (2) Akwa Ibom, (3) Bayelsa,  (4) Cross River, (5) Delta, (6) Edo, (7) Imo, (8) Ondo, (9) Rivers 
 
The Niger Delta region is located in the South-southern part of Nigeria, and covers about 
70,000 square kilometres of the country’s land mass. The Niger Delta currently comprises 9 




Imo and Ondo states -  and is home to 31 million inhabitants of such diverse ethnicities as the 
Ijaw, Itsekiri, Efik, Urhobo, Kalabari, Ogoni, Okrika, Igbo, and Esan, amongst others. 
Researchers estimate that there are at least 40 identifiable ethnic groups inhabiting the region 
(CRS 2008; Asuni 2009; Orogun 2009; Okonta et al., 2003). Nnoli (2008) does not necessarily 
dispute these numbers, but rather points out the difficulty of knowing with certainty the exact 
number of ethnic groups in either Nigeria or the Niger Delta – a difficulty which, according to 
him, arises from lack of unanimity amongst researchers and scholars over the criteria for 
determining what constitutes an ethnic group. For instance, some analysts use language as the 
primary determinant, while others insist that more than language is required in making ethnic 
distinctions, principally because ethnic boundaries are sometimes contextualised, especially 
during moments of political crisis (Nnoli 2008). But then, even amongst those who use 
linguistics as the main criteria for determining an ethnic group, a fresh difficulty in 
distinguishing between a language and its dialects is also encountered. Igbo, for instance, is a 
language spoken by the Igbo people, and which is also used to identify members the Igbo ethnic 
group. However, there exists another ethnic collectivity which, although speaking an Igbo 
dialect, do not recognise themselves as Igbos, but rather as the Ikwere ethnic group. Occasions 
like this create scenarios in which analysts and experts who recognise dialects as substantive 
languages, and those who do not, disagree about the number of ethnic groups in Nigeria and 
the Niger Delta. This is why, as Nnoli (2008) notes, the exact number of ethnic groups in 
Nigeria is unknown. Despite this, the number of ethnic groups in the Niger Delta could 
conservatively be put at 40. For different opinions about the number of ethnic groups in Nigeria 
(also in the Niger Delta), see works by Otite (1990), Hoffman, (1994); CRS (2008); Asuni 
(2009); Orogun (2009); Okonta et al. (2003). 
The Niger Delta region is also naturally endowed with one of the finest and most fascinating 
ecosystems in the world. Freshwater swamps, lowland rainforests, and mangrove swamp 
forests are some of its principal ecological zones. With these, the region is capable of 
supporting an incredibly wide range of fish, animal and plant species. The precolonial Niger 
Deltans (and to some reasonable extent, contemporary Niger Deltans) were predominantly 
fishermen and peasant farmers who produced mainly to feed their immediate families, 
occasionally selling the surplus for a bit of income. So, they were massively dependent on the 
fertility of their soil and ecosystem for livelihood. Whatever impacts negatively on their 
environment has always had enormous consequences on their ability to survive or lead a 




Heritage of the Pre-Colonial African Societies: ‘Porous States’ and Kinship 
Lineage 
Modern African ethnicity, Berman (1998) affirms, is a social construction of the colonial 
period. Berman’s affirmation, far from being a mere subjective adumbration is actually based 
on historico-empirical research findings. It is a verifiable fact of history, and therefore hugely 
reliable. Thomson (2010), writing on the topic of ethnicity in Africa upholds Berman’s 
statement, and advises that if anyone wishes to fully appreciate the evolution and character of 
modern African ethnicity, and its implications for politics and violence, then one ought to go 
beyond its colonial origins and inquire into the nature of pre-colonial socio-political formations 
in Africa, notably the issues of ‘porous state’ and kinship lineage in pre-colonial Africa.  
Pre-colonial Africa is incredibly diverse. Different circumstances produced different societies, 
traditions, customs and politics, as pre-colonial Africans addressed the challenges that 
confronted them. Despite this diversity, pre-colonial Africa could be grouped, in terms of its 
socio-political organisation, under two broad categories: states and stateless societies. Evidence 
that testifies to the existence of strong states in pre-colonial Africa abounds. Thomson (2010) 
cites the states of Ghana, Mali, Ashanti, Benin, Egypt, Zulu and Bugunda among others, as 
examples of strong states in pre-colonial Africa. These states were built out of surpluses from 
agriculture and trans-Saharan trade. Historians now recognise that both technically and socio-
politically, some of these great civilisations (states) were ahead of their European 
contemporaries. Although the existence of states in pre-colonial Africa is no longer an issue 
that is reasonably questioned among historians, one should be mindful of the fact that the nature 
of these pre-colonial African states is quite different from the Eurocentric conception of a state 
as having precisely defined permanent boundaries within which law and order are strictly 
maintained by a supreme authority. These features of a European state were rare in pre-colonial 
Africa. The borders of the pre-colonial African states were flexible, and free movement of 
people was a regular occurrence. It is for this reason that scholars refer to them as ‘non-
hegemonic states’ (Thomson 2010: 11).   
Apart from these few strong pre-colonial African states, historians also recognise the existence 
of other ‘stateless’ collectivities in pre-colonial Africa. Relatively small economic surpluses 
and low population densities hindered the formation of states in many parts of Africa (Thomson 
2010). But ‘statelessness’ does not in any way connote backwardness, or that these societies 




these pre-colonial African communities, of sophisticated forms of representation, justice, 
accountability, and mutual security networks. To this effect, these ‘stateless’ societies should 
be understood for what they are – human collectivities whose primary interest was in 
responding to the concerns of their immediate surrounding, and not in the formation of large 
political states - types that are more often associated with the Western civilisation (Thomson 
2010, Nnoli 2008). 
Whether as ‘strong’ states or as ‘stateless’ collectivities, pre-colonial Africa generally has a 
historical trajectory of kinship; that is, the idea of an extended family. In theory, a kinship 
lineage could trace its past back to the same ancestral origin; and these bonds of origin bind 
the community together.  Realistically however, actual ties are not a continuum; for outsiders 
are occasionally brought into the clan, and individuals marry into other family lineages. All 
these show that kinship boundaries in pre-colonial Africa are not only constructed, but also 
flexible; and this is contrary to the colonialists’ primordialist description of ancient African 
societies as based purely on biological descent (Berman 1998). Rules guiding interpersonal 
interactions in the precolonial African societies are generally unwritten. They are rather handed 
down from one generation to the next through customary practices, folklores and oral tradition. 
Members of these groups understand and abide by them; and there are consequences for 
breaching them. The head of the community, usually the eldest male person, understood 
generally as the main custodian of the community’s unwritten laws, has a great deal of political 
power. Another significant feature of the precolonial Kinship group is that it provides 
solidarity, justice, security and welfare for its members. The wide range of support it provides 
increases and solidifies people’s attachment and bond to their communities (Horowitz 2000, 
Nnoli 2008).  
The description given above of the kinship lineage resembles that of ethnicity in a variety of 
ways. For instance, an ethnic group, just like a kinship group, lays claim to an imagined 
collective ancestral decent of its members; and also provides solidarity, welfare, security and 
identity amongst other things, for its members (Nnoli 2008).  Ethnicity is, as Horowitz 
(2000:57) states, the most extended form of kinship. This is why Berman (1998) also holds that 
the idea of ethnicity already existed in Africa before the arrival of the colonialists, although it 
was significantly different from the form that currently. Large ethnic groups with clearly 
defined boundaries which are obvious features of modern African societies are new, not old. 




colonial period. An accumulating weight of scholarly evidence shows that modern African 
ethnicity, particularly as it relates to politics, is new.  
What has been said above regarding the nature of pre-colonial African society is equally 
applicable to Nigeria and the Niger Delta in the pre-colonial era. The socio-political 
organisation of the pre-colonial Nigeria is significantly different from the way they currently 
exist. Nigeria did not have large ethnic groups with neatly demarcated boundaries before 
colonisation. More of this is discussed in the next section.   
 
A Hint on the Nature of The Precolonial Nigerian (Niger Delta) Societies  
In Nigeria, there currently exist over 250 identifiable ethnic groups of different sizes and 
proportions (Salawu 2010); and forty of these, at least, are found in the Niger Delta region 
(Ploch 2012; Asunni 2009).  Some ethnic groups have a staggering population of over forty 
million. The populations of the Igbo, Hausa, Yoruba, and Ijaw ethnic groups, for instance, are 
approximately twenty-eight million, fifty million, twenty-eight million and 4.6 million, 
respectively. These numbers by far exceed the population of many countries of the world, yet 
in Nigeria, they are mere ethnic groups, not independent nations. This gives one an idea of how 
large modern ethnic groups in Nigeria can sometimes be. Prior to the colonial era however, 
ethnic groups in Nigeria did not exist as large collectivities. The Igbo people were, for instance, 
organised into separate small autonomous political societies, coterminous with villages in pre-
colonial times. Although some of these villages had contact with one another through trade, 
many others did not; and were in fact, to a certain degree, unaware of the existence of other 
Igbo societies. So, Igbo speaking people had no collective consciousness of their existence as 
one large ethnic group in pre-colonial times (Nnoli 1989; 2008). The same is equally true of 
the Yoruba ethnic group of South-Western Nigeria. It was only after colonisation that the term 
‘Yoruba’ came to be used to designate those territories whose rulers traces its ancestry to the 
mythical Oduduwa. Previously, the term only referred to the Oyo kingdom. These small socio-
political groupings, that would later, in the post-colonial era, become part of the larger Yoruba 
ethnic group, existed in the area as autonomous societies before colonisation, occasionally 
interacting with one another as and when needed.  
The situation was not any different in the pre-colonial era of the Niger Delta region. Alagoa 




narrates that the people of the people of the Niger Delta, especially the Ijaw ethnic group, were, 
prior to colonisation, organised into small socio-political groupings called Ibe. An Ibe, 
according to Alagoa, has no linguistic parallel in English language. The closest English 
translation for the term is clan; yet Ibe, in terms of its composition, is different from a clan as 
understood in the English language. This is why Alagoa has preferred to retain the original 
term Ibe in his description of the pre-colonial Niger Delta societies. A typical Ibe, according to 
Alagoa (1972), is comprised of a group of villages and persons who speak a common dialect 
of the Ijaw language and believe in the common ancestral origin of all the villages that make 
up their Ibe. An Ibe has no central authority, for every village is politically autonomous and 
governed on the principles of gerontocracy (government by the elders). Logically, the 
executive, judicial and legislative functions of village were therefore vested in the oldest man 
in the village (Ama-Okusuowei, who is also the religious head) and in his cabinet of other 
elderly men, randomly hand-picked from various kinship lineages of the village. Knowledge 
of herbs (medicine) and history were the minimum qualification for being appointed into the 
cabinet. These roles were not hereditary (Alagoa 1972; Alagoa (ed.) 1999; Okaba 1999; Nnoli 
2008). 
What emerges clearly from the foregoing is that in pre-colonial Nigeria, large ethnic groups 
did not exist. People, in general, were rather organised into smaller villages which provided 
them with welfare, justice, security, values, identity and a sense of direction. Although these 
communities had some sort of boundaries, they were flexible and fluid. In general, pre-colonial 
kinship (‘ethnic’) groups and identities in Nigeria were relatively fluid, with some groups 
occasionally assimilating into another. Dike (1956) describes a case of assimilation between 
the Igbo and Ijaw ethnic groups of Nigeria during the pre-colonial era. Other instances of 
interethnic assimilations could be found in Nnoli (1989; 2008). So large, precisely defined, and 
often politicised, ethnic groups, as are currently evident in modern Nigeria, are recent. They 
are a social construction of the colonial and post-colonial periods. This is discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 6. 
 
The Niger Delta’s Uneasy Contact with Early European Merchants and 
Colonialists    
The region’s location on the West African coastal waters made it an important commercial 




and 19th centuries (Ogbogbo 2005). The people of the Niger Delta massively participated as 
middlemen connecting the European traders with Nigerians in the hinterland. It is worth noting 
that the relationship between the Europeans (including the British) and the Niger Deltans was 
that of a formal, and ‘mutually beneficial’ transaction in goods and services. There were as yet 
no clear signs that the British harboured any colonial agenda, otherwise peoples’ resistance 
would have been initiated quite early on. The wealth of both the Niger Delta region and of its 
indigenes grew significantly as a result of their avid participation in the economic activities 
and trade of the time. It was however not very long before the ignoble colonial project started 
unfolding, with the colonialists (hitherto disguised as businessmen) seeking to dominate and 
control every sector of the region’s economic and political life. At that point, the people of the 
Niger Delta, in an effort to maintain its vantage point of middlemen in business and protect its 
wealth, violently clashed with the colonialists. The well-documented history of numerous 
violent encounters between the colonialists and the powerful leaders of the Niger Delta such as 
King Jaja of Opobo, Koko of Nembe and Nana Olomu testifies to the Niger Delta people’s 
effort at maintaining its vantage economic and political position, and ward off these foreign 
aggressors (Ogbogbo 2005). Despite the region’s resistance, the more powerful colonial forces 
were able eventually to pacify the area, depose its powerful but defiant leaders, exile them, and 
finally bring the entire region under colonial domination and rule.  
Although internal disputes over ownership of fishponds and lands did occasionally occurr 
among the Niger Deltans themselves, the violent conflict between them and the British invaders 
were quite remarkable, for it marked the beginning of what would become a long-term 
resistance to colonialism which eventually culminated in Nigeria’s political independence. The 
negative consequences of colonialism would be felt in both Nigeria and the Niger Delta region 
for years to come.  
 
Indirect Rule, Ethnic Polarisation and Conflict in the Pre-Independence 
Nigeria 
Colonial rule fittingly described by Berman (1998) as ‘an apparatus of authoritarian 
bureaucratic control’ continued to dominate the traditional societies of the Niger Delta and its 
neighbouring areas.  By 1913, the colonial expeditionary forces had already successfully 
pacified these territories, bringing them completely under colonial rule. In 1914, all the British 




by Lord Frederick Lugard. These territories, which had previously functioned as autonomous 
societies, barely had anything in common except the geographical appellation Nigeria. Despite 
this obvious fact, they were still forcibly merged for the colonialists’ economic and 
administrative convenience and interests. This was the birth of the new political entity called 
Nigeria (Colman 1958).  
Generally speaking, unification or merging of previously independent societies is not 
necessarily a bad project, particularly in circumstances where the reason for unification is clear, 
mutually beneficial, and freely, not forcefully, assented to. Historically, previously 
independent nations have often merged for good reasons, such as advancing their economic or 
security interests among others. There are for instance some significant linguistic, historical, 
and cultural differences between the people of Scotland, England, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
But these substantive nations have decided, for reasons that are mutually beneficial, to remain 
part of the one single political entity called the United Kingdom. The same could also be said 
about the European union and its member states. The decision to remain part of the union is 
free, and each constituent member state of the union, as is evident in the case of Brexit (Martill 
and Staiger 2018), could always decide, out of its own volition to exit the union. However, the 
same cannot be said about the colonial amalgamation of the previously autonomous societies 
of pre-colonial Nigeria. They were forcefully merged for the benefits of the colonialist, and not 
for that of the people. And the latter certainly had not been offered the liberty to exit the union 
at will. It was in the economic and administrative interests of the colonialists to keep this forced 
union going – denying pre-colonial Nigerian societies, including the Niger Delta area, the 
opportunity or right to take charge of their destinies (Coleman 1958; Nnoli 1978; 2008). The 
colonialists were very much aware of the undesirable consequences of forced union – 
resistance. It was simply a matter of time before this would begin to occur. To forestall this, 
they employed the system of ‘indirect rule’ which is an administrative method by which 
colonialists ruled over the Africans through their own chiefs and headmen, and institutions – 
decentralised despotism, as Mamdani (2018) calls it.   
As observed by Berman (1998), the primary objective of indirect rule was to keep Nigerians 
(and Niger Deltans) isolated from one another, and prevent them from engaging in any trans-
ethnic anti-colonial mobilisation. Scholars are now unanimous on the fact that indirect rule laid 
the foundation for the reinforcement of ethnicity and uncivil nationalism in Nigeria by 
reinforcing ethnic boundaries and inhibiting the formation of strong national consciousness. 




rather than promoting whatever was capable of unifying them. To get a sense of how indirect 
rule laid the foundation of modern ethnic discrimination, competition and future ethnic conflict, 
it is necessary to take a quick look at how this colonial policy was implemented in Nigeria. 
In 1910, the Land and Native Rights Ordinance was promulgated by the colonial state. This act 
officially declared that all lands in the Northern Nigeria, with the exception of just a few, were 
native lands and would henceforth be administered by the colonial government, and obviously 
through the intermediary of their already existing institutions, as deemed conducive. One of 
the primary objectives of this law was to limit and control the level of interaction and 
intermingling between the Northerners and Southerners, such as the Igbos, the Yorubas, and 
the Ijaws of the Niger Delta amongst other people migrating to the North, for fear that they 
could undermine the colonialists’  highly cherished alliance with the Hausa-Fulani ruling class 
of the North (Nnoli 2003; 2008). The colonialists had a soft spot for the highly centralised 
system of government operating in pre-colonial Northern Nigeria. The ruling class of the North 
had absolute power and control over their subjects, who carefully abided by their injunctions 
with little or no resistance. They had strict measures in place to effectively chastise defaulters 
and dissidents. The colonialists were sympathetic to this organisational structure and hierarchy, 
because it made easier the implementation of their exploitative agenda. Once the colonialists 
had successfully secured the loyalty and compliance of the ruling class, they also, almost 
automatically, had a firm grip on the entire population. It was therefore in the interest of the 
colonial government to do whatever was possible to prevent the intermingling of the Northern 
and Southern migrants. Hence the promulgation of the Land and Native Rights Ordinance 
briefly described above. The concrete implementation of this colonial ordinance led to the 
formulation of the so-called policy of ‘Sabon Gari’, whose main objective was to physically 
segregate the Northerners from the Southerners in Northern Nigeria. In Zaria (a city in Northern 
Nigeria) for instance, the policy of ‘Sabon Gari’ led to the development of three different 
categories of settlement: (1)The walled city, which housed the indigenous population of Zaria; 
(2) ‘Tudun Wada’, an area housing the non-indigenous northern population; (3) Sabon Gari, a 
zone housing the southern migrant population, referred to by the colonialists as ‘native 
foreigners’ (Nnoli 2003). The desire of the colonial government to shield its agenda from being 
undermined led to the segregation of pre-colonial Nigerian societies, the reinforcement of 
ethnic boundaries and the nurturing of ethnic sentiments and conflict. History has it that Sir 
Hugh Clifford, a colonial governor of Nigeria, actively encouraged ethnic polarisation in the 




right, for example, of the people of Egbaland ... or any of the great emirates of the North ... to 
maintain that each one of them is, in a very real sense, a nation .... It is the task of the 
government of Nigeria to build up and fortify these national institutions’ (quoted in Coleman 
1958: 194; Osaghae 1999; Nnoli 2003). Sir Clifford’s recognition of the historical and cultural 
differences between the pre-colonial Nigerian ethnic formations is correct. Both historical and 
ethnographic studies now reveal substantial historical and cultural differences between the 
composite sections of the country. But beyond this, one ought to understand that the colonial 
state was an apparatus for bureaucratic control and exploitation (Berman 1998), always seizing 
any available opportunity to propagate whatever favoured its goals. Sir Clifford leveraged the 
obvious historico-cultural differences of Nigerian ethnic categories to spread the propaganda 
that Nigerians had no common destiny vis-à-vis political independence. It was therefore the 
role of the colonial government, he argued,  to secure the right of each ethnic group to maintain 
its uniqueness, individuality, identity, nationality – its right to self-determination and the 
chosen form of government that draws on the accumulated wisdom and experiences of previous 
generations (Nnoli 2003). Clifford’s emphasis on differences, rather than points of 
convergence, was a colonial strategy aimed at preventing trans-ethnic anti-colonial 
mobilisation for political independence and the undoing of the colonial project in Nigeria 
(Berman 1998; Nnoli 2008; Thomson 2010). This was not because the colonial state genuinely 
cared about the protection and organic advancement of the pre-colonial Nigerian societies. If 
the latter was the case, the amalgamation of these previously independent territory into one 
country by Lord Lugard in 1914 would not have happened. The foundation of ethnic 
polarisation and ethnocentrism was largely laid in the colonial period through the 
implementation of the policy of indirect rule, and this had implications for the violent ethnic 
mobilisation witnessed in some of the major cosmopolitan cities of colonial Nigeria as people 
aligned themselves along ethnic lines in unhealthy inter-ethnic competitions over access to 
political positions and wealth.  Nnoli (2003) locates the roots of the violent ethnic tensions of 
Jos 1945, and of Enugu 1949, in the embers of ethnic discrimination and polarisation fanned 
into flames by the colonialists.   
Post colonially, modern Nigerians, just as was the case during the colonial era, are yet to fully 
overcome ethnic cleavages and unite behind a collective national project (Coleman 1958; Nnoli 
1999; 2008). Ethnicity, as shall be seen in Chapter Six below, continues to matter in post-
colonial Nigeria. In the work of Nnoli (1999; 2008) and Ukiwo (2005) among others, there 




distribution of the socio-economic and political values of the Nigerian state. Most of the post-
colonial violent ethnic mobilisations in Nigeria, and in the  Delta have been linked to the socio-
economic and political marginalisation of the minority ethnic groups, or an outright denial of 
their due.  
 
Setting the Stage for Post-Independence Grievances and Conflict in the 
Niger Delta 
Nigeria got her independence in the year 1960. This was the outcome of the efforts of Nigerian 
elites who managed to transcend ethno-cultural differences and formed a number of 
independence movements that fought for and gained political independence. At that historical 
moment, the priority of all of them was the expulsion of the common enemy (the colonialists), 
and the inauguration of self-rule. Apart from that, none had a clear blueprint of what a post-
colonial Nigeria should look like, or how to address the issue of ethnic pluralism - an obvious 
feature of the colonial Nigerian state. At the time of independence therefore, the political and 
administrative difficulties often associated with young and emerging states were still very 
much present. Paramount among these was the challenge posed by ethnicity. The colonialists 
encouraged and promoted ethnocentrism and ethnic polarisation because it served their agenda 
very well. It is important to recall that the colonial state in Africa was not designed to be an 
agent of democracy, but rather an apparatus of bureaucratic control and economic exploitation 
(Berman 1998; Nnoli 2008). It was therefore in its interest to prevent inter-ethnic cooperation 
and alliances, for these, the colonialists thought, were capable of seriously undermining the 
colonial project; hence their introduction of the policy of ‘indirect rule’ that promoted ethnic 
polarisation. This strategy may have worked for the colonial state, but was definitely unsuitable 
for the proper functioning of a democratic nation-state (independent Nigeria). An independent 
and democratic nation-state, as Udogu (1990) notes, demands that people go beyond ethnic 
cleavages and foster a stronger national consciousness. However, the new independent 
Nigerian state was ill equipped to address this challenge. She basically entered independence 
with the baggage of ethnic division – inherited from the colonial period, as well as all its 
associated problems such as ethnic favouritism in the distribution of jobs and positions. Before 
independence, ethnicity was already playing a significant role in job and wealth distribution as 
people favoured people of their own ethnic background, thus laying the foundation for ethnic 




access to political positions. Already in office, these elected politicians rewarded their ethnic 
supporters with appointments, contracts, and other favours. These rewards, according to Chabal 
and Daloz (1999) are usually not one-off, but rather form part of a larger ploy to keep them 
constantly at their service. When the ethnic population provides the necessary support, the 
ethnic politicians reward them for it. This is how this patron-client relationship or network was, 
and is still being kept alive in post-independence Nigeria. Generally, ethnicity provided the 
mobilisational base needed to get elected at the national level. Quite naturally, those of the 
majority ethnic groups such as the Igbo, Yoruba, and Hausa were very frequently elected. They 
usually had the numerical strength to put their men in power. However, the case was different 
for ethnic minority groups, including the ethnic groups of Niger Delta area. They lacked the 
numbers and were therefore quite frequently not elected to national positions, which, in 
Nigeria, has some implications for wealth distribution and appointment to jobs. Consequently, 
their interest was quite frequently not advanced – for their own people were not sufficiently in 
power. This unequal access of ethnic groups to state power and resources would become a 
major source of violent agitation in Nigeria in the years to come. In no other Nigerian historical 
epoch is the link between ethnicity, resources and violent conflict more evident than after the 
discovery of commercial quantities of oil in the Niger Delta region.  
 
The Discovery of Oil, a Game Changer in Violent Conflict in the Niger 
Delta  
The discovery of oil in the small town of Oloibiri in the Niger Delta region by Shell in 1956 
was not only a game changer in the dynamics of the Niger Delta conflict, but also very central 
in understanding and explaining the motifs behind the waves of violent ethnic mobilisation in 
the post-independence Niger Delta. One could in fact argue that the phenomenon of violent 
mobilisation in the region cannot be fully explained without considering the important role of 
oil in the entire conflict.  
Prior to the discovery of oil in commercial quantities, Nigeria’s economy was agro-based. 
Nearly all its foreign exchange earnings came from exporting agricultural products to Europe 
and other countries of the global west. However, with the discovery of oil in commercial 
quantities, there was a substantial shift from agriculture to a heavy reliance on oil. Most of 
Nigeria’s foreign exchange earnings from then on were derived more from the international 




discovery of oil in the Niger Delta, Nigeria was already exporting approximately 139,548,969 
barrels per year, which roughly translates to more than £91,942,000. By any standards, that 
was a very large sum of money in the 1960s. The Niger Delta’s oil had without equivocation 
become the most important sector of Nigeria’s economy, accounting back then for over 60 
percent of the country’s entire foreign exchange earnings. More than ten multinational oil 
companies operated in Nigeria. Today the contribution of the oil sector to the country’s 
economy has increased significantly to about 90 percent, unequivocally making Nigeria an oil-
based economy, and by extension making the Niger Delta region the greatest contributor to 
national wealth (Francis et al. 2011).  
Despite all this, the Niger Delta region does not seem to be receiving a fair share of the oil 
revenue it generates. Of all the ethno-regional categorisations of Nigeria, the Niger Delta area 
is amongst the poorest and most deprived. Poor infrastructure, a high level of unemployment, 
environmental degradation due to careless oil exploration activities, and inadequate 
educational facilities are some of the challenges facing the region (Ogbogbo 2005; Faleti 2013). 
Quite logically, the region has expected that at least a fair portion of the enormous wealth 
generated within its borders should be deployed to address some of these challenges, but the 
basic and vital needs of the inhabitants of these areas have been ignored while their wealth has 
been continually channelled towards the development of other parts of the country, especially 
those areas belonging to the majority ethnic groups. On a number of occasions, the Niger Delta 
region has formally complained to the federal government regarding this issue, which it 
perceived as an act of injustice, and as gross negligence of the needs and plight of the region. 
However, sufficient concrete steps have not been taken to address or alleviate the suffering of 
the region. Left with no other option, the region has resorted to protests, and violent 
mobilisation along ethno-regional lines in a serious demand for self-determination and control 
of their resources.  
 
The Niger Delta’s Push for Self-Determination and Resource Control 
The first major episode of violent ethnic mobilisation in the post-independence Niger Delta 
was organised and led by Adaka Boro in February 1966. This was a secession attempt in which 
he declared the Niger Delta an independent Republic. Boro’s primary objective was to sever 
the region’s relationship with Nigeria – a country which he thought did not care much about 




is: why did the newly independent Nigerian state disregard advancing the interest of the Niger 
Delta area? One would have expected that after such a long time of collective oppression and 
suffering under the colonialists, the new political leaders would have empathised with the 
ethnic minority regions that were lagging behind in key political appointments and in the 
distribution of the socio-economic values of the new state. But this was not the case, mainly 
because the new Nigerian state, as already mentioned above, was not purposefully and properly 
institutionalised. Its raison d'être, apart from breaking free from the colonialists, had never 
been clear from the onset. Post-independence, Nigerian politicians inherited the state structure 
that had been specifically designed to exploit Nigerians and serve the interest of the colonialists 
and did not make any substantial modification. They simply replaced the colonialists who had 
benefited directly from the spoil that this official state apparatus enabled – a condition often 
referred to by scholars such as Hechter (1975) and Wolpe (1975) as ‘internal colonialism’; that 
is, the domination and exploitation of natives by natives, as opposed to the domination of 
natives by foreigners (Casanova 1965).2 It was a ‘winner takes it all’ sort of scenario, as these 
politicians often sought to perpetuate their term of office by providing favours to individuals, 
organisations, and their own ethnic base (on whose back they rode to victory), in exchange for 
its continual loyalty and support. The implication of this is that the minority ethnic groups who 
were always weaker in numerical terms in comparison to the majority ethnic groups, might 
never get a chance to lift their own people or politicians into the corridors of power, and ipso 
facto would hardly ever be able to get a good opportunity to advance their own ethno-regional 
 
2 The term ‘internal colonialism’ is employed here with utmost criticalness. While this project understands the 
core information that users of the expression such as Hechter (1975) and Wolpe (1975) try to put across, it is 
important, the current thesis contends, to ensure that neither ‘colonialism’ nor ‘internal colonialism’ is employed 
in a manner that suggests that the only distinction between the concepts lies in the qualifying adjective ‘internal’ 
– to signify the domination and exploitation of natives by natives, as opposed to the domination and exploitation 
of natives by foreigners (colonialism). The ruthlessness, vileness and loathsomeness of colonialism in Nigeria and 
Africa cannot be accurately compared with the internal (intra-state) hegemony, or preponderance, of one ethnic 
group over another. In the latter scenario, there is at least some sort of competition between two distinct and 
autonomous ethnic categories, even if one group were, for instance, dominant and constantly outcompeting the 
other. This sort of situation is pervasive, and could be found in many nation-states across the globe, and throughout 
historical epochs. However, the former (colonialism proper) is a carefully designed system of domination and 
exploitation in which some state-sponsored foreign forces invade, dominate, and exploit an unsuspecting and 
vulnerable people - dramatically changing their institutional structures, modus vivendi and destiny. The horror of 
colonialism is well captured in the words of Frantz Fanon: ‘…Colonialism is not satisfied merely with holding a 
people in its grip and emptying the native's brain of all form and content. By a kind of perverted logic, it turns to 
the past of an oppressed people, and distorts, disfigures, and destroys it. This work of devaluing pre-colonial 
history takes on a dialectical significance today’ (Fanon 1963: 210). The impacts of both ‘colonialism’ and so-
called ‘internal colonialism’ are not on the same scale, therefore not comparable in any meaningful way. This 
issue has been raised here in order to clarify that the use of the expression ‘internal colonisation’ is metaphorical, 
and done with full awareness that the concepts of ‘colonisation’ and ‘internal colonization’ are not interchangeable 
salva veritatae. This clarification is not entirely novel. Other scholars, such as Casanova (1965) and Hunter 




interests within such an ethnically plural state as Nigeria, where ethnic competition, not 
cooperation, has become incredibly fierce. It was frustration over the seemingly perpetual 
unequal access of ethnic minorities, such as those of the Niger Delta, to the socio-economic 
and political benefits of the Nigerian state that caused Adaka Boro to lead a rebellion in which 
he sought the secession of the Niger Delta region from Nigeria and to form a new republic: the 
Niger Delta Republic.  
This ‘new Republic’ did not, however, see the light of the day, for the Nigerian Federal forces 
successfully thwarted the rebellion and re-integrated the Niger Delta region into Nigeria. But 
the status quo remained pretty much the same, as not much was done to address the injustices 
in reaction to which the region had attempted to secede. The regional grievances continued to 
simmer until the 1990s when Saro Wiwa, an indigene of the Niger Delta and the founder of an 
ethnic movement MOSOP (Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People) led a non-violent, but 
incredibly potent protest against the Nigerian government over the environmental degradation 
of  Ogoni land due to some unethical and careless oil exploitation activities that led to oil 
spillage in the area. Saro Wiwa’s cause was cut short as he was arrested and hurriedly tried in 
what may best be described as a rogue military tribunal. Eventually, under the military 
dictatorship of General Sani Abacha, he was executed (Ogbogbo 2005; Faleti 2013). 
 
The Rise of Ethnic Militia Groups in the 1990s 
The unjust execution of Saro Wiwa sparked wide-ranging fury among Niger Deltans, leading 
later on to the formation of multiple ethnic militias that proactively and violently demanded  
self-determination for the Niger Delta region, as well as total control of the region’s resources, 
including oil. The Ijaw Youth Movement (IYC), the Egbesu Boys (EB), the Niger Delta 
People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger 
Delta People (MEND) are among the armed militia groups that have popped up in the Niger 
Delta to violently confront the Federal government over the region’s environmental pollution 
and socio economic and political marginalisation. Because these violent militia organisations 
claimed to be fighting on behalf of the entire Niger Delta population, they were all too often 
supported either wholly or partially by the Niger Deltans themselves. The harsh socio-
economic challenges faced by the inhabitants of the region are very real, and they agree 
unanimously that the government should be challenged about it. However, when it comes to 




ethnic organisation such as the MOSSOP, that is, the followers of Ken Saro-Wiwa, preferred 
the path of non-violent protest, the militia groups cited above and their supporters thought that 
force should be matched with force, and violence with violence.  The modus operandi of these 
other violent ethnic militia groups ranged from vandalising oil production and transportation 
facilities, to oil bunkering and kidnapping of expatriates working for the oil multinationals, 
among other similar crimes. These nefarious activities progressively led to the decline of oil 
production and export in Nigeria, and consequently a huge fall in the income generated through 
the international sale of the Nigeria’s oil (Ogbogbo 2008; Okodua 2010; Faleti 2013). Initially, 
the Nigerian government’s general reaction to this new development was militarisation of the 
region as a means of quelling the violent insurrections. Over 10,000 troops and 2 war ships 
were, according to Ogbogbo (2008), deployed to fight the Niger Delta militants. The 
government’s aim of subduing the violent militants through the use of military force was 
unsuccessful, as the militants’ highly sophisticated arms and expertise helped them to engage 
effectively and efficiently with the military, making it difficult to completely overpower them 
(the militants). The government’s realisation of the ineffectiveness of military force in 
permanently resolving the regional crisis compelled it to consider other alternatives which 
entailed the use of negotiations and dialogue.  
 
The Phase of Government Negotiations, Policy Formulations and 
Implementation 
The persistent violent push by the Niger Deltans and their militia groups for absolute control 
of their oil resources compelled the Nigerian government to rethink its revenue allocation 
formula. In section 162(2) of the country’s 1999 constitution, a provision was made to officially 
allocate 13% of all the revenue from the sale of Nigeria’s oil to the Niger Delta region and all 
its constituent parts. This was a smart move by the federal government to calm down the 
regional violence, and to some extent neutralise the region’s demand for total control of all its 
resources. This positive development, it should be highlighted, was the outcome of substantial 
pressure by Niger Deltan governors and elites, as well as, obviously, the violent ethnic militants 
(Ogbogbo 2008; Ako 2011; Orogun 2010). Although the implementation of this revenue 
allocation formula took effect in April 2000, the people of the Niger Delta were still not 
satisfied with 13%, which they regarded as insufficient. Fifty percent was the minimum that 




oil accounting for about 95 percent of its earnings, allocating 50% to the Niger Delta, which is 
just one of six geopolitical zones of Nigeria, would be destabilising for the entire country. 
However, judged by the region’s historical antecedents, such a demand, many argue, is not 
entirely misplaced For instance,  Orogun (2010) recalls that during the British colonial 
administration, and prior to the discovery of large quantities of oil in the Niger Delta, the 
revenue allocation formula was based on a 100% derivation principle; each region had the right 
to manage the entirety of its resources, and to be economically creative and responsible for the 
outcome of its choices and ventures. In those early years of the country’s history, the Niger 
Delta area was not as economically prosperous as other regions such as the North, West or 
Eastern parts of the country. In fact, it quite frequently needed financial support from the 
country to address some of the peculiar developmental challenges it faced due the hazardous 
nature of its environment (the Niger Delta is a wetland and prone to flooding - rendering the 
construction of roads and other infrastructures extremely difficult and significantly more 
expensive than in other parts of the country).  Unfortunately, the assistance usually requested 
by the Niger Deltans was often not supplied, mainly because each region, in accordance with 
the sort of fiscal federalism operating in Nigeria back then was  one of economic independence 
with each state responsible for the ownership and management of its resources, natural and 
otherwise (Ogbogbo 2008; Orogun 2010). This meant the Niger Delta region was to a very 
great extent at the mercy of other regions’ goodwill, which was unfortunately not always 
forthcoming.  
Oddly enough, after the discovery of oil in the Niger Delta, the first civilian democratic 
administration in Nigeria (1960-1965), composed mainly of the majority ethnic groups, pegged 
the derivation formula on mineral producing regions at 50%. At the time when oil became one 
of the most important sources of income in the country, the Niger Delta region, at the behest 
of the ruling majority ethnic groups, was denied its right to own and control the entirety of its 
resources, as had hitherto been the case. Between 1970 and 1984, a period of pervasive military 
coups and dictatorship, the revenue allocation formula based on the derivation principle was 
once again dramatically reduced. For instance, in 1975, the oil revenue allocation to the Niger 
Delta region was reduced from 50% to 20%. In 1982, it was slashed again to 2%. Further 
declining to 1.5% by 1984. It was that draconian. To this day, most Niger Deltans continue to 
believe that they have been unjustly treated, ignored and marginalised due to their minority 
status, by the majority ethnic groups who have continually used the apparatus of the state to 




my fieldwork in the region. At the time when the Niger Delta region had the most promising 
opportunity to lift themselves out of poverty, after years of neglect by the Nigerian polity, the 
rules of the game were changed by the majority ethnic groups in their own favour, to the 
disadvantage of the oil producing minority region of the Niger Delta. Considered against this 
background, it is fairly easy to understand the drive behind the Niger Delta’s agitation for 
resource control, and why they are not fully satisfied with the 13% derivation allocation they 
currently receive on their resources (Orogun 2010). Although the issue of resource control is 
far from being fully resolved, the Federal government’s increased resource derivation 
allocation from 1.5% in 1984 to 13% 1999 (its current rate), undoubtedly constitutes one of the 
major governmental efforts at resolving the Niger Delta crisis. Later on, the presidential 
amnesty initiative of President Yaradua was added to the series of efforts to resolve the regional 
agitations. 
 
The Presidential Amnesty Programme in the Niger Delta 
The presidential amnesty programme represents a real attempt by the Federal government of 
Nigeria at conflict mitigation and resolution in the Niger Delta region. Shortly after his 
assumption of office in 2007, President Yaradua set up a Presidential Committee on Amnesty 
and Disarmament of the Niger Delta Militants. This body was charged with the task of 
designing a feasible framework for the disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and 
integration of fighters (Ikelegbe 2010). For President Yaradua, this seemed an obvious thing to 
do, especially as previous governmental efforts at resolving the regional crisis have not 
delivered the desired outcomes (Chiedozie 2008).  The work and recommendations of this 
committee culminated in the presidential declaration, on the 25th of June 2009, of amnesty for 
the Niger Delta militants - the objective being to incentivise these non-state combatants to 
abandon violent militancy and embrace the presidential amnesty package that aimed to 
reintegrate them profitably into normal society. Those militants who welcomed and 
participated in this amnesty programme allegedly handed in their arms (weapons) to the federal 
government, which in return rewarded them with monthly stipends while demobilising and 
training them for employment in normal society. It is recorded that the Federal government 
earmarked a whopping sum of no less than 127 billion Naira between 2009 and 2011 solely in 
support of this programme (Abdallah 2012). Three years after the inauguration and 




declined considerably and that oil production, sales and revenue had increased significantly 
(Hinshaw 2012). This is one of the positive impacts of the presidential amnesty programme. 
These positive effects were, however, short-lived, as the amnesty programme itself did not 
completely rid the Niger Delta region of violent militancy. What it did was to momentarily halt 
violent attacks, but the latter quickly returned once the amnesty period was over and the 
militants stopped receiving regular monthly stipends from the state. This does not however 
mean that all the ex-militants returned again to their creeks. Certainly some, particularly their 
leaders such as Asari Dokubo, Tompolo and Jomo Gbomo, among others who made an awful 
lot of money from the amnesty programme, became too wealthy and comfortable to return to 
a life of violent militancy. However, some who did not benefit as much returned once more to 
piracy and violent militancy, for in some way it was financially rewarding to remain a militant 
(Ogbogbo 2005; 2008).  
Militancy in the Niger Delta has not ceased to attract new members, who under the guise of the 
‘fight against injustice’, continue to pursue their own private selfish socio-economic objectives 
through the perpetuation of violence in the region. As shall be seen in what follows, the pursuit 
















Niger Delta Timeline 
This timeline is the outcome of a creative adaptation of Francis, P., et al’s (2011) and Falola, T., et 
al’s (2008) timelines of both Nigeria and the Niger Delta. The aim of this timeline is to provide a very 
quick overview of some major historical events that may help the reader to make sense of the context of 
violent ethnic mobilisation in the Niger Delta region. 
Period Historical Events 
 
 
600 BCE  
There is some evidence of iron technology used by Nok 
civilisation. Geographically, Nok is located near the current day 
capital of Nigeria, Abuja.  
 
1300 -1600 
This epoch is often described as the ‘golden age’ of trans-Saharan 
trade due to booming economic activities of a diverse nature taking 
place at this time. Slaves, gold and other valuable commodities 
were traded from Northern Nigeria across the Sahara, North Africa, 
the Middle East and Europe. The slave trade continued across the 
Sahara until the 19th century, though in a highly reduced manner 
due to increases in direct trade with the Europeans in West African 
coastal waters in the 15th century AD.  
 
1450 -1850  
The slave trade, which was prevalent in the Niger Delta coastal 
waters during this historical epoch, shaped the economic and 
political life of the region. Although there was trade in other 
commodities within the region, these did not significantly shape the 
political and economic future of the region to the same extent as the 
the slave trade.  
 
Early 1800s – mid-
1900s 
Following Great Britain’s ban on formal participation in slave trade 
in 1807, its merchants turned their attention to the Niger Delta’s 




and other products - making the Niger Delta an economic nerve 
centre of colonial Nigeria.  
1886 
 
The formation of the British Royal Niger Company (BRC) which 
had the monopoly of trade in the Niger Delta Basin up to 1900 
when its charter was revoked.  
 
1894 
Chief Nana Olomu of Itsekiri, in the Niger Delta region, revolted 
against the Royal Niger Company. He was consequently deposed 
and exiled for preventing the British from accessing the interior 
markets of the Niger Delta and beyond.  
1914 
 
The Northern and the Southern protectorates of Nigeria were 
amalgamated by Lord Lugard. This act was done primarily for the 
administrative and economic convenience of the colonialists.  
1914 - 1918 Nigerian military troops were enlisted to assist the British cause in 
the First World War. 
1923 
 
The establishment of Clifford’s constitution which, for the first 
time, allowed for the participation of elected representatives in the 
governance of Nigeria.  
1946 The enactment of the Richards Constitution which formally 
partitioned Nigeria into three regions: the North, the South- East, 
and the South-West.  
1956 Shell Multinational oil company discovered oil in commercial 




Nigeria gained political independence from Great Britain under a 








Nigeria became a Republic for the first time, replacing the Queen 
of England with the first indigenous Nigerian president, Dr. 
Nnamdi Azikiwe.  
 
1966 
Isaac Adaka Boro, an Ijaw man of the Niger Delta area, led a 
revolution against the Nigerian government and declared the Niger 
Delta region an independent country.  
1966 - 1969 
 
The first military regime in Nigeria created a new state - Rivers 
State - thus giving greater autonomy to the core oil producing states 
of the Niger Delta.  
 
1967 - 1970 
Civil war between the Nigerian federal forces and the Biafran 
separatist soldiers. The war ended in 1970 with the surrender of 
Biafra on January 12th, 1970, and the reintegration of Biafra into 
Nigeria. 
1969 The Federal government’s petroleum decree unilaterally 
transferred the ownership and control of all petroleum resources in 
the Niger Delta to the Federal government of Nigeria.  
1971 Nigeria became a member of the Organisation of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC). 
1979 - 1983 The era of Nigeria’s Second Republic 
1983 The Second Republic was overthrown in a military coup on 
December 31st, which led to the emergence of Muhammadu Buhari 




1985 Another military coup, ousting Buhari and imposing Ibrahim 
Babangida as the new military head of state in Nigeria.  
 
1990 
Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSSOP) issued the 
Ogoni Bill of Rights – a document that outlined the demands of the 
Ogoni people from the Federal government over the degradation of 
their environment due to some unethical and carefree oil 
exploitation in Ogoniland of the Niger Delta region.  
 
1995 
The execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa - a human rights and 
environmental activist, and his 9 other colleagues. This was 
perhaps the most infuriating manifestation of Sani Abacha’s 
military tyranny.  
1997 - 2003 
 
Three successive waves of petroleum related violent ethnic 
mobilisation in the Warri city of the Niger Delta. The Federal 





The pronouncement of the famous ‘Kayama Declaration’ in which 
the Ijaw youths of the Niger Delta advocated for self-
determination, total control of their resources and the withdrawal 
of oil industries from their land.  
 
1999 
The commencement of Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, with Olusegun 
Obasanjo as the president. During this time, the oil revenue 
allocated to the Niger Delta region, the oil producing area of 
Nigeria, was increased from 1.5 percent to 13 percent.  
 
2004 
Asari Dokubo, an ethnic militia leader, declared an all-out war 




Nigerian president: Olusegun Obasanjo, unsuccessfully reached 
out for peace, as the violent protests raged on.  
2005 
 
Asari Dokubo, one of the most notorious ethnic militia leaders in 
the Niger Delta was arrested and jailed. Aggrieved by this incident, 
all the violent ethnic organisations in the Niger Delta formed a 
coalition under the name MEND (Movement for the emancipation 
of the Niger Delta) to press for his release. Kidnapping of oil 
workers, oil bunkering and theft, and attack on oil facilities were 
some of the illegitimate avenues used by MEND to pressurise the 
government into releasing Mr. Dokubo.  
2007 Musa Yaradua was elected president of Nigeria and pledged to pay 
more attention to the crisis in the Niger Delta and do whatever was 
necessary to resolve it.    
 
2009 
On the 15th of May, a high-profile joint military operation was 
carried out against MEND for the killing of soldiers and some 
expatriates. This clash led to a fall in oil production as MEND and 
the Nigeria Army engaged one another in a prolonged battle.  
President Yaradua later on granted a presidential amnesty to the 
Niger Delta militants as part of his effort at resolving this persistent 
problem. The amnesty programme was only partially successful as 
not all the militants participated in the programme.  
 
2010 
Following the demise of President Yaradua in office, his deputy 
Goodluck Jonathan was sworn in as the substantive president of 
Nigeria. He is the first Niger Delta person to rule Nigeria. But his 
presidency has not managed to put an end to the Niger Delta crisis.  
 
2011 - 2019 
Violence in the Niger Delta persists to this day. Although a few 




they claim to be fighting for is not substantially different from that 


























PREAMBLE TO CHAPTERS 4, 5 AND 6 
 
Chapters four, five and six collectively constitute what may be rightly described as the 
empirical section of this thesis. In them the bulk of the original data obtained during the 
fieldwork in the Niger Delta are analysed and engaged with in a more critical and elaborate 
manner. 
To enable a smoother transition from the previous chapters (mainly theoretical)  to the next and 
more empirical ones, it is pertinent to provide some sort of prologue as a way of refreshing the 
mind of the reader on what has gone before and what next to anticipate, as well as how both 
complement each other as parts of a single monograph (the whole thesis).     
Early on in this document, the primary objective of the current research was announced as a 
quest to find out why violent ethnic mobilisations have persisted in the Niger Delta region of 
Nigeria despite governmental efforts to eradicate them. Theoretical evaluation of the context 
of violence in the Niger Delta revealed that no other theory is more suitable than 
Ethnosymbolism in understanding and  finding solutions to the problem of violent mobilisation 
in the region. Hence the reason for its selection as the theoretical framework within which the 
entire research project is pursued. The Kaufmanian version of ethnosymbolism used here is 
particularly potent for providing a robust explanation of how and why ethnic violence occurs 
and persists. According to Kaufman (2001), for extreme violent ethnic conflict to take place, 
the following conditions are necessary: interest, manipulative elites, and ethnicity (ethnic 
myth/symbol complexes). It is the complex interaction of these elements that causes ethnic 
violence to occur. In other words, ethnic violence occurs and persists when manipulative elites 
tap into hostile ethnic myths to orchestrate violent turmoil as a means of attaining some 
preconceived objectives or interests.  To examine these causal conditions a bit more critically 
and elaborately, each has been made to form a core theme of one of the chapters that constitute 
the empirical phase of this thesis (Chapters 4, 5 and 6). Chapter 4 will investigate in what 
way(s), if any, ‘interest’ may have causally contributed to the spiralling and persistence of 
violent ethnic mobilisation in the Niger Delta. Where possible it will do so with concrete 
historical examples. Chapter 5 will examine whether or not manipulative elites have played 
roles in the spiralling and sustenance of the regional violent conflict under study. In Chapter 6, 
the possible roles of ethnicity in the spiralling of ethnic violence will also be examined. In 




exercise will also be critically appraised. The overall aim has been to establish whether 
























THE CONTRIBUTION, OR OTHERWISE, OF INTEREST IN THE GENERATION 
AND PERSISTENCE OF THE NIGER DELTA VIOLENCE 
 
This chapter explores the role, or contribution, of ‘interest’ in the generation, escalation, and 
sustenance of violent ethnic mobilisation in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. The core stance 
defended here is that violent ethnic conflict cannot occur unless there is some sort of interest, 
real or imagined, at stake (Kaufman, 2001). Analysing some relevant cases of violent 
confrontation in the Niger Delta region, the chapter affirms and upholds the importance of 
‘interest’ in meaningfully explaining the rise and persistence of ethnic violence in the region 
under study. The analysis of the interviews conducted with members of elites, as well as the 
conclusions of the supplementary and triangulation materials deployed, also corroborates this 
affirmation.    
The ‘rational choice’ assumption that calculus over obtainable interests is the principal driver 
of violent ethnic mobilisation is not always as straightforward as it might seem. For the 
economy and resource-based theorists of ethnic violence, amongst others, this assumption does 
not constitute a problem. However, the same may not confidently be said of those individuals 
who might still be somewhat sympathetic, either consciously or unconsciously, to primordialist 
theory, or its ancient hatred doctrine.  In the theoretical chapter, it was made clear that 
primordialism as a framework for evaluating and resolving the problem of ethnic violence has 
been superseded, and is no longer considered credible, at least amongst many key scholars of 
ethnic violence. This does not however imply that there are no longer individuals, even if they 
are in the minority, who still tend to understand and interpret ethnic violence scenarios through 
the prism of primordialist theory. As both Kaufman (2001) and Taylor (2011) have pointed 
out, as recently as the 1990s and 2000s, there were attempts to explain the extreme violent 
conflict that took place both in Rwanda and in the Balkans from the perspective of primordialist 
theory – an indication that this mode of evaluating the contexts of ethnic violence, even if 
intellectually problematic, has not yet been completely abandoned in some parts of the world. 
Might this also still be the case with regard to the Niger Delta?  This chapter elects to set the 
record straight on this, that is, to clarify whether or not  there are still theorists who view and 
interpret violent conflict in the Niger Delta from the standpoint of primordialism; in other 
words, who downplay or entirely deny that competing interests constitute a key factor in the 




because it helps, not just to gain a better understanding of the nature and main drivers of the 
regional crisis, but also in the construction of a bespoke and more appropriate conflict 
resolution plan for the region, which cannot happen unless we understand how regional conflict 
is perceived, understood, or interpreted.  
 
Interview Data  
For the purpose of this research, I interviewed a total number of 16 individuals (members of 
the elite) about the causality of violent ethnic mobilisation in the Niger Delta.  Among the 
plethora of responses there were none that suggested that the regional crisis is understood 
through the prism of primordialism. On the contrary, all, without exception, affirmed interest 
rather than primordial ethnic impulses, as the key driver of ethnic violence in the region. 
Although these individuals were not, strictly speaking, academic experts on the subject of 
ethnic violence, they were able to draw conclusions about the contributory roles of competing 
interests in the spiralling of ethnic violence in the region. For instance, one community leader 
interviewed had this to say: ‘if not for the selfish ‘interests’ of both the militants, and also of 
those individuals occupying the government seats, the issue of violence in the Niger Delta area 
would have long been resolved’ (Interview response by a traditional ruler in Yenagoa, Bayelsa 
State, Nigeria; April 2017).  In expressing his opinion, another individual interviewed, a 
political leader, said:  
I am aware that both the corrupt occupants of government positions and the 
violent ethnic militia groups pursue their respective ‘interests’. But the way 
out of this trouble, I think, is for the federal government to harmonise these 
conflicting interests for the benefit of the entire country. (Interview response 
by a traditional ruler in Port Harcourt, Rivers State, Nigeria; May 2017) 
A similar expression involving the use of the term ‘interest’ was also used by another 
traditional ruler interviewed. In his words:  
I am not saying that all the militants have the good of the people at heart. 
Some of them use the opportunity to seek for their own selfish interests, 
rather than for the good of the public. (Interview response by a Member of 
Bayelsa state House of Assembly in Yenagoa, Bayelsa State Nigeria; June 
2017) 
I have referred to these individuals, not because they are the only respondents to have made 




many, who employed the term in the articulation and presentation of their opinions. For me, it 
was quite interesting to observe that although the interview questions did not explicitly employ 
the term ‘interest’, the responses provided by the respondents overwhelmingly did. Although 
the questions had been carefully constructed to elicit information on the role of ‘interest’ in the 
evolution of the Niger Delta violent conflict, explicit mention of the term was carefully avoided 
in order not to influence respondents’ choice of words in replying to the questions posed. This 
strategy notwithstanding, nearly all the interviewees spontaneously made an explicit mention 
of the term ‘interest’ in their answers. Should their usage of the term be dismissed as a mere 
coincidence or be understood for what it is – that elites are acutely aware that competing 
egoistic or sectional interests constitute a key driver of violent ethnic mobilisation in the region 
under investigation? Considering that my respondents were well-informed elites, who, in the 
course of their conversations with me, had calmly and carefully chosen their words, there are 
no reasonable grounds for believing that their decision to use the term was entirely arbitrary. 
Based on this, this thesis concludes that if these respondents used the word ‘interest’ of their 
own volition, this is most probably because it was of great relevance for them in understanding, 
articulating and communicating their thoughts on phenomenon of ethnic violence in the Niger 
Delta region. When closely examined, the views of my interviewees on this issue were found 
to correspond fundamentally with those of Kaufman (2001) - the theorist within whose 
ethnosymbolic framework the current research is being conducted.   
 
Supplementary/Triangulation Data 
For triangulation, I expanded the data collection base – drawing on a wide range of already 
existing, but relevant television and print media interviews of youth leaders, technocrats, ex-
militants, politicians, government officials, conducted by other investigators, especially 
journalists. I obtained, transcribed, and made use of 21 such data sources. These materials were 
rich, diverse, and helpful in confirming and further strengthening the validity and reliability of 
the elite interviews. While examining and analysing these supplementary documents, I 
meticulously searched for evidence that might suggest that the Niger Delta violent conflict is 
being either understood and/or interpreted from a strictly primordialist theoretical standpoint – 
just as early European anthropologists in Africa did, and as some contemporary commentators 
on extreme violent ethnic conflict in Rwanda and Balkans, have tried to do. My findings, 




to primordial impulsive animosities, constitute a major causality of Niger Delta violent conflict. 
The responses provided by the following categories of individuals are representative. In an 
interview with the TVC News, Nigeria, Bristol Alagbariya, the secretary of the Ijaw youth 
movement, indicated that the pursuit of personal interest, rather the collective public good or 
interest, is among the major reasons why the crisis in the Niger Delta continues to occur and 
persist (Bristol Alagbariya’s interview with TVC News, Nigeria, on June 17, 2016). Henry 
Okah’s response was similar. Okah, a Niger Delta militant and arms dealer, hinted that the 
exclusion of the Ijaw ethnic ‘interest’ by the Federal government of Nigeria constitutes a reason 
for the occurrence and persistence of the Niger Delta crises (Henry Okah, as reported in the 
Saharah Reporters, 2008). In another exclusive interview with the Vanguard Newspaper, Asari 
Dokubo, an ex-president of the Ijaw Youth Council, recognised that the pursuit of private 
interest to the detriment of the collective good or interest of the Ijaw people of the Niger Delta 
is a major contributor to regional conflict. He therefore pledged not to act in the same way. 
Ijaw interest, he said, would always be the priority. In his own words:  
Maybe I will benefit, but I should not put my benefit over and above the 
interest of the generality of the people. The way forward is let the right thing 
be done. (Asari Dokubo’s interview with the Vanguard Newspaper, Nigeria, 
November 4, 2019)  
Apart from these individuals, who literally evoked the term interest as a causal factor in the 
rise and persistence of the Niger Delta conflict, were many others who did not directly employ 
the term ‘interest’, but used synonymous concepts or expressions such as: economic 
marginalisation, looting of resources, corruption, syphoning of public funds. All these denote 
various ways in which individuals or groups prioritise, and illegally pursue, private or sectional 
interests, rather than public interest, even though the notion of interest is here implied. 
Whichever way it was viewed, ‘competing interest’, not some primordial biological instinct, 
was ultimately found to be at the heart of the Niger Delta crisis. 
Now, the idea that interest is a generator of conflict is not new amongst Niger Delta scholars. 
It can be found in the writings of such scholars as Obi (2009; 2010; 2011; 2014), Ikelegbe 
(2006), Omeje (2004; 2006), Adunbi (2015), Watts (2004; 2006), and Ako (2011), among 
many others. On the other hand, there is a paucity of work that successfully investigates the 
Niger Delta crisis with the specific objective of clarifying whether or not the regional conflict 
is being understood or interpreted from the point of view of primordialist theory – the idea that 




differences based on biological descent or ancestry. Most Niger Delta scholars habitually work 
with the assumption that primordialism, as a framework for understanding the phenomenon of 
violent ethnic mobilisation is already obsolete, but without bothering to verify this claim or 
assumption. This project is not satisfied with unverified assumptions and affirmations – for it 
is not impossible for there to exist proponents of a primordialist explanation of the Niger Delta 
conflict, just as was the case in the Rwanda and the Balkans during the 1990s and 2000s. This 
is why extra effort has been made in this thesis to explore this issue further, in order to reach a 
conclusion backed up by facts. Based on the data collected and examined, this project now 
announces with even greater confidence that there is currently nothing to suggest that the Niger 
Delta conflict is being understood or interpreted from a primordialist viewpoint. On the 
contrary, the idea that struggle over interests is at the heart of the regional conflict is sustained. 
This result reiterates what the Kaufmanian ethnosymbolic theory guiding the current research 
has always affirmed and upheld – the indispensability of interest in explaining why violent 
ethnic mobilisations occur and persist.  
What may be observed from the foregoing is the apparent importance of the concept of 
‘interest’, both for Kaufman and other interview respondents. A challenge that however 
remains at this juncture concerns the fact that there are multiplicity of ways in which the 
concept of interest may be understood (Benn, 1960; Schmitter, 2006). Given this, it is therefore 
worthwhile, I believe, to explore all the possible connotations of the concept of interest, and 
then clarify the exact sense in which it is understood and employed in the current project. The 
conceptual clarification will be followed by a more empirical phase that examines some 
specific contexts of violent conflict in the Niger Delta in order to demonstrate that ‘interest’ 
has actually played a role in the spiralling and persistence of violence.  
 
In what consists the term ‘interest’? 
Given the centrality of the term ‘interest’ in Kaufman’s theory of ethnic conflict, one would 
have expected him to provide an elaborate clarification of the concept; but he did not. It seems 
he presumed it to be a commonly used term with which the average English speaker is familiar, 
and which therefore did not need to be explained. Whatever be the case, given that the term 
itself is susceptible to a multiplicity of connotations, as Benn (1960), Wall (1975), Benditt 




way the term interest is understood and employed in this project. This gap (in Kaufman’s work)  
is in no sense trivial, which is why I attempt to fill it below.  
Much has been written about the definition of the concept of ‘interest group’, but when it comes 
to the definition of the term ‘interest’ per se, only a few scholars, including Benn (1960), Wall 
(1975),  Benditt (1979), and Schmitter (2006), have devoted sufficient time and space to its 
elaboration and analyses.  My elucidation of this concept draws extensively on the incredibly 
complex, but lucid definitions and clarifications provided by these scholars.   
In the English language, Wall (1975) notes, there are basically three senses in which the term 
interest is used. The first is the sense in which one’s ‘interests’ are those things or activities 
which one finds attractive, fascinating, or absorbing, and which one may be inclined to pursue 
just for their own sake. Circularly put, interest is that which an individual finds interesting. A 
good instance of this might be a person’s hobbies. The second sense views interest as a ‘good 
or advantage’. To say that something is in one’s interest is tantamount to saying that it is for 
one’s good, advantage or benefit. The term interest used in this sense is evaluative, implying 
that it could be used to denote and commend things that are valuable either in themselves or as 
a means to other valuable or beneficial things or conditions. Other uses of the term to signify 
investments, stakes, and interest groups, are all, according to Wall (1975) derived from this 
second basic sense. If acting in a specific manner would be to one’s advantage, then it would 
be correct to hold that the said action is in that person’s interest. ‘In one’s interest’, according 
to the second sense explained here, simply means ‘conducive to one’s good or advantage’. In 
its third sense ‘interest’ simply means money paid for the loan of money.  
A careful evaluation of Kaufman’s theory of ethnic conflict reveals that his use of the term 
‘interest’ is in line with the second basic sense described above. This second understanding 
also corresponds to the sense in which my interviewees employed the term.  So, in the context 
of this investigation in the Niger Delta, the concept of interest is to be understood and employed 
in accordance with Wall’s second description of the term to denote goods, benefits or 
advantages that can be derived, by either an individual or a group, from engagement in the 
Niger Delta’s violent conflict. Accordingly, private interests shall therefore refer to the benefits 
that accrue to a section of the public, while public or general interest shall be used to refer to 
those goods that are to the advantage of all (the whole), not a just a section of it.  Whether on 
a private or public scale, the term interest, in the manner that is employed in this research, 




Having said this, it is also worth mentioning that in concrete existential situations, determining 
when an interest may be said to exist is not an easy task, yet being able to establish whether or 
not this is the case in any given socio-political situation is of utmost importance for the 
assessment and analyses of peoples’ politically relevant choices and actions.  
Regarding how best to determine whether or not an interest exists, two competing tendencies 
are often recognised:  normative and naturalistic tendencies (Benn1960).  According to the 
first tendency, the interest of an individual or group may be established by simply accepting 
what they have conscientiously and overtly declared their interest to be; that is, their publicly 
declared norms or intentions. There is however a difficulty associated with this view. It is not 
uncommon to encounter scenarios in which an individual’s or group’s actions blatantly deviate 
from, or entirely contradict what they say their interest is. In the case of Niger Delta for 
instance, there is hardly any government administration in Nigeria, at least since 1999, that has 
not overtly declared its interest in resolving the problem of violent mobilisation in the region 
as a matter of urgency and of general interest. However, some of their policy choices and 
actions have often suggested otherwise - leaving the public in doubt as to whether the 
government ever genuinely had an interest in resolving the regional crisis. Excessive use of 
military force in the region is a case in point. Here there seems to be a disjuncture between 
objective interest (what would be done) and actual interest (what is being done). It is for reasons 
such as this that the naturalist or behaviourist have arisen in opposition asserting that the 
interest of an individual or group cannot be known except through their actions - what is done 
and promoted (Plamenatz 1954: 1-8).  Hence the need to focus on the actual activities of an 
individual or group and infer from those what their real interests are. For scholars of this 
naturalistic or behaviourist tendency, interest is to be inferred from what an individual or group 
(an organisation formally acting through its officials) does and insists on, and not vice versa. 
Proponents of this perspective belong to the second leaning: naturalistic or behaviourist 
tendency.  
Even with its merits, the behaviourist approach is certainly not without some flaws. Making 
verifiable activities or actions the sole determinant of interest is a bit too narrow, for it precludes 
the possibility that individuals or groups could, and do occasionally, act out of sheer altruism, 
and not with some preconceived interests or benefits in view. In real life, people are not always 
subjecting their actions to rigorous, challenging and lengthy processes of evaluating the costs 




not every action is an expression of interest. So, the question ‘what then is interest?’ still 
remains.   
Another weakness for which the naturalistic view is criticised lies in its inability to discern the 
complex connections between actions and interest. When considered in isolation, the place or 
role of certain actions aimed at actualizing a particular interest may be easily misunderstood. 
Superficially, certain choices or actions may appear to contradict or be contrary to an overtly 
acclaimed interest of a group or individual. However, when examined within the larger scheme 
of things, such choices or actions may turn out to be a part of a complex web of efforts towards 
the realisation of an averred interest. It is in recognition of this complexity that Schmitter has 
opted for a more encompassing understanding of interest as ‘complex calculations involving 
careful specification of one’s factual and counterfactual alternatives, weighted consideration 
of one’s probable cost and consequences, lengthy assessment of one’s probable cost and 
consequence, lengthy assessment of one’s possible future opportunities, enhanced or 
foreclosed, and pondered clarification of one’s order of preferences’ (Schmitter 2006: 299).     
Interest ought therefore not to be seen as a once and for all rational conversion of wants or 
preferences into appropriate actions or behaviours, but rather as a multi-sequential, iterative, 
and continuous social process. It involves a repeated set of interrelated calculations and 
transformations that leads from needs, to interests, action, associability. But for this process to 
come full cycle, concerned actors have to be able to carefully analyse a situation and identify 
what is at stake. It is only after concluding that what is at stake is realizable and desirable does 
the problem of interest move to the stage of concern, actions, and formation of an association 
that pursues and promotes the said interest. Overall, if what is at stake has not been properly 
identified, articulated, strategically and repeatedly pursued, then one cannot really speak of 
interest. For interest is more than just a mere desire or want.   
 
This conception of interest, unlike that of the behaviourists, rejects the view that actions alone 
should be the sole determinant of interests, and upholds rather that a combination of both the 
naturalistic and normative tendential understandings of interest, not one in isolation of the 
other, is a better alternative. And this is the ‘interest-determining’ strategy preferred in this 




Having enabled a clear understanding of the term interest and clarified how it will be employed 
in the context of this research, the next section aims to identify the possible interests that 
underpin violent ethnic mobilisations in the Niger Delta region.   
 
Towards Identifying the Interests that Underpin Violent Confrontations in 
the Niger Delta  
Violent ethnic confrontation in the Niger Delta region is a very complex phenomenon. This 
complexity is often captured and made evident in scholarly and policy-making attempts to 
explain the escalation and persistence of violent conflict in the region. Among the causal factors 
blamed for this regional turmoil are poverty, lack of infrastructure, political and economic 
marginalisation, exclusion, and corruption (Salawu, 2010). In the course of my field work, I 
observed that most of my interviewees still considered these factors to be the key drivers of 
conflict in the region.  Although one could reasonably visualise ways that these factors 
contribute causally to violent conflict in the region, I noted that over-emphasis on them is a bit 
misleading – and obscures the more fundamental stake or interest that underpins the entire 
conflict, namely oil (and its associated benefits). Oil, in my opinion, is the independent variable 
in reference to which the contributions or roles of the often-touted causal factors outlined above 
in the Niger Delta conflict may be understood and explained. Pretending for a moment that 
poverty, economic marginalisation, lack of infrastructure, corruption amongst other causal 
factors mentioned above are the real reasons for violent ethnic mobilisation in the Niger Delta 
it can be seen that these factors are also present in many other regions, and amongst many other 
ethnic minority groups in Nigeria; yet, organised and persistent ethnic violence has never been 
experienced in any of those communities on the scale and intensity with which it occurs in the 
Niger Delta region, primarily because there are at the moment no exceptionally valuable 
lootable resources (interest), such as oil to justify engaging in violence. So, beyond these often-
mentioned multiple causal factors, there is another more potent and fundamental driver of the 
Niger Delta conflict - oil. The more elaborate insight into the phenomenon of ethnic violence 
in the Niger Delta that follows shortly will be helpful in the portrayal of how oil wealth (rather 
than other factors often referred to such as poverty, marginalisation, corruption, etc.), is in fact 





I have purposely used the term contemporary as a way of distinguishing between the sorts of 
politically salient violent conflict that existed in the Niger Delta region prior to, and after the 
discovery of commercial quantities of oil in the region. The interests or stakes that inspired and 
drove conflict during both periods are different, so I have decided to identify them in two 
different, but related sections. First, I discuss the pre-oil era violent conflict in the Niger Delta 
region, and thereafter treat what may be considered as the oil era conflict. In all these 
considerations, my overarching aim is to identify, in keeping with my theoretical framework, 
the interests or stakes in each era.   
 
Interests and Conflict in the Pre-Oil Era of the Niger Delta Region  
There is a wide-spread misconception that conflict in the Niger Delta are a recent development. 
Sometimes, individuals who examine the phenomenon of violent mobilisation in the region 
solely from the purview of its (the conflict’s) relationship with petroleum resources, fall victim 
to this pervasive but misleading belief that  there was no conflict in the Niger Delta before the 
discovery of crude oil.  For instance, two of the young MPs interviewed during my fieldwork 
appeared to have little knowledge of the historical antecedents of the Niger Delta conflict. For 
them, it is all related to agitations over who controls the oil wealth and there is no doubt that 
this is the main stake in the contemporary violent agitations. But in order to appreciate the 
nature and complexity of these conflict, one ought to pay attention, as Ogbogbo (1995) argues, 
to earlier tales about the Niger Delta people and their environment, and how they have 
responded to some of the common challenges they faced.  
From the writings of Ikime (1969; 1981), Alagoa (1980), and Ogbogbo (2005; 2008), among 
others with serious intellectual enthusiasm for the history of the Niger Delta people, one learns 
that violent conflict in the region predates the discovery of crude oil in a commercial quantity. 
Ogbogbo (2005: 2) points out that the Niger Delta people has “a well-documented tradition of 
nationalism and resistance against attempts by people foreign to the region to control the 
resources of the region”. A close examination of this assertion reveals something profound and 
pertinent. His employment of the term ‘nationalism’ for instance, clearly suggests that the 
peoples of the Niger Delta region have always had a consciousness of themselves as a people 
or nation with interests to be protected – which is exactly why (as Ogbogbo notes), any attempt 
by foreigners either to dispossess or to alienate them from these resources (interests) was met 




idea of conflict; for there is no need to speak of resistance in the absence of tensions or conflict. 
All these are compelling indications that there existed some conflict over interests in the region 
well before the discovery of crude oil in the region. A question  thus arises here concerning the 
identification of the sorts of interests or stakes over which parties clashed in the Niger Delta’s 
pre-oil era.  
According to Ogbogbo (1993; 1995), apart from minor natural resources such as arable lands 
and fishing water bodies, the main resource, or more appropriately speaking, the greatest 
interest, that the Niger Deltans sought to protect in the pre-oil era of the Niger Delta was the 
region’s strategic geographical location along the West African coastline. To adequately 
comprehend the significance (mostly economic) of the region’s strategic geographical location, 
a reference needs to be made to the Portuguese exploration and trading activities on this 
coastline in the first half of the 15th century. These activities gradually opened up West African 
territorial waters to European international commerce. Between the 15th and 19th centuries, the 
region became famous as a commercial hub and a gateway to some of the West African interior 
markets, and the people of the Niger Delta played vital roles in these economic and trading 
activities, mostly as middle-men connecting European traders on the coastline with Nigerians 
in the hinterland.  
Their function as middlemen, Ogbogbo (1995) contends, made the indigenes and inhabitants 
of Niger Delta key players in the economic affairs of the Nigeria for centuries to come. This 
immensely rewarding economic role constituted a valuable ‘interest’ that Niger Deltans worked 
zealously to protect – a treasure that originates from the region’s accidental geographical 
positioning on the coast of West-Africa. In his work Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, 
Dike (1956: 19) affirms that ‘it was as navigable waters that the rivers of the Niger Delta 
became so important in the economic history of modern Nigeria’, to the point of actually being 
analogously described as the Venice of Africa.  
From the foregoing, it emerges clearly that for the people and the inhabitants of the Niger Delta, 
the strategic geographical location they occupied was the mainstay of their economy, and ipso-
facto their greatest interest, one they were always poised to protect.  Quite frankly, there is 
nothing particularly bizarre or novel about this situation. More frequently than is thought, 
people’s geographical locations have become a huge source of revenue, and by that very fact, 
an important and enviable asset or interest to be protected.  Great Britain for instance still 




advantages. Any attempt by foreigners to tamper with these vintage national zones usually 
triggers tensions, which, if not properly managed, can spiral into full blown violent conflict. 
The swift reaction of the British Navy during a  Russian incursion into British territorial waters 
in 2018 is a good case in point. The British Naval authorities acted immediately to ward off 
this uninvited guest, because its territorial waters are without doubt, among the country’s most 
valued assets, in terms of economy, security and sport. It is an interest they are always eager to 
protect.  The unbending determination of the Niger Deltans, during the pre-oil epoch, to protect 
both their coast and the pivotal role they played as middle-men resulted in a number of violent 
clashes during the era of the violent European invasion of West Africa. All the well-known 
violent confrontations in the Niger Delta during this period (including clashes between the 
British colonialists and the following traditional rulers: Jaja of Opobo, Koko of Nembe, and 
Nana Olomu), were fought over interests - economic and political alike.  
The objective of the discussion above is not to provide an elaborate and systematically 
structured discussion of the horrors of the European or colonial invasion of West Africa, but 
rather to establish that Kaufman (2001), whose theory of ethnic violence is being used in this 
thesis, is right to suggest that violent conflict, ethnic or otherwise, are always articulated around 
some sort of interest (real or perceived). In the pre-oil era of the Niger Delta region, most of 
the politically salient violent ethnic conflict were organised and fought around an important 
interest - benefits accruing from the strategic geographic location of the region along Africa’s 
west coast. The clash was mainly between Europeans and the indigenes/ inhabitants of the 
Niger Delta.  
Apart from this, Obaro Ikime, Alagoa, and Ogbogbo also recognise that prior to the arrival of 
European traders and colonialists, there were some violent internal conflict amongst the people 
of the Niger Delta themselves over fishing rights, ownership of farmlands, and aspects of 
cultural life. However, I have chosen not to emphasise these, because such conflicts were not 
peculiar to the Niger Delta region. They existed, and to some extent still do, in many other 
regions of Nigeria. But in order to bring out the peculiarity of the violent conflict in the Niger 
Delta during the period under review, it is reasonable to limit the discussion to distinctive  
conflicts, not those that are co-extensive with many other regions of Nigeria. The violent 
clashes between the colonialists and the inhabitants of the Niger Delta region over the control 
of its strategic and economically rewarding coastlines is certainly one such bespoke violent 




With the brutal advancement and entrenchment of the colonial agenda, the people of the Niger 
Delta were overpowered and consequently lost control of their territory as well as the dominant 
and immensely rewarding economic position of middle-men. This weakened the region’s 
capacity to generate enough revenue on its own and significantly reduced its ability to provide 
basic amenities for its people. Consequently it became hugely dependent on the colonial state 
for survival. Some Africanist scholars such as Berman (2008) and Thomson (2011) suggest 
that the sequestration of the resources and valuable interests of the colonised people was a 
recurrent pattern in the colonialist’s operations in Africa, which was evident in the Niger Delta 
region’s encounter with the colonial powers. 
From the foregoing, it is obvious that prior to the discovery of oil the Niger Delta region had 
witnessed some degree of violent conflict articulated around such interests as fishponds, 
farmlands, and most obviously the region’s strategic location on the West African coastal 
waters. Thus the widely held belief of certain modern Nigerians with limited knowledge of the 
history of Niger Delta (that the region had always been a peaceful zone until the discovery of 
oil and gas), is not correct. Yet among my respondents were two young members of parliament 
who held that view.  
Having identified the main stakes in the pre-oil era violent conflicts in the Niger Delta, the next 
section considers the issue of violent mobilisation in the Niger Delta since the discovery of 
large quantities of oil and gas. The main preoccupation of the section is to demonstrate how oil 
(and its associated benefits) has become the new interest around which the contemporary 
violent conflicts in the Niger Delta revolve.   
 
Interests and Conflict in the Oil and Gas Era of the Niger Delta Region 
The Nigerian economy is hugely reliant on oil. According to Faleti (2013), Kew and Philips 
(2007) and UNDP (2006) oil accounts for over 90 percent of the country’s foreign exchange 
earnings, and over 80 percent of its total revenue. Because it is the region from which Nigeria’s 
oil derives, the Niger Delta is indisputably the most important contributor to the wealth of the 
entire ‘nation’. Despite this obvious fact, the region still remains one of the most impoverished 
areas of the country, lacking in basic necessities of life such as infrastructure, and basic health 




its attention not just on the explanations provided by professional analysts, but also on the 
opinions of the Niger Delta’s indigenous elites whom I interviewed during my fieldwork.  
Elite views on why the region has remained so impoverished are very similar; however, the 
response of one – a traditional ruler – was more articulate and clear, and was very representative 
of other responses. His thoughts go thus:  
The Nigerian government has constantly neglected this area due to its 
minority status. This neglect has caused poverty to thrive. The people have 
become frustrated and angry. They now want to take back control of their 
land. (Interview response by a traditional ruler in Port Harcourt, Rivers 
State, Nigeria; May 2017) 
Although his response seems quite simple and straightforward, it is in fact a rather complex 
one that needs to be unpacked. In this answer, a causal link is drawn between government 
negligence, poverty, and violent agitation in the region. The Niger Delta’s minority status is 
also identified as a major reason for government’s audacity to neglect, marginalise or become 
entirely nonchalant towards the region. In other words, had the region been of a majority ethnic 
group, the reverse would have been the case. To better appreciate this argument about minority 
versus majority statuses, it is necessary to say something about ethnic configuration in Nigeria.  
Nigeria is huge country with over 400 identifiable ethnic groups (Salawu 2010). Of all these, 
however, only three are considered major, namely: Igbo, Hausa, and Yoruba. The rest, 
including the territories that collectively make up the area designated as the Niger Delta region, 
are all regarded as minority ethnic groups. In Nigeria, just as in many parts of the world, having 
a minority status can sometimes mean that one’s views are not taken seriously in decision-
making processes, especially as democratic decisions are usually made on the basis of majority 
votes. This is why democracy often comes across as the tyranny of the majority (Tocqueville, 
1835), rather than the government of the people, by and for the , as described by Lincoln (1863). 
In no other place is this tyranny of the majority more obvious than in Nigeria where the majority 
ethnic groups are frequently accused by the Niger Deltans of leveraging their numerical 
strength to unfairly appropriate and redistribute the oil-based wealth from the Niger Delta 
without making sufficient effort to address the issue of underdevelopment, poverty and the 
associated violent agitations in the region.  While this thesis agrees with Emeseh (2010) that 
violent ethnic mobilisation in the Niger Delta is a regional reaction to what is perceived as the 




apparatus instrumentalised by the majority ethnic groups for their selfish ethnic agendas), it 
should be mentioned that behind the Niger Delta’s clamour for justice lies a real interest, that 
is, the desire to be given fair consideration in the distribution of the wealth that is derived 
primarily from oil extracted in their region. Thus it appears that violence in the Niger Delta, in 
the manner and scale at which it currently occurs, would not exist if oil were not present in the 
region. This may appear to be a bold assertion. However, it has not been made without careful 
consideration the pattern of civil conflict among other minority ethnic groups. Studies have 
shown that although poverty, unemployment, lack of basic health and social amenities (among 
other factors), for which the Niger Deltans violently agitate, exist amongst other minority 
ethnic groups in Nigeria, large scale, sustained violent confrontations of the type experienced 
in the Niger Delta, do not occur. This is primarily because they do not possess highly valuable 
and lootable resources of interest such as oil. As Kaufman (2001) observes, people do not 
engage in organised violent conflict unless there is some sort of interest at stake. In the case of 
the Niger Delta, oil wealth is clearly the bone of contention (interest).  The prevailing debate 
in Nigeria over ‘resource control’ is a good example, that further illuminates and strengthens 
this argument. This debate is examined below and provides useful insight into how violent 
mobilisation in the Niger Delta is constructed around interest in oil wealth.    
 
The Resource Control Debate in the Niger Delta 
Resource control, which according to Ako (2011) is at the heart of the Niger Delta violence, 
could be broadly defined as a politico-economic arrangement that allows the constituent states 
of the Nigerian Federation the autonomy to control and manage the resources within its 
geographic territory while making stipulated contributions to central government to fund 
federal responsibilities (Dafinone 2001; Ako 2011; Kehind et al 2013). Adesopo and Asaju 
(2004) note that the practice of resource control is in line with true federalism. Officially, 
Nigeria is a federal state, and as such should not have difficulties assenting to the Niger Delta’s 
demand for resource control. However, the available evidence does not suggest that the 
Nigerian state supports the idea of resource control, in which the people of the Niger Delta 
would be allowed to take full charge and control of the region’s oil and gas resources, even if 
this is in line with the principles and prescriptions of true and functional federalism. This 
explains why the resource control debate and its associated agitations have lingered for over a 




control? I shall return to this question later. The next section, however, rapidly traces the history 
of the resource control agitations in the Niger Delta to try to discern their underlying motif or 
rationale behind it. Mere grievances or interests?  This will become clear in the following 
pages.  
For a clearer presentation of the resource control narrative, it is necessary to discuss it in the 
wider context of the socio-political events that triggered the Adaka Boro led rebellion – an 
uprising often regarded by historians as the earliest resource control related violent agitation 
(Ogbogbo 2008; Ako 2011). 
Nigeria secured its political independence from Great Britain in 1960. For the minority ethnic 
groups, especially those of the Niger Delta, the years leading up to this event were filled with 
ambivalence. While the majority ethnic groups prepared for and anticipated the formal end of 
colonial rule with excitement, ethnic minority groups on the other hand, especially the people 
of the Niger Delta, expressed fears over the possibility of being dominated and marginalised 
by their ‘numerically more powerful’ neighbours in post-independence Nigeria. In reaction to 
the concerns raised by the minority groups, the then colonial administration set up a special 
commission of enquiry. The Willink’s Commission of 1958 was charged with the task of 
investigating the basis for these minority fears and make recommendations for allaying them. 
The outcome of the Willink’s commission’s inquiry revealed that these fears were grounded in 
two main issues. The first, as already hinted above, was a fear of domination in post-
independence Nigeria. The second was the need to pay special attention to the unique 
developmental challenges facing the region. Niger Delta area is an extraordinarily swampy 
environment. Because of this, the cost of road construction and other infrastructural 
development  is three times as high as other regions of Nigeria; the  region’s own internally 
generated revenue was not sufficient to address these environmental challenges. For this 
reason, they requested a higher allocation of funds to enable them to address these significant 
challenges.  
At the end of its enquiry, the Willink’s commission ruled that these concerns or fears, expressed 
by the ethnic minority groups of the Niger Delta, were legitimate, and that protecting them 
from possible domination, as well as allocating funds to enable them to tackle the unique 
environmental challenges confronting them, were reasonable, fair and necessary actions. 
Consequently, the commission recommended the creation of a federally funded board: NNDC 




addressing the specific environmental and developmental challenges confronting the region. 
This recommendation was accepted and the NNDC board was created and formally recognised 
by the constitution. Furthermore, on the issue of Niger Delta’s fear of possible domination by 
the majority ethnic groups in post-independence Nigeria, the commission again recommended 
that a constitutional provision be made for the protection of the fundamental human rights and 
liberties of every Nigerian. This, it was expected, would guard against the domination, 
marginalisation and infringement of the rights of every Nigerian, irrespective of the ethnicity, 
major or minor, to which anyone belonged.  
On the surface, the concerns expressed by the Niger Deltans may appear to have been 
addressed, especially as the government had not only recognised them as legitimate, but also 
made some constitutional provisions aimed at addressing them. However, this protective 
framework existed only in principle. In reality the political will to implement the 
recommendations of the Willink’s commission, now constitutionally recognised, was still 
lacking. With the discovery of oil in the Niger Delta region in 1958, and with the region 
becoming the greatest contributor to the national economy, thanks to the large oil reserves 
discovered in the region, the indigenes and inhabitants of the Niger Delta hoped for a better 
life and rapid infrastructural development. But this did not happen. The regional wealth was 
rather diverted towards the development of other parts of the country. Compared to most parts 
of the country, especially those belonging to the majority ethnic groups, the Niger Delta region 
still lags behind in terms of basic infrastructure, health and social amenities. Not much has 
changed since the time when the region first expressed their concerns to the Willink’s 
commission. During my fieldwork there, I experienced first-hand the poor and near-dilapidated 
state of its roads and infrastructures. The University of Bristol’s ethics committee, relying on 
information provided by the UK Home Office, also warned me about the poor state of the 
roads, as well as the dangers posed by floods in the region. I have mentioned this in order to 
highlight that the poverty and underdevelopment is real.   
Grievances over decades of marginalisation, exclusion, neglect, and environmental degradation 
by oil companies reached a tipping point - compelling the Niger Deltans to mobilise against 
the government. They subsequently demanded to be allowed to take back control of both their 
environment and resources.    
The earliest form of resource control related violent ethnic mobilisation in the post-colonial 




insurrection against the Nigerian government may best be described as a secessionist attempt, 
for it was aimed at breaking the region away from the rest of the country under the pretext of 
self-determination. The logic of Boro’s revolution is quite straightforward: the Niger Delta, he 
believed, would be better off as an independent state than remaining a part of Nigeria, a country 
which he thought marginalised and treated it unfairly. The Boro led revolution lasted only for 
12 days before it was confronted and quelled by a more powerful federal force (Ako, 2011; 
Faleti, 2013). But why did the Nigerian government find it necessary to resist the Niger Delta’s 
attempt at secession? One would have expected that if a collection of people in an unhealthy 
and tumultuous cohabitation with its neighbours desired, in the interest of peace, to separate 
and form a separate nation, they should be allowed to do so. After all, Gellner (1990), one of 
the finest scholars of nationalism, proposed that states tend to have less violent frictions when 
their political and national boundaries are congruent. A part of the reason why Western 
European countries seem to enjoy a significantly higher level of intra-state peace is perhaps 
because political boundaries have not been arbitrarily drawn. They have rather been made to 
coincide as much as possible with national boundaries, even if this significantly reduced the 
population of some of the independent European states. Liechtenstein for instance has a 
population of about 40,000 people; Monaco 38,500; Iceland 334,250; Andorra 77,280; and 
Luxembourg 583,000; and the list could get longer. These territories have become independent 
states not because of size of their population, but mainly because ethno-national units were 
taken as the main determinant of political boundaries. The relatively stable intra-state peace 
enjoyed by most of these states may be partly explained by the congruence of both their national 
and political boundaries. In contrast, the Niger Delta region has a total population of 
approximately 30 million (Okonta and Douglas, 2003). Based on the European example, each 
of the constituent states of the Niger Delta could easily form an independent country without 
much difficulty. If Nigeria is disallowing the Niger Delta’s push for session and self-
determination, it is most probably because of the interests or benefits it derives from it. As 
mentioned earlier, the oil in the Niger Delta constitutes up to over 90 percent of Nigeria’s 
internally generated revenues and foreign exchange earnings. Allowing the Niger Delta to 
secede would definitely have dire consequences for Nigeria. A country that suddenly loses up 
to 90 percent of its source of income would have great difficulty surviving. It can thus be seen 
that interest in oil wealth was at the centre of Adaka Boro’s violent confrontation with the 
federal government of Nigeria. It was therefore no surprise when barely three years after Boro’s 
revolution had been foiled, the federal government of Nigeria enacted the ‘petroleum act’ of 




the ownership and control of oil and gas deposits anywhere in the country in the federal 
government and not in the regional government. Although the Niger Deltans were against this 
move, that ignored their interests and systematically alienated them ownership and control of 
resources that derived directly from their homeland, no other formidable collective action had 
been taken since the time of Boro’s revolution to challenge this decision until the 1990s.    
 
From 1990s onwards, what may rightly be referred to as the second wave of the Niger Delta’s 
resource control agitation commenced. It is not entirely clear why, after the quelling of the 
Boro led armed insurrection, no other seriously organised armed confrontation of the Federal 
government occurred until the 1990s. Perhaps it was due to the fact that for most of those years, 
unelected military dictators were in power. The unilateral system of government they ran 
emboldened them to brutally punish whoever challenged their policies, sometimes even 
lethally. But again, this assumption is not very satisfactory, because in the year 1990 when Ken 
Saro Wiwa, a human rights activist from the Niger Delta, led what may be considered one of 
the most potent protests and demanded justice  for the region (particularly for the ‘Ogoni land’ 
- his home town), the military dictators were still in power. So, it remains difficult to understand 
why there was an interval of twenty-four years before another organised insurrection occurred. 
Perhaps this is why Ogbogbo (2007; 2008) referred to it as a ‘preparatory phase’ of the Niger 
Delta crisis. Although Ken Saro Wiwa and his colleagues were eventually murdered (hanged) 
by the military regime of General Sani Abacha, Saro Wiwa and his colleagues achieved a 
significant feat. They were able to articulate, for the first time, the grievances of their people 
through the ‘Ogoni Bill of Rights’, which they drafted in August 1990 (Faleti 2013). Moreover, 
they formed the Movement for the Emancipation of Ogoni People (MOSSOP) to champion 
this cause. The death of Saro Wiwa and his nine colleagues did not deter the Niger Deltans’ 
continual push for justice. It rather heightened their resistance and led to the formation of more 
violent ethnic militias in the region who demanded either secession or control of the region’s 
resources. From fieldwork experiences in the region, I can confirm that there is still a very 
strong feeling of anger and resentment amongst the ordinary people of the Niger Delta 
regarding what they consider an unjust alienation of their resources. One of my interviewees 
told me: ‘Nigeria should all break up. To your tents oh Israel’ (Interview response by a Member 
of Bayelsa state House of Assembly in Yenagoa, Bayelsa State Nigeria; June 2017). From this, 





The narrative above has been presented, not just as a way of recapitulating some historical facts 
about the Niger Delta, but mainly to establish that at the basis of all these violent conflicts in 
the Niger Delta lies some real interest: access to and control of oil wealth. It is therefore not an 
over-statement to posit that interest, as Kaufman (2001), and Collier and Hoeffler (2000) 
observe, is an indispensable factor in accounting for why violent ethnic mobilisation occurs 
and persists in the Niger Delta region.   
Apart from the confrontation between the Federal government of Nigeria and the Niger Deltans 
over resource control, another dimension of ethnic violence in the Niger Delta region is that 
between the indigenes and the oil companies. This will be examined in the next section again 
with a view to establishing whether or not interests have played a role in the generation and 
sustenance of the violent conflicts in the Niger Delta.   
 
Interests and Conflict in the Niger/Delta: Multinational Oil Companies 
versus the Niger Delta Indigenes 
 
The damaging impact of oil exploration on the environment 
The Niger Delta is host to some of the world’s top oil companies. Among those operating 
actively in the region are Royal Dutch Shell (British/Dutch), Chevron (American), Agip 
(Italian), Exxon Mobil (American), and Total (French), amongst others. Over the years, oil 
companies operating in the Niger Delta have been accused of recklessness and utter disregard 
for basic business ethics in their operations. The principles of business ethics require, for 
instance, the integration of best practice in business affairs in order to eliminate, or at least 
minimise the negative impacts of for-profit ventures both on human beings and the ecosystem 
in general. Viewed from this perspective, there is no doubt that multinational oil companies in 
the Niger Delta are seriously wanting, particularly in terms of the choices they make in their 
operations within the region. Their lack of will and enthusiasm to employ modern technologies 
and best practices in the exploitation of oil and gas in the Niger Delta region has led to major 
oil spillages and gas flares. Shell once admitted that most of their equipment was constructed 
in the 1960s and early 1980s. Although these facilities were built in line with the standards 




hazardous oil exploitation. Shell now recognises that this equipment would have been 
constructed differently today (Shell, 1995; Human Rights Watch, 1999; Agunobi et al. 2014). 
There is a consensus among experts that huge amounts of oil are spilled in the region, although 
estimates of the exact volume vary. Between 1976 and 1996, Nigeria’s Department of 
Petroleum Resources (DPR) estimated that a volume of 1.89 million barrels of oil was spilled 
in the Niger Delta region (Vidal, 2010). A UNDP report on oil spillage in the Niger Delta states 
that over 300 million barrels of oil have been spilled in the region between 1976 and 2001, of 
which only 30 percent was recovered, and 70 percent lost (UNDP, 2006).  The Nigerian 
National Petroleum Commission (NNPC) pegs the volume of oil spilled at 320 cubic meters in 
300 oil spillage incidents (Manby, 1999). A World Bank report by Moffat and Linden (1995) 
on the issue of oil spillage in the region casts doubt on figures previously published by 
government departments, arguing that oil spills in the region could be ten times higher than the 
so-called official statistics or figures. Vidal (2010)’s investigation on the issue of oil spillage 
reaffirms that it is impossible to establish the exact amount of oil spilled in the region, because 
both the government and the oil companies try as much as possible to keep such incidents 
secret. Whatever the statistics are, it obvious that oil spillage in the Niger Delta region is of 
staggering proportions.  
 
Niger Delta Indigenes confront oil companies 
These incidents of oil spillage and gas flaring have consequently led to the destruction of 
vegetation, farms and fishing areas on which most of the local population depend for livelihood 
and survival. Frustrated, the indigenes and other inhabitants of the area have resorted to protests 
(violent, and otherwise), as well as forming militia groups, vandalizing oil facilities,  and 
kidnappings, amongst other things, as a way of pressurizing the oil companies to properly 
compensate them for the environmental degradation which negatively impacts on their 
economic prospects and prosperity. In particular, the  worst hit have been farmers and 
fisherman who can no longer successfully carry on their businesses due to polluted soil and 
water channels, for which the oil companies are to blame.   
In 2003, Asari Dokubo, an indigene of the Niger Delta region founded a militia organisation 
called the NDPVF (Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force) whose main aim was to take back 




process of tapping and extracting oil from the pipelines for some clandestine market. In 
Nigeria, oil bunkering is considered illegal and a crime (Human Rights Watch, 2005).   In 2004, 
Olusegun Obasanjo, the then president of Nigeria, commissioned a military operation to wipe 
out the activities of the NDPVF. The latter, however, countered the intended military operation 
by declaring ‘all-out war’ with both the Nigerian state and the oil companies, threatening to 
blow up pipelines and other oil facilities, and consequently disrupt oil production and 
distribution. That was in September 2004. It caused a major stir in the region. Two days later, 
Shell, one of the major multinational oil companies operating in the area evacuated 235 of its 
non-essential workers from the field, leading to the reduction of oil production (BBC news, 
2004). For a country like Nigeria whose economy is heavily reliant on oil, the impact of this 
crisis was immediately felt. 
In the last quarter of 2012, Nigeria experienced a significant increase in piracy activities off its 
coast. By early 2013, it had become the second most pirated country in Africa after Somalia. 
Between 2004 and 2006 a total number of 12 ships had been hijacked, 33 sailors kidnapped, 
and about 4 oil workers killed. According to a BBC report, a Niger Delta Militia organisation 
is thought to be behind those attacks. (BBC News, 2006). Since 2006, kidnapping oil workers 
and well to do Nigerian political elites or their relatives, mostly in exchange for money, has 
become the modus operandi of the Niger Delta militia organisations. By 2016, Uguru and Faul 
(2016) report, more than 200 foreigners had been abducted, but mostly released unharmed in 
exchange for a huge financial ransom. A more chronological account of the issues of 
kidnapping and hostage-taking in the Niger Delta may be found in publications by Cutler 
(2008); Uguru and Faul (2016); Renshaw et al. (2016).  
To calm these violent agitations, and protect oil facilities from being further sabotaged, the 
multinational oil companies operating in the region devised a more informal means of tackling 
the problem, which entailed paying into a carefully negotiated compensatory fund in the oil-
bearing communities which in turn was expected to watch over the oil rigs and facilities and 
prevent them from being further vandalised. Unfortunately, however, this attempted solution 
did not fully succeed as the formula for distributing the large amount of money made available 
to oil-bearing communities became a highly contested issue. So, rather than being a solution, 
the informal provision of compensatory funds by oil companies to the so-called oil producing 




process by further generating some hitherto non-existent inter/intra communal or ethnic violent 
conflicts in which the Niger Delta people turned against one another.   
In all this, there is no doubt that every party implicated in these conflicts has been pursuing 
some specific interest. For the oil companies, it was the desire to be allowed to carry on with 
the oil exploration activities that provided them with enormous benefits. That was their interest. 
The Niger Delta indigenes on the other hand had an interest in protecting their environment, 
especially because the latter provided them with a livelihood. This again is an ‘interest’ at stake 
in the conflict. Furthermore, when the Niger Deltans turned against one another, it was once 
again over interest in the compensatory funds provided by the oil companies.  In all these 
conflicts, there has been some sort of interest at stake. This observation tallies with the position 
of the theoretical framework used in this thesis, which highlights among other things the 
indispensability of ‘interest’ in accounting for why violent ethnic conflicts occur and persist.  
 
Interest and Inter/intra Communal Crisis in the Niger Delta 
In her work ‘Oil exploration and conflict in the Nigeria’s Niger Delta’, which focuses on the 
case of Ilaje community of the Niger Delta area, Abosade (2015), describes how the majority 
of post-independence intra/inter-ethnic violent confrontations in the Niger Delta arise primarily 
from competition over the distribution of the compensatory fund provided by the oil 
companies. Quite often, a segment of the community that feels unfairly treated in the allocation 
of the fund  mobilises, sometimes violently, to challenge the status quo and seek its overturn. 
A case in point is that of the Ugbo or Ilaje crisis in which a couple of lives were lost.  
Ugbo Kingdom comprises of two sub-communities: Mahin and Ugbo. Oil production takes 
place is Ugbo but not in Mahin. However, the official designation: ‘oil producing community’ 
refers to Ugbo Kingdom; that is, to both Mahin and Ugbo sub-communities. This implies that 
any compensation made to this oil producing community is destined for the entire community, 
not just a portion of it. Before the discovery of oil, the Ugbo kingdom functioned perfectly as 
one undivided entity. In times of war, all its constituent parts stood together as one to ward off 
external aggressors. The single identity shared by these sub-communities was never in 
question. However, with the discovery of oil and its associated benefits, cracks and divisions 




company operating in the locality) to Ugbo Kingdom, became the main issue in the conflict. 
Rather than compensating the entire oil producing community, Chevron decided to pay only 
the inhabitants of the oil producing area of Ugbo, and not Mahin. In doing this, Chevron 
brought division into the identity of a community that hitherto functioned as one. The exclusion 
of Mahin from the compensation formula caused them to revolt, often violently, against both 
the oil company and against their neighbouring sister community Ugbo.  
It is important to notice the important role that ‘interest’ plays in the generation of conflict 
amongst the groups concerned. All the parties involved in the conflict have some kind of 
interest or benefits to pursue. The oil company was not keen to invest money in state-of-the-
art oil exploitation technologies, even if these were clearly desirable for their ability to 
minimise oil spillage and other negative effects of oil exploration on the environment. Not 
investing in new technology saves them some cost; in other words, it is financially beneficial 
for them, but on the other hand, damaging for the Niger Delta and its environment. Again, 
paying compensation only to the oil producing area, and not to the entire community, is 
certainly more financially rewarding for the oil companies. It reduces the compensation pay- 
outs significantly. It is therefore in the interest of the oil company (Chevron) to take such a 
line.   
From the case presented above, it is obvious that the conflict between Ugbo and Mahin sub-
communities was over the compensation fund provided by the oil by Chevron. Prior to the 
discovery of oil in this Ugbo kingdom, there was nothing worth fighting for. But since the 
discovery of oil and its associated compensatory funds, violent agitations over the distribution 
of funds have become a regular occurrence. Without doubt, the compensatory funds constitute 
the interest or benefit over which these sister communities clash. Whichever way it is 
evaluated, interests or benefits play an important role in explaining the reasons for violent 
conflicts occur and persist in Ugbo kingdom; and by extension, in the Niger Delta region, since 
Ugbo kingdom is a part of the Niger Delta.     
A similar instance of ‘interest’ driven intra-ethnic violence in the Niger Delta is that between 
the Torfani and Aberi people of Bayelsa state over the ownership of Aduku fishing community 
- a relatively culturally diverse location inhabited by people from other Nigerian ethnic groups 
such as the Igbo, Urhobo, and Isoko, mainly for fishing purposes. According to Sawyer 
(2014)’s investigation in the region, Aduku community is important for two main reasons: its 




a non-contested peaceful fishing area. However, with the discovery of oil, and consequently 
the negotiated rents paid directly to the oil-bearing communities by oil companies operating on 
site, Aduku community became a disputed territory over which the Trofani and Aberi people 
clash violently. My concern at this stage is not to determine the true owner of the disputed 
territory - a number of court cases have been filed to sort this out; but rather to highlight the 
role of interest in provoking a sustained and reprisal intra-ethnic conflict in the Niger Delta 
area. The discovery of oil in Aduku is in my opinion a real game changer. Peoples’ interest in 
the benefits that oil brings obviously pushed the Aberi and Trofani peoples into violent conflict 
against one another.  
Analyses of the root causes of violence both in Ugbo kingdom and in Aduku community 
supports Kaufman’s theory that people do not engage in organised and sustained violent 
conflicts unless there is some sort of interest to be obtained. In the cases presented and 
examined above, interest in oil and its associated benefits, constitutes an indispensable factor 
in understanding and explaining the why violent conflicts occur and persist in these areas, and 
ipso facto, in the Niger Delta. Echoes from my fieldwork interviews in Bayelsa State of the 
Niger Delta region correspond to this Kaufmanian theoretical perspective which provides the 
framework within which the current research is conducted.   
Conclusion 
The term ‘interest’ is a major relevant concept in this research project. The fieldwork data 
obtained from the Niger Delta, as well as the Kaufmanian ethnosymbolic theoretical framework 
within which the phenomenon of violent ethnic mobilisation in the Niger Delta is currently 
being examined highlight, amongst other factors, the indispensability of ‘interest’ in 
accounting for why violent ethnic conflicts evolve and persist. Kaufman’s opinion that violent 
ethnic mobilisation cannot occur unless there is some sort of interest at stake has not only been 
clearly affirmed in one of his most influential works: The Modern Hatreds (2001), but also 
directly or indirectly alluded to in a series of other works he published thereafter –  one 
indication of his unwavering conviction, along with the internal consistency that runs through 
his works on the subject of ethnic violence.  His opinion, to say the least, is very tenable; for it 
is reasonable to hold that under normal circumstances, rational entities would not engage one 
another in a pre-meditated, organised and sustained violent confrontation unless there is some 
sort of interest, real or perceived, over which they clash. It is, in fact, very hard, if not altogether 




contradicts it. If there is any issue on which the proponents of constructivism (Bates 1974; 
1983; 1997; Hechter 1986; 1995; Fearon 1994; Chandra 2004), instrumentalism (Duran 
1974:43; Glazer and Moynihan 1979; Lonsdale 1992; Collier and Hoeffler 2001) and most 
certainly ethnosymbolism (Young 1976;  Smith 1980, 1991; Connor 1994; Kaufman 2001, 
2006) converge, it is most probably on the indispensability of interest in accounting for the 
emergence and persistence of ethnic violence.  Even the interview participants interrogated on 
the phenomenon of ethnic violence during my fieldwork in the Niger Delta (although strictly 
speaking, not academic experts on the subject of ethnic violence), were able to recognise the 
necessary role of competing ‘interest’ in the evolution, occurrence and persistence of ethnic 
violence in the Niger Delta region. The responses they provided to the interview questions 
support, either directly or indirectly, the Kaufmanian stance on the indispensability of ‘interest’ 
in violent ethnic mobilisation.   
The idea that interest is a generator of conflict is not new amongst Niger delta scholars. The 
notion is seen reflected in the writings of such scholars as Obi (2009; 2010; 2011; 2014), 
Ikelegbe (2006), Omeje (2004; 2006), Adunbi (2015), Watts (2004; 2006), and Ako (2011), 
among many others. On the other hand, there is a paucity of work that has investigated the 
Niger Delta crisis  from the point of view of primordialism – the idea that ethnic groups fight 
one another due to some ancient, firmly established, fixed and inflexible differences based on 
biological descent or ancestry. Most Niger Delta scholars have worked with the assumption 
that primordialism as a framework for understanding the phenomenon of violent ethnic 
mobilisation is already obsolete and currently not being used in the Niger Delta, but without 
bothering to verify this claim through a separate inquiry. This project is not satisfied with 
unverified assumptions and affirmations – for there could have been easily some proponents 
of a primordialist explanation of the Niger Delta conflict, just as was the case in the Rwanda 
and the Balkans during the 1990s and 2000s. It is for this reason that extra effort has been made 
in this thesis to explore this issue further, and reach a conclusion that is backed up by facts, 
rather than just by assumptions. Based on the data collected and examined, it is possible to state 
with confidence that there is currently nothing to suggest that the Niger Delta conflict is being 
understood or interpreted from a primordialist viewpoint. On the contrary, the idea that struggle 
over interests is at the heart of the regional conflict has been overwhelmingly sustained. This 
conclusion reiterates the views of both my interview respondents and Kaufman on this issue – 
the indispensability of interest in accounting for why violent ethnic mobilisations occur and 





THE POSSIBLE ROLES OF ELITES IN THE SPIRALLING OF ETHNIC 
VIOLENCE IN THE NIGER DELTA 
 
In Chapter Four, it became clear that interest, particularly oil wealth, is central to a  meaningful 
explanation of the occurrence and persistence of violent ethnic mobilisation in the 
contemporary Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Following Kaufman (2001) and the resource or 
economy-based theorists of ethnic violence, such as Collier and Hoeffler (2002), amongst 
others, the last chapter reached a firm conclusion that ethnic violence would in fact not occur 
in that region unless there was some sort of interest, perceived or imagined, at stake. Indeed, it 
is inconceivable that rational entities would aimlessly engage one another in premeditated and 
well-organised violent confrontations unless there were some rewarding objectives to be 
pursued. Interests are usually a reason to fight (Pandey 1992: 41; Horowitz 1998) 
While this project recognises the indispensable role of interest in the rise and persistence of 
ethnic violence in the Niger Delta, it also acknowledges that there is nothing inherent in 
interests, or the pursuit thereof, that inevitably provokes large-scale ethnic violence. 
Historically, people have always pursued interests, either individually and collectively, without 
necessarily ending up in some sort of premeditated and organised violent confrontations 
(Esman, 2004). Given this, it is therefore reasonable to hold that interest, although necessary, 
is not automatically a sufficient condition for the occurrence and persistence of ethnic violence. 
There is always a need for some sort of agency (ethnic elites or entrepreneurs) through whom 
tensions over competing ethnic interests metamorphose or transform into full-blown ethnic 
violence. It is in this regard that the agency of manipulative elites in provoking and sustaining 
ethnic violence emerges as an indispensable supplement.   
In the pages that follow, I will briefly revisit elite manipulation theory to enable a quick 
understanding of what it entails, as well as what my interview respondents thought of it, 
particularly in relation to the Niger Delta violent conflict.  Thereafter, the context of ethnic 
violence in the Niger Delta is again reviewed in order to assess whether the elites (manipulative 
and corrupt) have played any role in the provocation and persistence of the violent regional 





Elite Manipulation Theory Revisited 
Elite manipulation theory, an offshoot of the instrumentalist perspective on ethnic violence, 
represents the dominant explanatory paradigm relative to the origins or causes of violent ethnic 
conflict. It holds that elites incite and instrumentalise ethnic violence for personal interests or 
gains (Snyder, 2000; Gagnon,1994; Brass 1997, Fearon and Laitin, 2000). Gagnon (1994)  
argued that ‘violent conflict along ethnic cleavages is provoked by elites in order to create a 
domestic political context in which ethnicity is the only politically relevant identity’, adding 
that   
by constructing individual interest in terms of threat to the group, 
endangered elites can fend off domestic challengers who seek to mobilise the 
population against the status quo and better position themselves to deal with 
future challenges. (Gagnon, 1994:132) 
 
Kaufman (2001:5) later reiterated this position when he opined that leaders of ethnic 
communities provoke extreme ethnic violence or war in order to keep or grab powers or other 
egoistic benefits, real or perceived. Brass (1997:6-7), in his Theft of an Idol, presented the 
outcome of his investigation into the causes of reprisal violent ethnic riots in India in the same 
vein. He made the  striking observation that incidents that precipitate violent riots often arise 
out of contexts that are not inherently of an ethnic or communal nature. However, the elevation 
of these specific events to take on a large-scale ethnic dimension depends on the local elites’ 
attitudes to, and interpretation of such events. In other words, elites have the power to provoke 
violence or persuade for calm through their attitudes and interpretation of events. Brass’s 
investigation therefore concluded that ethnic riots are, in the case of India, a utilitarian 
instrument, carefully constructed and employed by elites and those who control the flow of 
information - the media, in view of attaining some egoistic political ends (Brass 1997:61). 
Usually, the elites are conversion specialists who know how to keep tensions at a combustible 
level and effectively convert moments of tension into large-scale violent confrontation to 
achieve some preconceived private ends (Brass 1997:9).  
Could the same be affirmed in the case of violent ethnic mobilisation in the Niger Delta? Have 
elites played any roles in the spiralling and persistence of the crisis? If so, how were they able 
to do this successfully? Below are some of the responses provided by the individuals 
interviewed on the roles of the elites in the spiralling and persistence of the Niger Delta crisis, 




Elites’ Roles in the Niger Delta Violent Conflict: Views from Fieldwork 
interviews 
In an effort to comprehend the possible roles of the elites in the provocation and persistence of 
violent ethnic mobilisation in the Niger Delta region, 16 interviewees were asked the following 
question during an in-depth qualitative interview conducted both in Rivers and Bayelsa states 
of the region under review: “Some have argued that if the elites wanted the crisis to cease, they 
would have been able to do it. But that they have not could be an indication that they themselves 
may be benefiting from the crisis. Do you think that it is the case that the elites have any interest 
in seeing the crisis end?”. The responses they provided overwhelmingly suggest that they are 
aware that elites have been instrumental in the persistence of violent regional conflict.  
For instance, a member of the State House of Assembly interviewed had this to say:  
there is no doubt that the elites are stake holders in the conflict, and surely 
have had a role to play in the escalation of these conflicts with the Niger 
Delta. (Interview response by a Member of Bayelsa state House of Assembly 
in Yenagoa, Bayelsa State Nigeria; June 2017) 
The point being made here is that the elites are equally a part of the political ‘class’ who are 
entrusted with the real power (political and economic) to contain the regional crisis. Rather 
than doing so, they embezzle the public funds designated for solving the problem of violent 
conflict in the region. Hence the persistence of the regional crisis. It is against this background 
that the interviewee thought that elites have played some role in the occurrence and persistence 
of the Niger Delta violent conflict. Responding to the question of whether or not elites have 
contributed to the escalation of ethnic violence, another respondent – a traditional community 
ruler, told me: ‘Well, the answer is yes’. He later added:  
The political elites know who the militants are, and how they operate. In fact, 
they interact and collaborate with them. (Interview response by a traditional 
ruler in Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, Nigeria; April 2017)  
Another interviewee’s response to the same question was more explicit.  
“Let us talk about those who currently own oil blocks in the region. They 
have money. They do not want the status quo to change. They want to 
continue to keep it …That is the situation. But the vast majority would fight 
against it. The common people would want the situation to change, but the 
elites, because of the benefits they get would want the status quo to remain, 
even if there is conflict. The people fight for change, but the elites 




them” (Interview response by a traditional ruler in Port Harcourt, Rivers 
State, Nigeria; May 2017). 
All the other interviewees in some way reiterated, in different words, these opinions;  they were 
unanimous in their conviction that elites have, and continue to, play some roles, especially 
through corruption and the embezzlement of public funds, in the occurrence and persistence of 
violent ethnic mobilisation in the Niger Delta.  
One element that did not quite come through in the interviews was the issue of the ‘mechanism’ 
of ethnic conflict. The respondents, a bit more like Brass (1997), did not explain the mechanism 
of violent ethnic mobilisation in the region; that is, how the elites actually stir the region’s 
ethnic population to violence. Yet understanding the processes or mechanism by which ethnic 
tensions metamorphose into full blown violent ethnic confrontation is helpful, not only in 
comprehending the dynamics of this conflict, but also for the purpose of developing a bespoke 
conflict resolution model for the region.  That the elites embezzle public funds does not quite 
explain this. Perhaps this issue might be resolved through examination of the triangulation and 
supplementary data, below.  
 
Triangulation/Supplementary Data 
To verify the information obtained from the interviews, I turned to other sources of primary 
data such as newspaper articles, television and print media interviews granted by ex-militants, 
politicians, statesmen, technocrats, traditional rulers, and youth leaders on the subject of elite 
manipulation and roles in the spiralling and persistence of the conflict. The outcome of my 
examination of these supplementary/triangulation documents reveals a unanimous conviction 
among all the data sources examined, that both the Nigerian and the indigenous Niger Delta 
elites have indeed been instrumental in the rise and persistence of the Niger Delta crisis; 
although the manner in which this fact was captured and communicated varies slightly from 
one source to another. Bibora Orubebe, for instance, acknowledges this when he says the 
following:  
“The oil wealth, oil production in Niger Delta has only enriched 
multinational corporations and Nigerian federal leaders, some in military, 
others in civilian uniform. They have used the wealth to improve and develop 
themselves and other regions and neglected the actual people that produce” 
(TVC News, Nigeria, breakfast interview with Bibora Orubebe, secretary 




In this interview, Orubebe acknowledges that part of the problem faced in the Niger Delta is 
that Nigerian political elites and oil multinational companies cart away the oil wealth belonging 
to the region for their own personal interest, and that of their respective regions. This point had 
been captured earlier by Henry Okah, a Niger Delta ex-militant currently on trial in South 
Africa on criminal charges, when he was interviewed by Aljazeera News Agency. In his words:  
Oil companies are on our land. If somebody comes on our land without our 
consent, it is our problem, that’s our business to get rid of them. If somebody 
takes control of your house or your car, what you want is your car or house 
from him. And that’s it. What we want from these oil companies is our land. 
And then they can sort it out with Nigerian government who permitted them 
to be on our lands against our wills. (Aljazeera’s exclusive interview with 
Henry Okah, Nov 1, 2009)  
Henry Okah believes that the unhealthy alliance between the Federal Government and the oil 
company to forcibly explore oil in the region is a principal reason for the occurrence and 
persistence of violent ethnic mobilisation in the Niger Delta. In the same interview, Mr. Okah 
threatened that if the Federal government did not start addressing the Niger Delta’s demand for 
fair inclusion in resource distribution, the region would resume violent agitation once more:  
I think in a few months, if the government doesn’t start addressing the real 
demands of the people of Niger-Delta. If the government doesn’t start 
speaking to the right people in addressing the real problems, there will be a 
resumption in violence. (Aljazeera’s exclusive interview with Henry Okah, 
Nov 1, 2009)  
Ben Donyegha, interviewed by  TVC News Nigeria, voiced another opinion on the causal role 
of elites in the Niger Delta conflict. When asked by the host if  he had heard “about the 
complaint that some of the boys gave that they were not receiving some of these monies and 
they wanted direct conversation with the authorities, so that they can also have a sense of 
direction ?”, his answer was simply “Yes.…” (Ben Donyegha, Interview with Channels 
Television Nigeria, on Developments in the Niger Delta, July 11, 2016).  Anyone who has 
followed the causes of events in the Niger Delta would easily discern that this response, 
although brief, is loaded with meaning. It might be helpful to discuss this response in context. 
Among the pertinent issues that Adunbi (2015) discusses in his monograph are some of the 
measures taken by the Federal government to address the Niger Delta conflict. The presidential 
Amnesty programme is one of them. An important part of this programme is the agreement by 
the federal government to pay monthly stipends to the Niger Delta as a way of demobilising 




money were earmarked for this purpose and entrusted to the Niger Delta elites for distribution. 
A significant portion of this fund was illegally diverted and mismanaged, and the purpose for 
which it was provided not fully attained. In this interview, Ben Donyegha acknowledges that 
this partly contributed to the persistence of the regional crisis. Ben Donyegha is a member of 
the central working committee of PANDEF which is the highest socio-cultural body of the 
Niger Delta people.   
All the supplementary/triangulation documents examined confirm, in one way or another, the 
respondents’ affirmations that corrupt elites have played some enabling roles in the spiralling 
and persistence of the Niger Delta conflict.  This conclusion is also sustained in the work of 
many experts on the subject of violent ethnic mobilisation in the Niger Delta, such as 
Ikelegbe(2006), Watts(2007), Obi et al (2011), Iwilade(2017), and Adumbi(2015) amongst 
others. Although these documents, as well as those of the above mentioned scholars, have done 
well in presenting compelling arguments that explain how grievances over the injustices 
perpetuated by the elites cause violence (this is an indirect and normal consequence of elite 
corruption as shall be seen in a later section), what they have however not done is to explore 
those circumstances in which manipulative elites have actively constructed and deliberately 
stirred up violent ethnic mobilisation, or explain the mechanism by which this occurred.   How 
exactly were the elites (for instance in the case Adaka Boro led violent mobilisation) able to 
lead rational ethnic adults to actively get involved in violent ethnic conflict, sometimes even at 
the risk of their lives? Grievances, even when extreme, do not always end in violent conflict. 
But when they do, it is usually because some agency or leadership has caused it to occur. What 
therefore needs to be explained is the mechanism (or the process) by which ethnic grievances 
are transformed into organised violent ethnic mobilisation. This was neither well explained by 
the interviewees nor by the triangulation/supplementary materials used to verify them. The next 
section aims to address this gap.  
 
A more comprehensive view of elite manipulation 
A more balanced and comprehensive account of the elites’ role in violent conflict may be seen 
in the works of Gurr (1994), Horowitz (2000) and Kaufman (2001) amongst others, who, 
although they acknowledge the indispensability of elites in provoking and sustaining ethnic 
violence, are equally clear  that the success of elite manipulation is contingent on a number of 




pre-conditions for ethnic violence. In Kaufman’s view, the elites would be incapable of 
mobilising rational adults to violence unless these pre-conditions were present – for these are 
like the raw materials, thanks to which manipulative elites are able to fabricate and maintain 
politically salient violent conflict for their own selfish interest. They are as follows: hostile 
ethnic myths, fear, and political space. Only in the light of these elements is one able to start 
making sense of how manipulative elites are able to impel an ethnic public to participate in an 
extreme violent conflict, even at the risk of their lives. 
To successfully mobilise an ethnic population, or a portion of it, to ethnic violence, there needs 
to be, first, a hostile group mythology that justifies ethnic violence. This does not need to be 
an accurate or true narrative of events, but must, more than anything else, cast the ethnic 
opponents in negative light – presenting them as dangerous enemies to be wary of.  The second 
factor is passion, or the emotion of fear. The elites need to create in the people a real sense of 
collective or group fear. Ethnic appeals would successfully produce extreme violence if an 
ethnic group is anxious that its collective existence is at risk of being destroyed. Exploitative 
and manipulative elites know how to tap into ethnic fears to strategically cause extreme 
violence, using a purposefully constructed hostile ethnic myth. The third factor is political 
opportunity. In order for an ethnic group to mobilise without being repressed by the state, there 
also needs to be sufficient political space or opportunity. The opportunity referred to here is 
comprised of the following: the presence of a weak or broken state structure; the availability 
of independent funds that are not formally derived from the state, and finally a territorial base. 
Toft (2003) and Kaufman (2006) suggest that ethnic militia organisations cannot effectively 
and efficiently mobilise unless they are territorially concentrated in some regions, either within 
their own state or in neighbouring countries.  All these conditions, it should be mentioned, 
cannot in and of themselves lead to ethnic violence. Another indispensable factor, namely a 
manipulative elite, is required for extreme ethnic violence to set in. Theoretically, elite 
manipulation entails a number of things simultaneously: a set of actors (elites) tapping into 
hostile ethnic myths and fear, and leveraging the weakness or fragility of the state (political 
space) to strategically provoke violent ethnic conflict that they expect to benefit themselves. 
All these constitute what Kaufman calls the ‘mechanism’ of violent ethnic mobilisation. Each 
of these pre-conditions (ethnic myth, fear, and political space) are  elaborated further below, in 
relation to the Niger Delta violent conflict. The aim is to show that these pre-conditions were 




to creatively harness and use them to mobilise ethnic populations in the Niger Delta to violent 
conflict in which they (the elites), and not necessarily the people, stood to gain.    
  
Hostile Ethnic Myth and the Niger Delta Conflict 
The key issue examined and discussed here concerns the ability of hostile ethnic myths to 
inspire violent ethnic mobilisation.   
Ethnic myth, from Greek ethnos (people) and mythos (story) may be broadly defined as a 
legendary or traditional narrative, with or without determinable factual or historical basis, that 
communicates about the origins, cosmology, customs, and practices of a people. Functionally, 
it provides a system whereby an ethnic group’s contemporary attitudes and actions are ordered 
and validated (Calhoun, 2002; Darvill, 2009; Baldick, 2015; Vivanco, 2018). West (2003) adds 
that myths are essential in providing the continuity that people need for collective ethnic or 
nationalist actions. According to Anthony Smith (1984), myth plays an important role in 
nourishing the sense of ethnic identity and mobilising ethnic communities for political action. 
In myths, the identity and “history” of ethnic communities are captured, communicated and 
perpetuated.  It does not matter whether a myth is accurate. What matters is that it exists, and 
that ethnic groups and nations refer to it in an effort to explain their origin and history and 
validate their actions.    
Nigeria, somewhat like the United states of America, is composed of many states (36 in total), 
with each state having an executive governor who runs its affairs largely independently of the 
federal government’s intervention. The Niger Delta region is comprised of 9 of these states, 
namely, Abia, Imo, Akwa-Ibom, Cross River, Bayelsa, Ondo, Edo, Delta, Rivers. However, 
these states are not ethnically homogenous, for within each exists a fairly large number of 
ethnic groups such as the Ijo, Uhrobo, Itsekiri, Ogoni, Ikewere, Kalabari, Egbema and Obolo 
amongst others (Nigeria Fact Sheet, 2012). It is not an easy task to determine the exact number 
of ethnic groups inhabiting the Niger Delta, but from the writings of Lauren Ploch (2012) and 
Judith Asunni (2009) it is certain that there are at least 40 identifiable ethnic groups, of different 
sizes and proportions, in the region. Each ethnic group is distinct, possessing the so-called 
essential markers of ethnicity such as myths of common origin, languages, customs and 
practices amongst others. As described above, these myths capture and communicate the 




inspire them to collective ethnic actions, violent or otherwise. These myths, whether or not 
historically accurate, are necessary in order to distinguish a particular ethnic group (in-group) 
from other groups (out-groups) of a similar nature, and in so doing create and reinforce ethnic 
boundaries.  For an in-group, ethnic boundaries foster unity and cooperation, but in relation to 
ethnic categories, that is, an out-group, ethnic boundaries highlight difference, and are ipso 
facto divisive, creating conditions that potentially favour inter-ethnic tensions or conflict 
(Horowitz 1985; Smith and Hutchinson 1996: 6; Fearon and Laitin 2000: 20; Kaufman, 2001)    
The Ijaw, for instance, is the largest ethnic group in the Niger Delta, with a population of about 
14 million people. Although they are scattered across many states within the region, they have 
myths that link them back to a common ancestry. According to Shoup (2011), the Ijaw appears 
to be one of the oldest ethnic groups in the Niger Delta, and is believed to have lived in the 
Delta region before the fifth millennium BCE. Some Ijaw people believe they originate from 
Upper Egypt, while others think their ancestral roots are in South Africa. These suppositions 
already suggest that the historical accuracy of the Ijaw peoples’ narrative or myth of common 
ancestry is somewhat contested. However, as mentioned earlier, what matters most is not the 
accuracy of these accounts, but rather the fact that a myth that explains their collective common 
origin exists. That is all that is required for mobilisation to collective action. 
Furthermore, there are other Ijaw ethnic myths or tales that glorify the heroic deeds, resilience 
and exploits of their ancestors and ethnic group. Ijaw people cherish and take pride in these 
glorious myths that recapitulate their ethnic group’s noble and heroic accomplishments, and 
which also serve as an inspirational reference point for every generation, motivating them to 
pursue and accomplish similar noble and heroic deeds (Alagoa 1972;  Ngaage 2003;  Ogbogbo 
2005, 2007). In this, the emotive and mobilising power of ethnic myths is more clearly seen. It 
is exactly for this reason that Anthony Smith (1984) posits that one of the greatest potencies of 
ethnic myth (also an ethnic community) lies in its ability to combine interests with affective 
ties, providing a highly suitable instrument of political action.  Ethnic myths and other markers 
of ethnicity are not only symbols of exclusion, they also represent a large repertoire of 
attachment and expression.  They help define collectivities, dividing the ‘us’ from the ‘them’- 
a division that better explains mobilisation along ethnic lines in pursuit of ‘interests’ (Smith, 
1984).  Attachment and pride in one’s ethnic group makes it relatively easy to be mobilised or 
manipulated along ethnic lines in pursuit of ethnic interest. According to Gurr (1994), it is 
impossible to mobilise people along ethnic lines if ethnic attachment is lacking. For ethnicity 




to their ethnicity needs to be grown. In the Niger Delta, ethnic identity, attachment and passions 
are very high.  
The Ijaw people of the Niger Delta are passionately proud of their ethnic heritage, identity and 
affiliation; and this makes it relatively easy to get them mobilised for collective action along 
ethnic lines. In the course of my fieldwork, I had a chance to witness a meeting of Ijaw youths 
in Port Harcourt, Rivers State. It was an event organised to discuss the best fund-raising 
strategy in support of local community sports events. I observed that the expression ‘Haa Izon’ 
was often used by speakers, mostly as motivational phrase.  I was later made to understand that 
for an average Ijaw person, that expression: ‘Haa Izon’ is replete with emotions and meaning. 
In some way, this expression, as brief as it is , is able to call to mind and make present all the 
existing positive myths or narratives that define the Ijaw people as unified, industrious and 
resilient achievers; its use in that context kept the youths motivated and focused on their 
fundraising exercise to finance their local community sporting event.  This is the emotive power 
of ethnic myths and symbols (words are a form of symbol, amongst others).  
Ethnic myths may be constructed positively or hostilely. When they are positively constructed, 
they are able to mobilise people for peace and rewarding intra/inter-ethnic projects, or for 
violence (war) when negatively or hostilely constructed.  In the Niger Delta, such hostile ethnic 
myths or narratives exist. There is a popular belief or narrative among the Niger Deltans that 
the disorder and crisis in their region are caused by the Federal government of Nigeria and the 
oil multinational companies. They are the external enemies; and are primarily to blame for 
environmental degradation and other socio-economic and political woes in the region. This 
explains why a significant number of violent ethnic attacks have been aimed at destroying oil 
facilities belonging either to the Federal government or the oil companies operating in the 
region. The goal is to disrupt oil production and transportation which will eventually 
significantly reduce the oil revenues or funds available to, and controlled, by the federal 
government.  For the regional population of the Niger Delta, the unjust activities of these ethnic 
enemies must be challenged and opposed if the rights and liberties of the ethnic minorities of 
the Niger Delta are to be restored and respected. These negative or hostile narratives about the 
federal government and oil companies have not only become popular amongst the Niger 
Deltans, but have also been received by them as credible. Manipulative elites tap into these 
carefully and strategically constructed hostile ethnic myths or narratives to heighten peoples’ 
grievance and hatred of both the federal government and the oil companies; making it easier to 




interests. It is for such reasons that Kaufman (2001) views hostile ethnic myth as a necessary 
and potent instrument, used by chauvinist elites to mobilise ethnic groups to violent conflict, 
particularly when the hostile myth in question has been popularised and accepted by an ethnic 
public (in-group) as truism.  
 
Fear and the Niger Delta Conflict 
That extreme ethnic violence or war is mainly driven by fear is the bold assertion with which  
Kaufman opens, in his  article ‘Ethnic fear and ethnic war in Karabagh’ (Kaufman 1998:). This 
claim is reiterated in Modern Hatred (Kaufman 2001), and again in his widely referenced 
article ‘Symbolic Politics or Rational Choice’ (Kaufman 2006). Horowitz (1985) and Gurr 
(1994), amongst others, have expressed similar views; all are unanimous on the basic notion 
that violent ethnic conflict escalates mainly because one ethnic party in the conflict, and 
eventually both parties, fear that their collective existence as a group is potentially at risk of 
destruction or extinction in their conflict with the other ethnic group. The prevalence of this 
sort of fear or phobia (security dilemma) among members of a particular ethnic group 
eventually motivates and justifies their resorting to violence, either in self-defence or in pre-
emptive attacks. So, whenever an ethnic group has violently mobilised as a collectivity, it is 
usually because they have come to believe, and therefore fear, rightly or wrongly, that their 
opponent presents a potentially fatal threat to their collective existence as an ethnic group. 
Kaufman recognises this sort of fear as a pre-condition for extreme violent inter-ethnic 
confrontation to occur.  
These insights are relevant for this project’s evaluation of the context of violent ethnic 
mobilisation in the Niger Delta, particularly the contribution of fear to the onset and persistence 
of the regional conflict. This project’s careful examination of academic and historical reports 
on the causes of ethnic conflict in the Niger Delta reveals that fear or phobia, especially of 
collective extinction, is a major contributor to ethnic violence in the region.   
As mentioned earlier, Nigeria is home to more than 250 identifiable ethnic groups (Salawu 
2010). But of all these ethnic groups, three (the Igbo, Yoruba and Hausa) make up the majority, 
due to their numerical strength. The rest, including all the constitutive ethnic groups of the 
Niger Delta region, including the Ijaw, Urhobo, Ikwere, Itsekiri and Ogoni, amongst others, 




For decades, the minorities of the Niger Delta have complained of marginalisation, exclusion 
and environmental degradation linked to unethical and careless oil exploitation by both the 
Nigerian government and oil companies (Faleti, 2013). Although these injustices are at the root 
of the Niger Delta’s ethno-regional grievances, and ultimately of its violent conflict, what needs 
to be explained concerns the mechanism by which these grievances turn to violence, since there 
seems to be no necessary connection between grievance one the one hand, and actual violent 
ethnic confrontations on the other. Some grievances, no matter how extreme, never end in 
serious violence. So if the Niger Delta grievances metamorphose into violence, as they actually 
have, it is simply because hostile ethnic myths have been carefully constructed, and 
purposefully manipulated to make the ethnic population fear that their collective existence as 
a group was under serious threat of possible destruction or extinction if they did not rise up in 
self-defence against the incessant brutality of both the federal government and the oil 
companies. When ethnic entrepreneurs are bent on stoking violence, the historical accuracy of 
such fear-inducing hostile ethnic narratives or myths is irrelevant. What matters is that they 
exist and are capable, when received by the ethnic public as credible, of passionately stirring 
them violently against an identifiable and potentially destructive opponent - in this particular 
instance the federal government of Nigeria and the oil companies.  Fear of possible collective 
destruction is, as noted by Kaufman (1998), a necessary pre-condition for successfully 
mobilising an ethnic group to violence.  
Between 1990 and 2000, a fairly large number of violent ethnic militia organisations such as 
the IYC (Ijaw youth council), NDPVF (Niger Delta people’s volunteer force), and NDV (Niger 
Delta vigilante) amongst others, were formed in the Niger Delta. These movements had one 
clear objective – fighting to defend themselves against the numerous injustices and brutality of 
the federal government and oil companies, which according to them constantly threaten their 
existence as a people. From the statements of the leaders of these militia organisations, one 
could discern that the fear of a possible collective destruction of both the people and their 
environment has contributed to impelling various ethnic groups in the Niger Delta to violence.    
For instance, Asari Dokubo, one of the most notorious ethnic militia leaders in the Niger Delta 
revealed that the federal government has been brutally killing indigenes of the Niger Delta just 
for defending their rights. Challenging this brutality, Asari forewarned the government that his 
people (the Ijaw ethnic group) would no longer watch as they are progressively decimated, that 
they would take up arms and fight back, matching force with force (Asairi Dokubo, TV 




federal government and the oil companies as life-threatening, and in so doing instilled in his 
people fear the of possible collective ethnic doom if measures, including use of violence, were 
taken to counter the ethnic enemies – federal government and the oil companies.  
For a people confronted with such a life-threatening situation, nothing could be more urgent 
than fighting for survival, even if violently.  As observed by Stern (1995), prevention of mortal 
danger, more than the pursuit of benefits, impels people to participate in collective action. 
Threat to life is a more compelling reason for violent mobilisation. A quick glance at some of 
the foreign policy interventions by some of the global superpowers shows that this is the case. 
The United States of America for instance often justifies external pre-emptive attacks on 
territories or peoples perceived as posing some potentially fatal security threats, either to its 
homeland or to its citizens. So, fear, especially of a potentially fatal threat to a people, as 
Kaufman observes, is a pre-condition for violent ethnic mobilisation, and experience of the 
Niger Delta scenario shows that this is a valid hypothesis. This project therefore supports 
Kaufman’s argument that fear, in the hands of manipulative elites, is a powerful and helpful 
tool for mobilisation to extreme ethnic violence.  
In the course of my data collection exercise in the Niger Delta, I had first-hand experience, not 
only of the brutality of the law enforcement agents in the region, but also of the enormous 
environmental pollution caused by oil exploitation activities. This situation is without 
equivocation a very serious and worrisome one. This acknowledged, what is however uncertain 
is whether the conclusion of impending collective ethnic doom, can necessaily be derived from 
that state of affairs as Asari Dokubo, an ethnic militia leader, suggests. It seems that a well-
meaning and forthright pacifist elite would have been able to address the issues involved 
without being overly dramatic, that is, excessively stoking ethnic fears. But again, this sort of 
thinking was reasonably countered by one of the community leaders interviewed during  
fieldwork. He pointed out that the Niger Deltans began their self-defence with dialogue and 
negotiation. But since these yielded no meaningful results, the people adopted the path of 
violence, which actually seems to be working. The federal government now takes the Niger 
Deltans very seriously, occasionally releasing funds aimed at resolving the regional turmoil 
(Interview response by a traditional ruler in Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, Nigeria; April 2017). But 
whatever the case, it is important to note that elite manipulators usually exaggerate hostile 
narratives (myths) as an an effective way of instilling fear in the public, thereby facilitating and 
strengthening their resolve to undertake any measure, even violence, to ensure their continual 




but exceptionally serious ones are. This is why manipulative elites present an often-exaggerated 
account of events, that casts the opponent in a very negative light, as this boost people’s 
willingness to approve of, and support, violent ethnic interventions.  
What emerges clearly from the forgoing is that fear, especially of collective ethnic doom, is, as 
observed by Kaufman (2001; 1998), Gurr (1994), and Stern (1995), an important element in 
successful mobilisation of an ethnic group to extreme violence. Manipulative elites in the Niger 
Delta region understand and use this tool to provoke ethnic violence, of which they themselves 
(elites) are sure beneficiaries.   
The next section considers the possible impact of political space in fostering violent ethnic 
mobilisation in the Niger Delta. Kaufman argues that political space is a pre-condition for 
extreme violent conflict in general, and the next section explores how this applies, if at all, to 
the context of ethnic violence in the Niger Delta.   
 
Political Space and the Niger Delta Conflict 
Political space to mobilise, which according to Kaufman (1998; 2001; 2006) is another pre-
condition for the occurrence of organised and sustained violent ethnic conflict, refers to the 
opportunity or freedom of an ethnic group to mobilise for violent action without being 
repressed by the state. Effective state policing can prevent the spiralling of violent activities, 
and political repression can also hinder ethnic elites from properly articulating ethnic demands 
and successfully mobilising their followers to violent conflict. It therefore follows that, where 
the state maintains an effective apparatus of oppression and repression, extreme and sustained 
violent mobilisation cannot occur (Kaufman 2001: 32).  
The political opportunity referred to here is, according to Kaufman (1998; 2006) composed of 
two elements. The first element relates to the political space occasioned by state breakdown or 
by the emboldening support of foreign countries. When the state is weak and no longer disposes 
of effective intelligence gathering and policing, a vacuum or window of opportunity for groups 
to violently mobilise is automatically created; quite frequently, especially in countries already 
rife with inter-ethnic tensions, ethnic groups seize the opportunity to violently mobilise. IN 
addition, the support of foreign countries, whether in the form of funding or intelligence 
sharing, could provide an ethnic group with the space or liberty needed to effectively mobilise 




view is similar to that of Toft (2003) who believes that ethnic rebels or militia cannot 
successfully mobilise for violence unless they are territorially concentrated in some region, or 
have got a territorial base in neighbouring countries. A lack of territorial concentration weakens 
an ethnic organisation’s or group’s ability to effectively mobilise violently.  
The availability of sufficient political space as explained above is very helpful in understanding 
why ethnic groups of the Niger Delta have, to a very large extent, successfully mobilised for 
violent actions. The opportunity or space for violent ethnic mobilisation in the Niger Delta is 
provided by the fragility of the Nigerian state, especially in area of intelligence gathering and 
effective policing. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (2005) 
uses the term ‘fragile state’ to describe nation-states where conflict is ongoing, or at risk of re-
occurring, and in which the central government does not have effective control over its borders 
or territories, is incapable of providing, or unwilling to provide, vital human necessities and 
services for a significant portion of its territory, and holds little or no legitimacy amongst its 
citizens. The United States of America’s National Intelligence Council’s (NIC) 2005 report: 
Mapping the Global Future uses a similar description of a fragile state.  A failed, failing, or 
fragile state is defined as that having ‘expanses of territory and population devoid of effective 
government control’.  
In many respects, the Nigerian state fits the above descriptions of a fragile state; not only is the 
current Nigerian state incapable of providing vital services for a significant portion of its 
population, it also does not have effective control of all its political territory. In the North-East 
part of Nigeria for instance, neither the Nigerian police or the military have been able to contain 
the insurgency of the Boko-Haram terrorist organisation, and the central government seems to 
have lost control of the security situation in that region. In the South-South, violent ethnic 
organisations demanding group-specific rights are still able to mobilise violently without being 
repressed by the Nigerian state. This is not because the state does not want to repress their 
violence, but mainly because these ethnic militia organisations in the Niger Delta are very 
sophisticated in their modes of operation, and are occasionally quite a way ahead of the 
intelligence-gathering apparatus of the state.  All this confirms, as earlier mentioned, that 
Nigeria is a fragile state, too weak to effectively police its territory. Good policing, as observed 
by Human Rights Watch (2010), is the bedrock for the rule of law and public safety. In other 
words, the stability of any country is highly threatened if its police unit is ineffective, 
incompetent or compromised. Without any prejudice to its occasional good work, studies and 




in the Niger Delta, is to a very large extent linked to the incompetence, ineffectiveness and 
corruption of Nigeria’s police force. This negatively impacts on the quality of its operations 
and ability to keep the country safe (Human Rights Watch 2010; Agbiboa 2015; Nwokolo et 
al. 2018).  
During my fieldwork in the Niger Delta, one interview respondent revealed that some militia 
organisations in the region are able to sustain their violent operations by selling crude oil they 
have sourced illegally through oil-bunkering on the international market, either for money or 
in exchange for arms (Interview response by a traditional ruler in Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, 
Nigeria; April 2017). Such a high-profile organised crime would not be possible if the Nigerian 
state was not fragile, and its security system was not inefficient.  
So, experience from Nigeria, particularly as it relates to the issue of violent ethnic mobilisation 
in the Niger Delta, corroborate Kaufman’s (1998; 2001) view that political space (thanks to 
which an ethnic group is able to violently mobilise without being repressed), constitutes a pre-
condition for an elite’s ability to manipulate people. In the Niger Delta, political elites take 
advantage of the fragility of the Nigerian state to stir an ethnic population to violence. 
Moreover, the territorial concentration of the ethnic groups of the Niger Delta in the South-
Southern part of Nigeria facilitates and strengthens their ability to mobilise. As Toft (2003) 
argues, an ethnic group is always willing to mobilise in defence of the territory that it identifies 
as its ancestral homeland.    
The next section uses the case of Adaka Boro to exemplify how these pre-conditions are 
brought together and activated to enable an elite to manipulate an ethnic population into 
violence.  
 
How Elites Manipulate: The Case of Adaka Boro of the Niger Delta 
Earlier in the chapter, it was observed that for the elites to successfully manipulate the public 
into extreme violent conflict, certain pre-conditions such as ethnic myths, fear, and political 
opportunity must exist.  As important as these conditions are, it is worth noting that they cannot 
in and of themselves lead to violent mobilisation in the absence of the agency of a manipulative 
elite or leader. According to Kaufman (2006), it is the strategic manipulation of the 
aforementioned preconditions by a manipulative leader or elites that eventually leads to 




explained by an increase in ethnic fear, political opportunity and hostile ethnic myth that casts 
the opponent in a negative light, and the elites’ provocative interpretation of symbolic events 
to generate violent conflict. In such a charged atmosphere, predatory policies and action plans 
aimed at countering or dominating a rival ethnic group or identified opponent, become popular 
and are welcomed by the people. An assessment of the dynamics of ethnic violence in the Niger 
Delta reveals the existence of not just the preconditions for ethnic violence outlined above but 
also the presence of manipulative elites in the onset and sustenance of some of the major violent 
mobilisations in the history of Niger Delta agitations.  The case of the Boro-led violent 
mobilisation is a good example.  
The earliest, best-organised and most purposeful large-scale ethnic violence in post-
independence Niger Delta history was arguably that led by Major Adaka Boro (Faleti, 2013; 
Ikporukpo 2018). In line with the basic definition of the term ‘elite’ in Chapter two, as a person 
of influence within a larger social category, Major Jasper Adaka Boro is arguably a member 
of an elite. Born in Oloibri, in present day Bayelsa state of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, 
in 1938, Adaka Boro was among just a few individuals of his time to receive a formal British 
education and training in post-colonial Nigeria. Following his graduation from high school, 
Boro was employed as a teacher, a job he did diligently, albeit briefly, before joining the police 
force, and later the army - rising to the rank of Major. Within the Nigeria of this historical 
epoch, these were rare, noble and enviable achievements, especially for someone his age. By 
virtue of his qualifications, positions, and exposure, Adaka Boro was in many respects an 
influential member of his ethnic group. In other words, he was elite, and in this capacity, as an 
influential figure, he mobilised his people (the Ijaw) to rebel against the Federal republic of 
Nigeria against what may be described as crippling injustices against the Ijaw people, and the 
Niger Delta region in general. Although this rebellion was short lived and ill-fated, none could 
reasonably doubt Adaka Boro’s success in persuading his people to violent ethnic mobilisation 
against the federal government of Nigeria. But a question that remains to be answered is this:  
How was he able to get rational adults to support or actively participate in such a violent ethnic 
action, even at risk to their own lives? This is perhaps where the details provided by Kaufman’s 
theory of ethnic conflict prove to be very relevant and helpful. According to Kaufman (2001; 
2006), elites cannot successfully manipulate rational adults unless the following preconditions 
already exist: hostile ethnic myths, political opportunity, and fear; and there are of course some 
sort of interests or benefits to be attained. In the light of these conditions, we are now able to 




popular hostile ethnic myths that cast the Nigerian government in a negative light to stoke 
ethnic grievance and fear, and arouse the ethnic public against the federal government. To 
better appreciate this point, it may be helpful to briefly analyse a portion of Adaka Boro’s 
motivational speech to his people. It goes thus:  
 
“Today is a great day, not only in your lives” (as Ijaw people), “but also in 
the history of the Niger Delta. Perhaps, it will be the greatest day for a very 
long time. This is not because we are going to bring the heavens down, but 
because we are going to demonstrate to the world what and how we feel 
about oppression….Remember your 70 year old grandmother who still farms 
to eat, remember also your poverty stricken people and then, remember too, 
your petroleum which is being pumped out daily from your veins, and then 
fight for your freedom” (Adaka Boro, February 23rd 1966; quoted in Oriola 
2016) 
 
A close examination of this excerpt shows that Adaka Boro’s speech contains all the pre-
conditions for ethnic violence outlined by Kaufman (1998; 2001). I have highlighted some of 
the most useful phrases. First: “Today is a great day, not only in your lives” (as Ijaw people), 
“but also in the history of the Niger Delta.” This  statement reminds Adaka’s audience, the 
Ijaw people, of their shared history; that is, their ancestral descent and their collective 
experience as a people. As Smith (1984), Anderson (2006) and Kaufman (2001) (as well as 
other scholars of ethnicity and nationalism) have argued, the histories of ethnic groups or 
nations are usually captured and communicated through ethnic myths and symbols, which play 
a vital role in articulating their identities and giving them a sense of purpose. The Ijaw ethnic 
group, who were the principal audience of Adaka Boro’s speech, have a number of ethnic 
myths that articulate and communicate the group’s origin and collective experiences of ethnic 
success, failure, or suffering. Some of these myths or narratives may be found in the writings 
of Alagoa (1966) and Obi et al. (2011). So, in this first statement, the Ijaws are reminded of 
their common history and bond as a people, that is, as a distinct ethnic group with a purpose, 
and of their collective experience of marginalisation, injustice and oppression at the hands of 
the federal government of Nigeria. In making reference to the peoplehood of the Ijaw, Adaka 
Boro was able to unite them. In provocatively referring to the collective suffering that they 
have endured at the hands of the federal government of Nigeria, Boro was able to subtly 




them to violently mobilise against their identified ethnic foe - the federal government. When 
Adaka Boro finally asked his people to fight for their rights and freedom, the people were 
already well disposed and finally joined in the Boro-led rebellion against the federal 
government, which took place on the 5th day of November 1966. The inability of the Nigerian 
state to effectively police its territory provided a window of opportunity (a political space) 
ceased by Boro and his cohort to violently mobilise against the federal government. This 
bloody violent confrontation lasted for twelve days before the superior federal forces were 
eventually able to pacify the region, bringing it under the control of the federal government. 
Freedom from severe oppression, which was expected to restore the ethno-regional ability to 
control their own economic resources, amongst other benefits, was the collective interest or 
objective that the Ijaw people were being invited to fight for. So as noted in the Chapter four 
above, there was clearly an interest to pursue. 
The overarching claim of elite manipulation theory, according to Synder (2000), Fearon and 
Laitin (2000), Gurr (1994), and Kaufmann (2001) amongst others, is that elites mobilise an 
ethnic public to violence because of the socio-economic or political benefits they stand to 
attain. If this theoretical claim is anything to go by, it follows that Adaka Boro incited his 
people to rebellion because of potential political and economic gains he stood to gain. A quick 
pry into Adaka Boro’s personal life reveals that he was a very ambitious young man. Before 
the 1960s, an era when access to formal British education was still very uncommon in Nigeria, 
Adaka Boro was already a fairly well-educated man. He served as the first students’ union 
president of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, worked as a school teacher, police officer, and 
later as a military officer in the Nigerian Army - rising to the rank of Major (Ikporukpo, 2018). 
All these are pointers to his ambitiousness and penchant for power and elitism. Going by all 
these, there may be good grounds for believing that Adaka Boro’s decision to mobilise his 
people to violent conflict against the federal government may have been inspired by a clear 
understanding that the successful overthrow of the Nigerian government, or a successful 
secession of his region from Nigeria, would be politically and socio-economically rewarding 
for him, especially as he would stand a good chance of becoming the head of state, either of 
Nigeria, or of the would-have-been-independent Niger Delta Republic. The hidden private 
interests elites pursue are frequently constructed and presented as ethnic interests, making it 
easy for them to ride smoothly and successfully on the back of an ethnic group’s support to 
attain these pre-conceived private ends.  In leading his people to revolution against the federal 




cause he fought for was presented and pursed as an ethnic one. However, from what is 
historically known about Boro as an ambitious and hard-working young man with penchant for 
power and leadership, one cannot entirely rule out the possibility that his private interests may 
have been the underlying reason for him to incite a historic rebellion against the federal 
government of Nigeria. Whatever the case, this cannot be proved conclusively, especially 
because Boro’s rebellion was not successful, which closes off the possibility of establishing 
that he led an ethnic rebellion for his own egoistic ends. However, the reverse would have been 
the case had he been successful, for analysts would have been able to examine his activities 
and moves after the rebellion, and based on that, credibly establish whether or not the Boro-led 
rebellion was a case of ‘elite manipulation’; that is, a situation  in which elites instigate violence 
just for their own selfish interests. It is important to note here an obvious weakness of elite 
manipulation theory. It does not provide for the possibility that elites may sometimes violently 
mobilise an ethnic group altruistically, that is, without necessarily having any ulterior motive 
or private end in view. It is reasonable to say that as an elite, Boro was instrumental in leading 
the Niger-Delta to conflict. His ability to tap into ethnic grievances and successfully persuade 
his people to engage violent conflict, was a game changer. He was central to, and indispensable 
in, bringing about this violent conflict.  The situation would have been different had he chosen 
not to go down the path of violence. Without his involvement, violent mobilisation would not 
have occurred. From the foregoing, there is no doubt that elites, as Kaufman (2001) argues play 
important roles in the spiralling of ethnic violence. The case of the Boro-led insurrection in the 
Niger Delta is a good instance of this; even if it remains difficult in that particular scenario to 
determine what his true motives were. The motive might have been egoism, just as it may also 
have been altruism.  Whatever be the case, the pre-conditions of fear, ethnic myth, and political 
space helped him effectively mobilise an ethnic population to violence, and Kaufman is right 
about the mechanism of elite manipulation.  
Another example that may be useful in demonstrating the indispensability of elites in 
mobilising for ethnic violence, or for peace, is the case of Ken Saro-Wiwa. This is examined 
in the next section.  
 
Saro-Wiwa, a ‘Manipulative Elite’?   
After the defeat of the Adaka Boro led Niger Delta revolution, no other remarkable large scale 




indigene of Ogoniland of the Niger-Delta area, mobilised his ethnic group to one of the most 
powerful, organised and most purposeful protests against both the oil companies operation in 
his homeland and the federal government of Nigeria.  Saro Wiwa, an environmental activist, a 
scholar, an author, a television producer, a 1995 winner of the prestigious ‘Goldman 
Environmental Prize’, and a recipient of the highly reputable ‘Right to Livelihood Award’, was 
without doubt one of the most influential elites, not only in Ogoni, but also in the entire Niger 
Delta region. In 1990, he founded the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) 
which articulated the ethnic grievances and demands of the Ogoni people, and through a series 
of non-violent protests, challenged both the oil industry and the federal government of Nigeria 
over oil spillages and the associated environmental degradation which put their lives at great 
risk. Ogoniland, an area which prior to the discovery of oil was one of the cleanest and most 
serene ecosystems in Nigeria, has arguably become the most life-threatening habitat in the 
country thanks to oil-related environmental pollution. The Saro Wiwa led an initiative (protest) 
that gained traction as members of his ethnic group identified with his cause, and actively 
participated in it.   
 
To better understand how Saro wiwa was able to successfully get the ethnic crowd to back his 
initiative, it is again helpful to use Kaufman’s (1998; 2001) pre-conditions for violent ethnic 
mobilisation (outlined above). The first is the hostile ethnic myth. There was already, among 
the Ogoni people a long-standing, pervasive and popular hostile ethnic myth that identifies the 
federal government as an enemy that had continuously stolen the natural resources of the Ogoni 
people, but not used them in any way to benefit them. Nearly all the Ogoni people believed 
that this negligence and injustice was largely due to  their (Ogoni) minority status, otherwise 
the reverse would have been the case. In democratic voting and decision-making processes in 
Nigeria, the numerical strength of an ethnic group is important. But the Ogoni people, as  a  
minority, lacks such strength; and by that very fact, they are often disadvantaged on a number 
of fronts. In the course of my interviews, one respondent complained about how the ethnic 
categories of the Niger Delta regions have been heavily disadvantaged because of their 
minority status (Interview response by a Member of Bayelsa state House of Assembly in 
Yenagoa, Bayelsa State Nigeria; June 2017). In pursuit of his cause, Saro Wiwa carefully 
tapped into this popular and hostile myth to instil fear in his people, persuading them of the 
need to urgently and vigorously challenge the injustices of the federal government and the oil 




therefore needed to fight for their collective survival. This is a large part of the reason that the 
term survival appears in the name of the movement formed to pursue this ethnic cause: 
Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP). With this persuasion, the Ogoni people 
were disposed and made even readier to act. Again, the territorial concentration of the Ogoni 
people, coupled with the government’s fragility and its ineffective policing of the region 
provided the opportunity for the people to mobilise for action successfully. All these conditions 
enabled Saro-Wiwa to effectively mobilise his people for collective ethnic action.  
In many respects, Adaka Boro and Saro Wiwa’s mobilisation strategies are similar and reflect 
the views of Rothchild (1997) and Kaufman (2001) on the indispensable role of an influential 
figure in provoking collective ethnic action. The only difference between Adaka Boro and Saro 
Wiwa is that the latter led the people to peaceful, rather than to violent ethnic protests, even if 
in principle he (Wiwa) could have as effectively taken the path of violent mobilisation as Adaka 
Boro.   
Because the objective of this chapter, as mentioned earlier, is to examine the ways in which 
elites have contributed to the orchestration and spiralling of ethnic violence in the Niger Delta, 
one might wonder why Saro Wiwa, a man who never chose the path of violence to pursue 
ethnic demands, has been brought into the current analyses. I have chosen to discuss Saro Wiwa 
here for a number of reasons. The first is to demonstrate by means of this example that elites 
have enormous capacity, not just for violent ethnic mobilisation but also for peace; the 
mechanism of elite mobilisation was exactly the same in each case, except that the outcome of 
one was violence and of the other a powerful peaceful protest. The second reason is that 
discussing Saro Wiwa’s case, especially his eventual murder by the military, is a useful way to 
understand the rise, in the 1990s and beyond, of violent ethnic mobilisations, militias and 
popular resistance in the Niger Delta. The post 1990 ethnic violence cannot be properly 
understood without mentioning  Saro Wiwa – for it was grievances over his death that led to 
the proliferation of ethnic militias in the Niger Delta region.    
 
Saro Wiwa’s Execution and the Rise of Violent Ethnic Militias in the Niger 
Delta 
In 1995, General Sani Abacha, the then Nigerian military Head of State and dictator ordered 




him. But before he had any chance to defend himself properly, he was hastily tried in a heavily 
biased military tribunal and sentenced to death by hanging. His killing was ordered as a means 
of stifling demands for social justice made by him and his cohort on behalf of their ethnic group 
- the Ogoni. Both local and international figures and organisations tried in vain to reverse the 
military tribunal’s verdict.  
Saro Wiwa’s death not only shocked the world and the Niger Delta region, but  also led to a 
rise in armed resistance in the Niger Delta. His murder was a strong signal for both the Ogoni 
people and the entire Niger Delta region that the federal government had become closed to 
peaceful resolution of conflict. In view of this violence became a very handy option. This was 
how ethnic militias formed and commenced attacks on oil facilities and installations in the 
region. These violent activities were supported by the Niger Delta elites who funded, and to a 
large extent also controlled, these violent activities for some private political and, or, economic 
ends.   
Just as the Niger Deltans anticipated, the use of violence seemed to have had more success in 
pressurising the federal government than the peaceful means previously employed, especially 
by Saro Wiwa, for the federal government saw the revenue generated by oil drop significantly. 
For instance, oil bunkering and assaults on oil installations by the militants caused the federal 
government to lose the sum of 6.8 billion dollars between 1999 and 2004, a loss that 
dramatically plummeted to about 6 million dollars daily, which translated to approximately 4.4 
billion annually by 2007 (Watts 2007). For a country like Nigeria where 95 percent of foreign 
exchange revenue comes from oil, the violent and destabilising activities of the ethnic militias 
and organisations in the region is issue to worry about.  
Since violent armed resistance started in the Niger Delta, there has been a number of attempts 
by the federal government to negotiate with the region on how to contain it, and in so doing 
remove obstacles to oil production and distribution. It is for such reasons that Duruji (2015) 
argues that violent ethnic mobilisation and militias seem to have become a new form of 
pressure group used by ethnic groups and their elites to attain political or economic benefit.  
He suggests that a clear pattern has now emerged in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic in which 
violence is used as a means of attention-seeking; that is, to draw the government’s attention to 
ethnic demands and force it to the negotiation table (Duruji 2008). In the case of the Niger 
Delta, such negotiations and bargains have been made through the Niger Delta’s elites and 




It is in this elite bargain, often non-transparent and laden with corruption, between the Niger 
Delta and the federal government that another dimension of elites’ contributions or roles in 
either stoking or calming violence is more glaringly witnessed. Over the years, the federal 
government has made a number of attempts to negotiate a resolution to the phenomenon of 
ethnic violence in the Niger Delta. Among these, one of the most widely known has been the 
Presidential Amnesty Programme (PAP). More will be said about this in the next section.   
 
Elites, Corruption, Patron-Client Network, Youth Resistance and Ethnic 
Violence in the Niger Delta  
One of the most significant efforts by the federal government to address and eradicate violent 
conflict in the Niger Delta has been the introduction of the Presidential Amnesty Programme 
(PAP). PAP, as was mentioned above, is the Nigerian version of the United Nations’ DDR 
strategy (Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration). DDR is a United Nations’ Peace 
keeping programme that has been meaningfully used in the reduction of armed conflict in some 
countries of the world including Dafur, Congo, Mali, South Sudan, and Central African 
Republic (Cockayne et al., 2015). As the name implies, this programme aimed to disarm the 
militants and disband militia groups, to create attractive opportunities and offers that 
discourage ex-combatants from participating further in armed conflict, and finally to create a 
way for them (ex-combatants) to be eventually re-integrated into normal society.  
On the 25th June 2009, and in what appeared to be a genuine commitment to the eradication of 
the Niger Delta violent conflict, President Musa Yaradua announced his proposed amnesty 
package for the militants, and subsequently released the enormous sum of 50 billion naira 
(approximately one billion US dollars) to get this initiative under way. To properly execute this 
programme, the government set up a Presidential Amnesty Implementation Committee led by 
Major General Godwin Abe. According to Nwokolo et al (2018), this presidential amnesty 
programme was not entirely successful, due mainly to mismanagement and corruption of elites 
- the public officials charged with its implementation. For instance, Akinkuotu (2017) notes 
that the former PAP coordinator Kingsley Kuku, a Niger Delta indigene, was arrested and 
questioned, alongside some Nigerian bank officials, for allegedly diverting a sum of 3 billion 
Naira (6 million US dollars) that was earmarked for the payment of 1,500 Niger Delta ex-
militants who had embraced the presidential amnesty programme. To date, no verdict has been 




mobilisation in the Niger Delta has therefore not been eradicated, partly because the promise 
made to the ex-militants within the framework of the PAP deal has not been fulfilled; some of 
the elites charged with the implementation of the programme took advantage of their position 
to illegally and fraudulently divert a huge portion of the funds meant for this programme for 
personal use, rather than utilising it for the project as intended. Diversion of funds intended for  
solutions to the problem of violent ethnic conflict in the Niger Delta is obviously a way in 
which the elites intentionally perpetuate the cycle of violence in the region, in order to 
constantly benefit from that situation. This example corroborates the elite manipulation theory 
which claims that elites cause violence to occur and persist because of the gains they derive 
from it (Gurr 1994; Brass 1997; Fearon and Laitin 2000; Synder 2000; Kaufman 2001). 
For anyone  unfamiliar with the subject of prebendalism and the patron-client network in 
Nigeria, a question that immediately comes to mind is: why not arrest and prosecute those that 
have been accused of fraudulently carting away public funds, especially those meant for 
resolving the problem of violent ethnic mobilisation in the Niger Delta region? This question 
is legitimate. In countries where the rule of law is respected, it should be to expect severe 
consequences for the embezzlement of public funds. But in Nigeria, unfortunately, things 
sometimes work a bit differently. There is a ‘special logic’ that quite frequently guides the 
state’s bureaucracy, and it is important to understand this. Chabal and Daloz’s (1999) refer to 
it as prebendalism. Briefly defined, prebendalism denotes a political system in which elected 
government officials arrogate to themselves the right to deploy the state’s revenues, even if it 
is unlawful, to the benefit of their own supporters, who, in return for favours received continue 
to provide their loyalty and support to these leaders (their patrons), even when this may require 
employing violent means (Bayart 1994; Chabal and Daloz 1999). The relationship between the 
leaders (elites) and their supporters in the context of prebendalism is not arbitrary. It has rather 
been carefully constructed to provide a network of mutual protection in times of crisis. It is the 
solid support and protection provided by this informal and often nefarious network that usually 
frustrates, obstructs and eventually eliminates every attempt at investigating corrupt officials 
in Nigeria. The stronger a leader’s network, the more easily he could get away with crime such 
as murder, corruption and embezzlement of public funds amongst other crimes. However, he 
(the leader) must ensure that his network of supporters and allies benefits from the spoil, either 
directly, or indirectly through the award of bogus contracts or political appointments that offer 
them a fresh opportunity to steal from the public treasury without fear of being prosecuted. 




Often, efforts are made to co-opt small social groups, religious, professional, and militia groups 
into this network (Chabal and Daloz, 1999).   
Thus, if efforts to prosecute and incarcerate corrupt elites such as Kingsley Kuku and other 
elites who have been accused of fraudulently diverting or looting the funds meant for solving 
the problem of armed militancy and underdevelopment in the Niger Delta have been 
unsuccessful, this is basically due to the pervasiveness of prebendalism and patron-client 
networks, which offer formidable protection to corrupt elites in Nigeria. Rather than spending 
money demobilising ethnic militants, in line with the objectives and prescription of the PAP, 
and on narrowing economic inequalities and other social justice issues for which the Niger 
Delta region violently agitates, these elites have chosen to fraudulently divert these funds for 
personal use, and to bribe the leaders of the violent militia organisations operating in the Niger 
Delta, to momentarily prevent them from attacking oil installations and causing further 
violence.  
Ekeh (2014) and Oriola et al (2013) recount a shady deal in which political elites payed huge 
sums of money to leaders of some violent ethnic militias in the Niger Delta in order to prevent 
attacks on oil facilities. Leaders of violent ethnic militia organisations such as Asari Dokubo, 
Ateke  Tom, Victor Ben Ebikabowei, and Ekpemupolo (ethnic militia leaders) were reported 
to have received 9 million  USD, 3.8 million USD, 2.8 million USD, and 22.9 million USD 
respectively during President Jonathan’s administration in order to calm their violent attacks 
and activities in the region. It is important to remember that the money spent on bribing these 
militants is part of a larger fund earmarked for infrastructural developments, job creation and 
provision of other amenities useful for demobilising militants and re-integrating them into 
normal society. But then, spending money on these projects would not leave enough loopholes 
for elites’ to divert and embezzle some for their own private use. For this reason, elites have 
preferred to bribe, thus keeping the cycle of violent agitations in the Niger Delta ever alive.  
The revocation of this shady agreement in 2015, that is, post President Jonathan’s 
administration, has continued to provoke serious threats and attacks on oil facilities in the Niger 
Delta (Nwokolo, 2018). This shady and informal means of addressing the Niger Delta crisis 
does nothing positive, but perpetuates the cycle of violence, bribery and corruption in the 
region. 
Chapter four discussed how the rise of ethnic violence and militia in the Niger Delta is linked 




infrastructural development and environmental degradation. Both the elites and the ethnic 
militia groups that have sprung up in the region claim to be fighting on behalf of their ethnic 
populations for the reversal and correction of these ethno-regional social injustices. However, 
what has been witnessed in the Niger Delta, as explained above, is the collusion of elites (and 
the so-called official representatives of the people) to loot funds designated for resolving the 
regional turmoil. It was in reference to this that one of my respondents (a community ruler) 
speaking of government officials and the oil companies, said:  
Rather than address the critical issues that the militants are raising, there is 
an attempt to compromise the key figures in the struggle. And so, they award 
them bogus contracts, make large sums of money available to them. These 
militants become very comfortable and a good number of them abandon the 
struggle. However, there is a pool of other militants waiting to take over, 
because the original issues had not been addressed. And so, there is a sense 
in which you can talk about the militant economy, in which it pays to harass 
the state or the oil company and force them to settle (make money available 
to them). The amount of money in question is so substantial that militancy 
becomes more beneficial than going to find a genuine type of employment. 
They have been wrongly socialised, and a good number have gotten used to 
it. (Interview response by a traditional ruler in Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, 
Nigeria; April 2017)  
  
This quote offers a sense of how the elites tap into hostile ethnic myths, and fear to create 
violent conflict in the Niger Delta as a way of forcing the federal government to release funds 
for resolving the root causes of violent agitations in the region. But the lack of will and 
commitment on the part of the elites to use these funds for their designated purpose not only 
benefits them (the elites), but also perpetuates the regional violence.  All this highlights the 
existence, within the context of the Niger Delta violent crisis, of the necessary pre-conditions 
for violent ethnic mobilisation outlined by Kaufman (1998; 2001; 2006), especially the fact 
that elites play an incredibly important role in provoking and sustaining violent ethnic conflict 
for their personal economic, and, or, political gains. Therefore, any meaningful effort to address 
the problem of ethnic violence in the Niger Delta must take into consideration the factors that 
favour its occurrence and persistence such as hostile ethnic myths, interests, and certainly the 





The Place of Youth Resistance in The Niger Delta Conflict 
There is now a substantial amount of work on youth resistance and participation in the violence 
in the Niger Delta. The major focus of this literature is usually to show that youths, not just the 
elites, are equally relevant in accounting for why ethnic violence occurs in the Niger Delta. 
Iwilade (2017) makes a concerted effort to explain and shed more light on this phenomenon, 
thanks to some concrete instances of youth-led insurgencies in the Niger Delta region, 
particularly in one of its prominent states: Rivers State.  
This thesis does not deny youth involvement and participation in the Niger Delta conflict and 
acknowledges its occurrence in several chapters, particularly in discussions of violent ethnic 
militia groups – a predominantly youth organisation, and sphere of activity. The same could be 
said of Kaufman – the scholar whose ethnosymbolic theory has been creatively deployed as a 
guide for this thesis. A significant portion of Modern Hatreds (2000), for instance, was 
dedicated to the examination and analyses of the nature and character of youth-led violent 
insurrections. But even then, he did not consider this to be a “necessary” factor for the spiralling 
and persistence of extreme violent ethnic mobilisation. However, Kaufman’s failure to consider 
irate youths (unlike elites) to be necessary for the provocation and maintenance of violent 
ethnic mobilisation is mainly because he perceives them as subservient to, and largely 
dependent on, the actions and inactions of corrupt and manipulative elites. When closely 
examined, it would quickly become evident how so-called violent youth mobilisation or 
resistance is often a reaction to the unjust attitudes, actions, or inactions of corrupt or 
manipulative elites. Considering the other side of the coin and imagining for a moment that the 
Nigerian and the Niger Delta elites (rulers, leader, and influential others) were neither corrupt 
nor manipulative; that is, that they properly exercised their functions as ‘just’ leaders and  men 
of honour, the Niger Delta youths would not have any cause to agitate or engage in any well-
structured, organised and sustained violent mobilisation. If they tried, they would not only have 
no moral justification for their violent activities, but elites also have the necessary state 
apparatus at their disposal to contain, quell and disperse them. Unfortunately, however, this is 
not the state of affairs in the Niger Delta. On the contrary,  the true scenario is one in which 
manipulative and corrupt elites fuel the regional crisis through unjust and illegitimate actions 
and inactions, and these provide the youths with the moral grounds and impetus for violent 
resistance and agitation. Thus, if Kaufman did not consider it necessary to include the mass-
led mobilisation as part of the necessary conditions for extreme violent ethnic conflict, it is 




Injustice breeds rebellion. The youth resistance or rebellion in the Niger Delta is a natural 
consequence of the ‘unjustness’ of corrupt and manipulative elites both in Nigeria and in the 
region, rather than, strictly speaking, one of the necessary causes of the regional crisis. It is 
also for this reason that this thesis concentrates more on the examination of the roles of the 
elites than on the violent activities of youths. It is through discussion of the negative and 
provocative actions/inactions of the elites in the region that the place of youth resistance in the 
Niger Delta crisis can be better understood.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to examine whether or not elites have contributed to the spiralling and 
persistence of the Niger Delta conflict. Analysis of the fieldwork interviews as well as of the 
supplementary sources of primary data all point in the same direction – they show that these 
individuals have played significant enabling roles in the regional crisis. The contributory role 
of irate youths in inflaming violent conflict has also been acknowledged. However, of all the 
sources of data examined, none has explained the mechanism of the crisis; that is, how it has 
occurred, or the means by which it was brought about. Yet understanding the mechanism by 
which ethnic tensions metamorphose into large-scale violence is important, as this would 
enable bespoke conflict resolution strategies to be designed. Kaufman’s theory has been used 
extensively throughout this thesis to fill this gap in knowledge, and to offer an explanation of 
the mechanism of ethnic violence in the Niger Delta region.  
In this chapter, following Kauman, Gurr, Horowitz, and other ethnosymbolists, I have briefly 
explained the role of ethnic myths in the provocation of ethnic violence. Ordinarily, one would 
have expected the causal role of ethnicity in the rise and persistence of the regional crisis to be 
pretty clear. This however is not the case. In the course of my interviews, I encountered 
individuals who believed that ethnicity is not relevant in understanding and explaining the 
regional conflict. Economy or resource, they say, is. In the next chapter, therefore, I consider 
the possible roles of ethnicity in the spiralling and persistence of violent ethnic conflict in the 
Niger Delta. It appears that there is some sort of bifurcation on the causal impact of ethnicity 
on violent conflict involving ethnic group(s), not just among my interviewees, but also amongst 
established scholars in the field of ethnic violence. These debates are explored in greater detail 






ETHNICITY: A CAUSAL FACTOR IN THE NIGER DELTA CONFLICT? 
 
The role of ethnicity in the generation and persistence of violent conflict between ethnic groups 
is still a highly contested issue. While some of the economy or resource-based theorists of 
ethnic violence such as Fearon and Laitin (2003); Collier and Hoeffler (2000) and Muller and 
Seligson (1987), amongst others, tend to downplay, or entirely negate, the contribution of 
ethnicity in the onset of politically salient violent conflict between ethnic groups, there are 
others including Smith (1984); Gurr (1994), Kaufman (2001), and Estaben et al.(2012) who, 
in spite of recognising the economic dimension of ethnic violence, still persuasively uphold the 
relevance of ethnicity in the orchestration, occurrence and persistence of violent conflict among 
ethnic groups. This chapter critically examines these debates, particularly as they relate to the 
phenomenon of violent ethnic mobilisation in the Niger Delta region. The chapter’s overall aim 
is to establish whether or not ethnicity has played any role in the spiralling of the Niger Delta’s 
regional turmoil.  
Ethnicity is one of the key concepts employed in this research project. The term, and its 
cognates such as ethno and ethnic, have been mentioned more than 315 times in the entire 
thesis, and discussed to some extent in nearly all its major sections. This notwithstanding, when 
it comes to the term’s causal correlation with violence in the Niger Delta region, only chapter 
five has addressed the issue, and even then only partially, as part of the attempt to explain how 
manipulative elites exploit ethnic myths and sentiments to provoke violence. However, because 
the ethnosymbolic theoretical framework  of the project demands, amongst other things, a 
critical and robust examination of the role of ethnicity in the spiralling and persistence of ethnic 
violence, particularly in the Niger Delta region, it is worthwhile engage in a more detailed 
discussion.  This is the raison d’etre of this chapter.  
Over the years, economy and resource-based theorists of ethnic violence have vitiated or 
completely negated the impact and relevance of ethnicity in conflict generation and persistence. 
The epistemological viewpoint championed by these theorists, has gradually, and for a long 
time, informed conflict resolution policies and action plans employed in the resolution of ethnic 
conflict, in some well-known ethnically divided societies such as Nigeria. Some of the elites 
interviewed in the course of my fieldwork have also neglected, denied, or ignored the role of 




spiralling and persistence of the regional conflict. This chapter, and indeed the entire thesis, is 
not satisfied with that view, for there is something theoretically unsettling about it.  
Having therefore critically examined the phenomenon and dynamics of violent ethnic 
mobilisation in the Niger Delta, as well as the possible roles of ethnicity in the entire conflict 
scenario, the results clearly suggest that ethnicity is a relevant causal factor in the Niger Delta’s 
regional conflict. This concurs with the view of Kaufman (2001) who upholds the 
indispensability of ethnicity (hostile ethnic myths) in provoking and sustaining ethnic conflict; 
it is also in line with Gurr and Harff (1994) who recognise the important role of ethnic solidarity 
and cohesion in the spiralling and maintenance of ethnic violence; and it is also in agreement 
with Estaben (2012) and others, whose empirically-based research findings reveal that ethnic 
polarisation has a substantial impact on conflict across a number of different specifications 
within ethnically deeply divided societies when ethnic cohesion is high. Overall, the core stance 
defended here is that ethnicity is a causal factor in the Niger Delta’s violent turmoil, and that 
the regional crisis could not be fully and robustly explained without affirming its contribution 
to the dynamic of the entire conflict.  
The chapter commences with a critical examination of the data obtained from the field on 
peoples’ opinion regarding the possible role of ethnicity in the Niger Delta violent conflict. 
This is very important, because peoples’ understanding of the nature and dynamics of conflict 
shapes, in no small measure, their conflict resolution strategies and choices. There is a very 
high probability that policy makers for whom ethnicity is not a factor in conflict generation 
would not take it into consideration in their conflict resolution plans and implementation and 
vice versa. This section is followed by some historically based evidence that highlights the 
origin and motive for the construction of modern Nigerian ethnicity, as well as its implication 
for wealth distribution and conflict, especially in the Niger Delta region. 
 
Any Possible Correlation Between Ethnicity and The Niger Delta Violence? 
-  Opinions from the Field 
In order to establish, especially from the perspective of the Niger Delta’s elites whether or not 
ethnicity has been an influential factor in the onset and persistence of its regional conflict, 
interviewees were asked a set of deliberately formulated interview questions. Feedback 




of ethnicity in the Niger Delta violence; for while some (9 out of 16 persons interviewed) were 
convinced of the indispensable role of ethnicity in the spiralling and persistence of the regional 
crisis, the rest dismissed it as unimportant. For instance, when asked to comment on whether 
or not ethnicity had played any role in the spiralling and sustenance of the Niger Delta’s violent 
crisis, one traditional leader responded:  
No, I do not think that ethnic identity was an important element in the conflict 
when you talk about the region as a whole.  
A little bit later, he added:  
What urged people to participate was a common experience of injustice, 
environmental degradation and marginalisation. (Interview response by a 
traditional ruler in Port Harcourt, Rivers State, Nigeria; May 2017, int. num. 
B,2)  
Responding to the same question, a member of the Bayelsa State’s House of Assembly 
answered:  
Yes, ethnicity has a very great influence here. (Interview response by a 
Member of Bayelsa state House of Assembly in Yenagoa, Bayelsa State 
Nigeria; June 2017, int. num. C,2)  
For him there was no doubt that ethnicity is a factor in the regional conflict. Yet another 
respondent (a traditional ruler), in speaking about the criteria for membership to the numerous 
violent militia organisations in the Niger Delta, brings out some ethnic dimension of the 
regional crisis. The question was: What is the criteria for membership into these militant 
organisations? Is it ethnic based or are the organisations open to those of other ethnic 
categories? His response was:  
Ehmm. They are largely ethnic based. I chose my words carefully because 
the resistance struggles became organised first along community lines, and 
then, the Ogoni insurrection took it to an ethnic level, such that after MOSOP 
came on board, we started having other groups such as Ijaw Youth Congress 
(IYC) and so on; all having the flavour of an ethnic group. The Ijaws, the 
Ikwere, the Urhobo, the Itshekiri have all organised themselves along those 
lines. For instance, the MEND was largely an Ijaw thing, with the Egbesu 
playing a major role in their affairs. I used the word ‘largely’ advisedly 
because, occasionally, you find those who tag themselves activists who have 
lived amongst these peoples, who although not of that ethnic origin realise 
that the lives cannot be separated from that ethnic environment, and so have 
come to associate and identify with the struggle … which was an ethnic 
struggle originally. (Interview response by a traditional ruler in Yenagoa, 




For this last respondent, the criteria for membership of these violent militia organisations is 
primarily and basically ethnicity, even if sympathisers do occasionally identify with this ethnic 
cause.   
 
These responses, although they vary, are representative of all the answers on the subject of 
ethnicity by the other interviewees; they synthetically capture the basic stances of  both those 
who recognise the causal relevance of ethnicity in the Niger Delta conflict, and those who do 
not. This invariably leads to a twofold conclusion: (a) that ethnicity is of causal importance in 
the Niger Delta violent conflict; (b) that ethnicity is not of causal importance in the Niger Delta 
violent conflict. These diametrically opposed stances show that the question of the causal role 
of ethnicity in the Niger Delta conflict remains a contested issue. It is in regard to this 
conundrum that this chapter is  helpful because it aims to clarify the contribution of ethnicity 
to the Niger Delta conflict.   
It is necessary to examine the responses above more critically. In the first (int. num. B2) there 
is an attempt to deny, or rather an outright denial, of the role of ethnicity in the Niger Delta 
violent conflict. The respondent suggested that injustice and marginalisation of the region, 
rather than ethnicity, constitute the motive for conflict. This position fundamentally reflects the 
view of the economy or resource-based theorists of ethnic violence who often contend that 
unequal distribution, or access, to the socio-economic values of an ethnically plural state is the 
reason for conflict, violent or otherwise. The Marxist paradigm that income or wealth 
inequality is a major cause of conflict has had an enormous influence on early empirical 
researchers of ethnic conflict, making them focus on indicators of wealth distribution or 
economic inequalities within an ethnically plural society, as passible correlates of conflict. This 
view is reflected in the work of Brockett (1992), Muller and Seligson (1987); and Muller 
(2000), amongst others. However, as Lichbach’s survey article of 1989 suggests, the results 
obtained from these were generally ambiguous (Cited in Estaben et al 2012) . The effort at this 
point is not to deny that income or wealth inequality influences conflict. Definitely, unjust 
disparity in wealth or income distribution, as became evident in Chapter 4 above, constitutes a 
major driver of conflict particularly in the Niger Delta region, but this does not by any means 
preclude a contributory role for ethnicity in the entire conundrum. Quite naturally, it is 
reasonable to expect that poor and marginalised people would hold some grievances and 




their poverty. But for sustained violence to ensue, these grievances and antagonisms need to 
be properly channelled into organised action - an activity that often requires a large quantity of 
of finance and expertise. That the poor cannot usually afford these often militates against their 
capacity to successfully mobilise for sustained violent insurrection against an affluent 
opponent. Most Niger Delta militants, as reported by Asuni (2009), are also poor – making it 
hard or impossible for them to finance and sustain the conflict.  So, they simply turn to other 
markers such as religion, nationalism or ethnicity as the basis for mobilisation and ordering of 
actions. Considered from this angle, a different understanding of social conflict emerges. As 
Estaben et al (2012:131) note: social conflict ‘could emanate from economic motivations, but 
find its expression through the cleavages generated by religion, ethnicity or national origins’. 
The poor and economically marginalised communities of the Niger Delta, just as Estaben et al. 
(2012) argue, have found a strong base for violent mobilisation in the cleavage provided by 
ethnicity. This manner of conceiving of ethnic violence is also affirmed in Kaufman (2001; 
2013), Gurr and Harff (1994) and Estaben et al (2012), among others, who go beyond the 
economic roots of ethnic violence to recognise the causal contribution of ethnicity in the 
spiralling and persistence of violence conflicts that are classed as ethnic. This perspective is 
however not very popular with some economy and resource-based scholars of ethnic violence, 
including Fearon and Laitin (2003), Muller (2000), Collier and Hoeffler (2001). It is certainly 
not popular with the interview respondent cited above (Int. num.  B2). These either downplay 
the causal role of ethnicity in conflict generation, or deny it altogether.  
On the other hand, it is important to emphasise that interviewees who acknowledged the causal 
impact of ethnicity in the Niger Delta violent conflict (int. nums. A and C), are not simply 
naive – since beyond acknowledging the impact of ethnicity in the Niger Delta conflict,  they 
also, in a separate interview question, affirmed the indispensable contributions of competing 
economic or resource interests in the rise of this regional imbroglio. In other words, they accept 
that resource or economic inequality is a serious factor in the rise and maintenance of ethnic 
violence. This is evident their responses to questions on the economic dimension of the conflict. 
For instance, when interrogated on the motive behind the formation of violent ethnic militia 
organisations in the Niger Delta, the traditional ruler designated as ‘Respondent A’ had this to 
say:  
The Niger delta demands which eventually turned into violent agitation that 
produced the militants started during the colonial period. At that time, it was 
basically an agitation for infrastructural facilities to be provided for them. 




in the region, their demands, and agitations obviously increased. Why? 
Because during the colonial era, their demands were not met, for the 
colonialist claimed that little or no resource came from there with which to 
address their requests. Now, the country entered an era where entire states 
of the federation depend on the region for its revenue, external foreign 
exchange. And yet, their demands were not still met. And so, their demands 
moved from mere requests and letter writing petitions, to going to court. It 
was after the futile ‘going-to court’ phase that it now degenerated into 
militancy. It is within that historical trajectory that the militants came on the 
scene. The failure of the authorities to address the issues earlier created the 
room for the emergence of militants. It was like having talked and talks 
failed, it was time to war. But very unfortunately, they have been socialised 
into a process where they have come to believe that when they shoot the guns, 
the authorities listen to them. (Interview response by a traditional ruler in 
Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, Nigeria; April 2017; int. num. A) 
 Responding to a similar question, a member of the Bayelsa state House of Assembly otherwise 
known in this project as the ‘int. num. C’ had this to say:  
It all has to do with deprivation, economic deprivation. The entire scenario 
may be described in the following words: the goose that lay the golden egg 
does not even get to see the golden egg, not to talk of benefiting from it. This 
is what the people felt after some time, and affirmed that somethings must 
change. We cannot lay the golden egg, and some other person comes from 
millions of miles away to take control of it. This golden egg is what we call 
the petrol or the crude oil. Huge amount of money is made from the sale of 
this crude oil, but the proceeds are carted away from where it was made. The 
people of the Niger Delta are therefore left to suffer the dangerous impact of 
a carefree and unethical oil exploration. They felt excluded and therefore 
decided to agitate against the arrangement that has consistently excluded 
them. In Nigeria, we got independence in 1960. At independence, there was 
a constitution which had a revenue sharing formula that allows those from 
whose region the natural resources are extracted to take control of it, but 
remit a certain percentage to the centre (federal government). In the North, 
they had the groundnuts, in the south west they had the cocoa, in the South 
East, they had the palm oil. This revenue sharing formula was applicable in 
all these cases. But when oil was discovered the rule changed because the 
region where the oil was discovered was in the minority. So, they 
manipulated it to favour the majority. This was against the then constitution 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. This manipulation was done by 
promulgating the land use act that which declared that any resource located 
beyond six feet from the ground belongs to the Federal Government and not 
to the region. Invariably crude oil is among those resources that are located 
beyond six feet from the ground. So, the majority used this policy to syphon 
what ought to have come to us. This act was promulgated after oil had been 




a Member of Bayelsa state House of Assembly in Yenagoa, Bayelsa State 
Nigeria; June 2017; int. num. C) 
These views (int. nums. A and C) clearly point to the economic dimension of the Niger Delta 
conflict; but beyond that, they also acknowledge, unlike ‘Respondent B’, the causal impact of 
ethnicity in the rise and perpetuation of the regional violence. This thesis also argues that 
without the passion and cohesion generated by ethnicity, violent mobilisation in the Niger 
Delta, especially in its current form, would not exist; de facto, it happens mainly on the basis 
of ethnicity. So, the opinions of these respondents (int. nums A and C) are not only 
appropriate, but also in line with the views of established scholars of ethnic violence including 
Estaben et al (2012) Gurr and Harff  (1994), as well as obviously with the Kaufmanian(2001; 
2013) ethno-symbolic theory of ethnic violence - the theoretical framework within which this 
project has been framed. This demonstrates the active role of ethnicity in the Niger Delta’s 
violent conflict.   
Throughout the course of my fieldwork I quietly wondered why some of the respondents were 
not able to discern the causal relevance and role of ethnicity in the spiralling of the violent 
conflict. The conclusion that seemed obvious to me was that it must have been due to ignorance, 
negligence, or lack of familiarity with the historical circumstances that have led to the 
emergence of modern Nigerian ethnicity; and what implication the latter has for job 
opportunities, positions, wealth distribution and conflict, violent or otherwise. It is difficult, if 
not altogether impossible, to be familiar with these and still not perceive or establish some 
causal links between ethnicity and the onset and persistence of violent mobilisation in the Niger 
Delta region. Given this, it becomes pertinent, or even necessary, to retrace and elaborate more 
on the origins and motives for the construction of ‘modern ethnicity’ in Nigeria, as well as its 
implication, especially in the Niger Delta region. The following sections therefore first trace 
the rise of a modern Nigerian ethnic identity, before discussing its implication for opportunities, 
wealth distribution, politics and conflict. This will lay to rest any iota of doubt about the causal 
contribution or role of ethnicity to the spiralling and sustenance of violent mobilisation in the 
Niger Delta region.  
 
Nigerian Ethnicity, Recent, Not Ancient 
This section emphasises that ethnicities in Nigeria are of recent origin. It asks why they were 




modern Nigerian ethnicities and their implications for inter-ethnic economic competition and 
conflict are better understood.  
Berman (1998)’s assertion that modern African ethnicity is a social construction of the colonial 
period applies to both Nigeria as a whole and to the Niger Delta region. Far from being a merely 
subjective adumbration, this is based on some verifiable historico-empirical research findings, 
and is therefore reliable.  
Socio-political organisations of the ancient, or rather pre-colonial Nigerian societies, are 
significantly different from their modern variants. Large ethnic groups – a glaring feature of 
modern Nigeria, were non-existent in the country’s pre-colonial era. Apart from the few 
‘porous’ states (caliphate and empires) that existed during this time, pre-colonial Nigeria 
generally had a historical trajectory of kinship, that is, the idea of an extended family 
(Thompson 2010; Faloa et al. 2008). In theory, a kinship lineage could trace its past back to 
the same ancestral origin; and these bonds of origin bound the community together.  
Realistically however, actual ties are not a continuum; for outsiders are occasionally brought 
into the clan, and individuals marry off into other family lineages. This shows that kinship 
boundaries in pre-colonial Nigeria were, apart from being a socially constructed reality, also 
flexible; and this is contrary to the colonialists’ primordialist description of ancient African 
(Nigerian) societies as based purely on biological descent (Berman 1998). Rules guiding 
interpersonal interactions in precolonial African societies were generally unwritten. They were 
rather handed down from one generation to the next through customary practices, folklore and 
oral tradition. Members of these groups understood and abided by them; and there were 
consequences for breaching them. The head of the community, usually the eldest male person 
understood generally as the main custodian of the community’s unwritten laws, had a great 
deal of political power. Another significant feature of the precolonial kinship group was that it 
provided solidarity, justice, security, and welfare for its members. The wide range of support 
it provided increased and solidified people’s attachment to and bonding with their communities 
(Horowitz 2000, Nnoli 2008). This was the nature of the pre-colonial Nigerian societies, 
including the Niger Delta region. Kinship, rather than ethnicity3 was the basis for the socio-
political ordering of the pre-colonial Nigerian societies. In fact, as Alagoa (1972) observes, 
there is no term corresponding to ‘ethnicity’ in the pre-colonial dictionary of the Niger Delta 
people. Ethnicity – a large collection of people believing themselves to be of the same ancestral 
 




roots, was not a feature of the precolonial Nigerian societies; but rather a creation of the 
colonial period (Berman 1998; Nnoli 2008).  
At this point, we are left with some important questions about how and why ethnicity was 
formed during the colonial times? Addressing these questions will necessitate, first and 
foremost, an understanding of the purpose and nature of the colonial state and colonial urban 
settings; for it is against this backdrop that one is able to properly comprehend the 
developmental process of modern Nigerian ethnicity, as well as its implication for wealth 
distribution and conflict. Thus, highlighting the connection between ethnicity and the Niger 
Delta conflict, which is the primary objective of this chapter. However, it is useful to begin 
with a few words on the character of the colonial urban setting.   
 
The Colonial Urban Setting: The Cradle of Modern Nigerian Ethnicity 
As mentioned above, Nigerian ethnicity as well as its relationship to politics, economy, and 
violence, has its origin in the colonial period. Prior to this time, Nigerians had no consciousness 
of belonging to large ethnicities as they do now. It was in colonial urban settings that Nigerians 
first acquired a common consciousness of their existence as members of ethnic groups.  The 
colonial urban setting, as Nnoli (2008) describes it, is the cradle of ethnicity in Nigeria; and 
logically so, because the phenomenon of ethnicity cannot exist unless people from disparate 
cultural groups are in contact with one another within a specific location over a relatively long 
period of time.  
In Nigeria, the colonial urban setting provided the locus for significant contact and interaction 
between members of the precolonial colonial cultural and linguistic formations and polities. 
Prior to the establishment of colonial urban centres in Nigeria, inter-rural migration for reasons 
such as work, trade, or farming provided an opportunity for contact between members of 
different precolonial cultural groups. However, these mobilities were usually on a small scale 
and were not significant for the emergence of ethnicity in the country. Records exist of some 
Igbo people migrating for work in cocoa and rubber plantations in the Igbira, Owo and Afemai 
communities. There are also reports of how migrants from various parts of pre-colonial Nigeria 
arrived to fish in the creeks and lagoons of Niger Delta area. There was certainly a fairly regular 
movement of migrants in Nigeria before colonialism; however, relative to the population of 




percent) and did not cause any rupture in the socio-political and economic life of their host 
communities. This sort of contact was insignificant for the emergence of ethnicity, especially 
as the new arrivals were not perceived as threats capable of disrupting the communal cohesion 
of their host communities (Nnoli 2008). This being the case, there was therefore no need to 
activate and reinforce in-group (ethnic) consciousness and boundaries in order to exclude these 
new arrivals. The sort of relationship that existed between the migrants and their host 
communities was not that of inter-group competition, but of complementarity - thus eliminating 
group competition, which is usually at the heart of the growth of inter-ethnic consciousness 
and conflict.  So, inter communal contacts and interactions in rural areas did not engender 
ethnicity in Nigeria or in the Niger Delta (Nnoli 2008). The level of contact significant for the 
emergence of the modern ethnicity in Nigeria, as mentioned above, occurred in the colonial 
urban setting, not in the rural communities.  
 
The Colonial State and The Radical Transformation of Pre-Colonial 
Nigerian Traditional Societies 
The common saying that necessity is the mother of invention seems to make sense when one 
critically reflects on the history and evolution of technology. The latter evolves as people 
attempt to creatively respond to the challenges and opportunities of their immediate 
environment. There is therefore an organic link between a physical environment and the pattern 
of inter-human relations that evolves as people originally and creatively explore and harness 
their resources to address their interests and needs. This organic or material link between the 
geographical environment and the developmental trajectories of a society has always been a 
central tenet of marxism (Martley 1966).  
In Nigeria, colonialism disrupted this organic interdependence or link in various pre-colonial 
societies. How? To meet the British factories’ demand for raw materials, the colonial state, 
described by Berman (1998) as ‘an apparatus of authoritarian bureaucratic control’ decided 
what crops should be prioritised and grown for export. If these were already being grown in 
Nigeria, they encouraged their increased production. If on the other hand they were not yet 
being cultivated, but the climatic and soil conditions were favourable, they introduced them 
from outside the country. For instance, for the production of soap in Britain, basic raw materials 
such as palm oil, palm kernel oil, peanut oil, and copra oil were required. For this reason, the 




southern parts of Nigeria. In the Northern part, the cultivation of peanuts was promoted and 
increased. The requisite oils were then extracted and exported for use by the Lux, Sunlight, and 
Lifebuoy soap factories in Britain, and other similar factories in Switzerland, USA, Germany, 
Belgium and Canada (Nnoli 2008). Quite naturally, ancillary industries relevant to the 
production and extraction of these raw materials were also developed - creating jobs which 
absorbed a vast majority of the local workforce (colonial manpower was limited). The 
consequence of this was the disruption of the local pattern of production and local consumption 
habits; for no attempt was made to design industries and activities relevant to the needs and 
taste of the local population. The indigenous work force, previously dedicated to catering for 
the needs of local Nigerian communities, were suddenly redeployed to produce goods and 
services to fulfil British capitalist needs, breaking the organic link that existed between the 
needs of pre-colonial societies and the means (technology) they creatively developed to harness 
their resources for their own benefit. Colonialism disrupted the pre-colonial Nigerian societies’ 
gradual, organic, and more natural progression to modernity and technological advancement. 
This could not have been otherwise, for colonialism, as Berman (1998) observes, had a 
different agenda:  economic exploitation of the colonised territory for its egoistic interest. 
One outstanding feature of capitalism is the constant need to reduce cost and maximise surplus 
(Scott 2006; Ali 2006). The colonialists were capitalists par excellence; and as such, cutting 
costs and maximising outputs was one of the obvious modes of operation. In Nigeria, the 
colonialists’ needed to constantly reduce the cost of administration and avoid overstretching 
their limited foreign manpower, which compelled them to concentrate or limit their activities 
to colonial enclaves or settings. The most significant of these enclaves were the colonial urban 
centres, described by Nnoli (2008) as the peripheral nerve centres of imperialism, mainly 
because it was from these centres that colonial organisational, manipulative and administrative 
activities and control occurred. From there they penetrated the nooks and crannies of the 
country, as well as its socio-political and economic life.  The significant structural changes that 
took place in Nigeria during the colonial period occurred in the colonial urban centres. The 
growth, expansion, structural modification, and vibrancy of the colonial urban centres were 
stimulated and dominated by three major, but interrelated activities - those of British private 
business enterprises, British colonial government, and the missionaries. All these, especially 
the activities of firms, were instrumental in the structural modification and transformation of 




The British colonial economy was dominated by firms’ investment capital, employment 
facilities, and general influence. Private trading firms were the most significant of these 
enterprises (Nnoli 2008). Quite early on, Mars (1948:58) described how the aggregate profit 
made by import-export trade in Nigeria in the 1930s was three times higher than that made in 
the mining sector. Private trading firms made their profit by simply purchasing and exporting 
agricultural goods from Nigerian middlemen for sale in Europe; and by importing a wide range 
of consumer service goods which were then sold to Nigerians either directly or through 
retailers. In this way, Nigeria was already well on its way to a non-productive economy which 
obviously stunted the development and growth of local industries that had previously and more 
organically produced for the local population. Importation of foreign consumer products 
changed local consumer taste and made the home economy dependent on a foreign one. 
Colonial private trading firms were instrumental in bringing about this significant change in 
Nigeria. By 1918, as Mabogunje (1968) argued, both British and European private firms, 
including UAC, African and Eastern Trade Corporation, B.B. Ollivant and Co., John Holt and 
Co., Ltd., and Société Commerciale et Industrielle de l’Afrique Occientale, and Miller 
Brothers, had already established their presence in Lagos and opened branches in Ibadan 
(another colonial urban centre). Because of the heavy consumer demand of the high-income 
earners, coupled with the concentration of the capitalist and administrative infrastructures, it 
was both practical and beneficial for firms to maintain their centre of operations in colonial 
urban settings. The colonial government kept expanding its urban enclaves as businesses and 
other relevant activities grew. In anticipation of high returns from new trading locations in the 
hinterland, and the need for increased political control of remote parts of the country, the 
colonial government embarked on the construction of roads and railways. Just as anticipated, 
by the time the railway reached Kano in northern Nigeria, the export of peanuts had increased 
significantly from 1,179 to 19,288 tons. In addition to this, the colonial government also 
engaged in the construction of harbours in Lagos and Port-Harcourt to boost export and import 
trade. It is important to emphasise that in all this activity the colonialists had no intention of 
systematically developing Nigeria. The forms of development that occurred in colonial urban 
centres were simply the unintended outcomes of the colonialists’ well calculated and organised 
profit-making venture.  The government policies and research projects promoted during this 
time were simply geared toward satisfying the colonial agricultural, industrial, and trading 
needs. The West African Institute for Palm Research and The West African Cocoa Research 




Following the growth and expansion of this beehive of activities, the colonial government 
needed proper centres of administration for effective control of the entire country. This led to 
the promulgation of the township ordinance in 1917 under which different categories of 
townships were created throughout the country (12 of them in the northern and southern parts 
of the country respectively). From there the colonialists maintained effective control of the 
socio-economic and political activities of Nigeria. 
It needs to be mentioned that prior to colonialism urban areas existed in Nigeria, particularly 
in Ibadan, Abewokuta, Ifes, Oshogho, Ogbomoso, Kano, Zaria, Sokoto and Katsina. These pre-
colonial urban areas, with small populations of between 20,000 and 70,000, naturally emerged 
as a result of growth in production that was well beyond the required need of the local 
population. The resulting surplus provided an opportunity for a complex division of labour in 
which individuals, in addition to agriculture, specialised in other sectors of the local economy 
such as crafts, medicine, trade, and administration. Generally, the production of goods and 
services during the pre-colonial era was inspired and guided by the local population’s tastes 
and consumption patterns. This is quite unlike production in the colonial period which 
occurred, not to satisfy the local demands of Nigerians, but rather the demands of the British 
and European capitalist market (Nnoli 2008).  
Among the features concentrated in the newly created colonial towns were wage employment, 
hospitals, small scale businesses, education (provided mainly by missionaries), water and 
electricity supply, although they were very limited in relation to the population of the country 
as a whole. Township status soon became the parameter that guided the distribution of social 
amenities and services during this era. The activities of firms, missionaries and colonial 
administrators became a massive centripetal force that pulled many able-bodied men to the 
urban centres. Paden (1971) observes that Kano’s population grew by 26.8 percent between 
1911 and 1921- a figure that had tripled again by 1952. This sudden migration to the colonial 
urban centres and towns weakened the equilibrium of the traditional pre-colonial Nigerian 
societies as they began to lose the manpower that had previously sustained their traditional 
industries and institutions to the colonial urban centres, especially to make up for the limited 
foreign labour in these centres. Closely examined, it may be sustainably defended that this mass 
movement of people to the colonial urban centres and towns was not entirely voluntary. The 
needs and pressure of the new order compelled them to move where they would otherwise have 
preferred to remain in the highly cherished ambience of their traditional communities. 




traditional system of values and maintained regular contacts with their families and village 
communities. Although they lived in the town, their hearts remained with their traditional 
village communities, which they visited frequently still participating in nearly all their major 
events. The towns were simply a place to earn money and then return eventually to their 
villages. Offegbu captured these inner tensions well when he wrote:  
...their emotional and sentimental attachments are not with the urban 
communities, but with their home towns. Hence, they are willing to endure 
any hardship deprivations, and suffering in the towns without protesting 
because they feel their stay is temporary and essentially instrumental. 
(1977:16) 
It is interesting to observe that Ofoegbu also talked about the temporary predicaments that these 
earlier township dwellers may have had to endure. This, as Nnoli (2008) highlights, was mainly 
because the colonial urban centres were not designed to be a place of glamorous habitation and 
integration for the new migrants from rural areas, but rather grew out of the need to meet 
colonial economic and political objectives. The physical amenities available in the urban 
centres were provided primarily because they were either directly or indirectly relevant to 
colonial trade, administration, and political control, not because they were tailored towards 
assisting new migrants readjust to a new set of values. The situation in the colonial urban 
settings created some sort of ambivalence in these earlier migrants. Ukiwo (2005:8) citing 
Nnoliamply describes this scenario thus:  
Having been uprooted from the pre-colonial setting which had valid meaning 
for him, in which history had effectively and organically related him to his 
local environment, and culture had produced salutary patterns of 
interactions with others, the African migrant found the door to the 
coloniser’s glorified world securely barred to him. The resultant anomie and 
alienation affected his socio-economic and political activities. Even in 
interactions with his fellow Africans, he experienced tension, anxiety, and 
insecurity… . (1978: 22) 
 So, the nature of the colonial urban setting was that it was never a locus in which the migrants 
from the rural areas ever fully settled and felt at home. Therefore, this sort of migration was 
never voluntary, even though colonialists and some analysts tend to view it as such. They fail 
to acknowledge the compulsion that was directly linked to the introduction and enforcement of 
British legal tender (money) as the only means of economic exchange, especially as one could 
neither sell nor buy goods and services in the new order except by means of legal British 




of exchanging goods and services) and engage in colonial activities in order to acquire this new 
means of livelihood, namely, British money. The following British policies: an alien currency, 
forced labour, taxation and artificial scarcity  - forced a huge number of the rural population to 
migrate to the zones of new colonial activities for work or trade, as only a handful of Nigerians 
could fend for themselves and their families by performing their pre-colonial work or activities. 
This was the common experience of pre-colonial traditional Nigerian societies, including the 
pre-colonial Niger Delta region.  
 
Differential Urban Migration, A Favourable Condition for The Emergence 
of Ethnicity in Nigeria 
Both the booming colonial economy and the mass influx of migrants from different linguistic 
and cultural backgrounds to the colonial urban areas created the opportunity for the emergence 
of ethnic consciousness in Nigeria (Nnoli 2008).  Green (1974: 288) reports that between 1952 
and 1963, an estimated number of 644,000 migrants from a variety of linguistic backgrounds 
streamed into the metropolis of Lagos in south-western Nigeria. This accounts for about 59,000 
migrants annually arriving from the Igbo, Yoruba, Ijaw (of the Niger-Delta area) and Hausa 
speaking areas of the pre-colonial Nigeria. At the same time, that is, between 1952 and 1963, 
approximately 129,989 migrants from the South poured into some of the colonial urban centres 
of Northern Nigeria such as Kano, Jos, Zaria, and Kaduna. According to Nnoli (2008) most of 
these migrants to the North (88.6 percent) were from the South-East, which is predominantly 
an Igbo speaking region of Nigeria. Some were also from the Igbo speaking part of the Niger 
Delta.  Having arrived, these migrants went either into industries, mining or commerce, or other 
job possibilities available in these colonial urban settings. It was in these urban towns that 
significant contact or interaction amongst migrants from various linguistic backgrounds took 
place. Such contact is a pre-requisite for the emergence of ethnicity; for ethnicity exists only 
when there is more than one group (identified as ethnic) at least occupying a particular territory. 
The colonial urban setting made clusters of different culturally and linguistically groups 
possible. This is a necessary condition for the emergence of ethnicity. This point becomes 
clearer when one considers the sort of migration that occurred in the south-eastern and south-
southern parts of Nigeria during the colonial period. The colonial urban centres of Onitsha, 
Aba, and Port-Harcourt (in the Niger Delta area), just like those in the West and North, also 




came  primarily from one linguistic group - the Igbo people indigenous to these areas. No 
significant contact or interaction with any other linguistic groups was therefore possible there. 
For this reason, ethnicity could not be developed in either Onitsha, Aba or Port-Harcourt. Post-
colonial Nigeria is notorious for its inter-ethnic violent clashes, but it is interesting to observe 
that most of these clashes have occurred in places with a high concentration of members of 
other ethnic groups. A close examination of the inter-ethnic clashes of 1932 and 1945 in Jos, 
1948 in Lagos, 1953 in Kano, 1966 in Kaduna, up to the present day supports this claim (see 
Nnoli 2008, Falola 2008, Salawu 2010; Tawarikh 2013). Rarely has any major inter-ethnic 
clash occurred in the South Eastern part of Nigeria. The reason is very simple. The non-
indigenous population there is insignificant in comparison to the local population, making it 
difficult for ethnicity to develop.  Whatever semblance of ethnic conflict that may have taken 
place in the South-East and South-South is usually reactionary, as they express their grievance 
at home over the bad that may have been done to their kinsmen in other parts of the country. 
Against this background, it is easier to understand the pervasive implication or involvement of 
the Igbo-speaking people of Nigeria in many of the significant interethnic conflicts that have 
occurred across Nigeria. More than any other linguistic group, the Igbo speaking population, 
both of the South-East and of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, migrated in large numbers to 
most colonial urban settings and to date continues to migrate for both work and trade.  
 
Resource Competition in the Colonial Urban Setting and The Construction 
of Ethnicity in Nigeria 
From the foregoing, it is evident that the concentration and interaction of multifarious cultural 
and linguistic groups in the colonial urban settings is a necessary pre-condition for the 
fomenting of ethnicity. But contact alone does not satisfactorily explain why ethnicity forms. 
The element of competition over scarce resources is very important in offering a more robust 
explanation. Earlier in this chapter, following Dike (1956), I highlighted a number of instances 
in which contact between different cultural or linguistic groups occurred, but which did not 
necessarily lead to the emergence of ethnicity. Thomson (2010) also notes that there were some 
cases of assimilation among certain pre-colonial African societies. For instances, there was a 
case of assimilation between the Igbo and Ijaw of the Niger-Delta area in the pre-colonial era 
(Dike, 1956). All this indicates that it is not in all cases that contact or interaction between 




ethnicity developed in the colonial urban setting in Nigeria, it was primarily because of the 
socio-economic competition that existed there. Competition over scarce resources is usually a 
reason for the activation, reinforcement and instrumentalisation of ethnic consciousness and 
boundaries. Nowhere is this view more eloquently expressed than in the writings of some of 
the well-known resource-based theorists of ethnic conflict such as Collier and Hoeffler (2001). 
Competition over scarce resources is the dominant feature of the colonial urban setting. Jobs 
and relevant trade, as well as the social amenities available in the colonial urban area were, 
relative to the ever-growing local population streaming into them, very limited. This sort of 
scarcity, which usually emerges when the demand for available vital goods and services is 
significantly higher than their supply, forced people to compete fiercely over access to limited 
resources in the urban centres.  
Furthermore, by importing the capitalist mode of production into Nigeria from outside, 
Colonialism ushered in a period of significant scarcity in the country. Unemployment and 
limited access to the decision-making quarters are some of the prominent ways in which this 
scarcity manifested itself. In the first instance, the colonial capitalist economy disrupted the 
pre-colonial modes of production in which the local population were gainfully employed and 
replaced it with a capitalist production mode which was entirely alien to the pre-colonial 
Nigerian societies. This stunted the viability of local modes of production and rendered many 
previously gainfully employed Nigerians jobless (Nnoli 2008). During the colonial era, 
opportunities for Nigerians to participate in political processes, especially the formulation of 
national policies, were severely limited. Europeans dominated all the sectors of colonial 
Nigeria’s politics and economy. Struggle for access to scarce employment and extremely 
limited political positions contributed to the fomenting of contemporary ethnic sentiment as 
people aligned along ethnic or ethno-linguistic lines for effective competition.    
In 1920, Nigerians express their dissatisfaction over the scarcity of jobs and opportunities for 
political office through the National Congress of British West Africa, which called for a 
legislative council meeting in which half of its members would be nominated (Nnoli 2008). 
Between 1922 and 1946, the status quo hardly changed. The number of Nigerians occupying 
relevant political office was still quite small in comparison to their European counterparts. It 
was not until 1951, under the McPherson Constitution that a glimmer of hope appeared on the 
horizon as 12 individuals, out of the 18-man council of ministers formed at the federal level, 
were Nigerians. Only six were colonial officials. In addition to this, 136 other Nigerians were 




suffrage which allowed adults to vote and be voted for was adopted across the entire country 
except the North, where women were disallowed voting rights on religious grounds. The North 
was predominantly Islamic. In 1960, Nigeria gained political independence, but even then, the 
foundation and shape of its political economy for decades to come had been solidly laid during 
the colonial period.  
The foregoing shows that scarcity was pervasive in colonial Nigeria - manifesting itself in 
every sector of the country’s socio-economic and political life. Under such condition, 
competition became very fierce as people struggled to gain access to the limited economic and 
political opportunities available. To secure their interests and enhance their chances of success, 
migrants to colonial urban settings aligned themselves more closely with others of similar 
ethno-linguistic backgrounds (Sofola 1970).  Kinship groups and communal unions such as the 
Naze Family Meeting, Ngwa Clan Union, Owerri Divisional Union, Calabar Improvement 
league, Egba society, Yoruba Union, and Ijaiye National society, among others, were formed 
for this purpose in the colonial urban centres during the 1920s and beyond. These groups were 
usually very cohesive and their members usually supportive. Once a member of a particular 
group was fortunate to gain access to a good job or position, or resources, they used this to find 
employment for others, or at least to point them in the right direction. The consequence of this 
is ethno-linguistic inequality in employment and income which further inflames ethnic rancour 
and animosity in the groups that lag behind (Nnoli 2008).  
The scenario just described shows that inter-ethnic animosity is usually constructed around 
competition over scarce resources. Contrary to the view of the primordialists, its origin is 
rationally explainable. It is not biological. Ethnic identity was therefore a big issue for colonial 
urban dwellers, but less so (or even not at all) for those in rural areas whose population is 
mainly homogenous. In the rural pre-colonial setting, although there was contact and 
interaction between different social groups, the need for ethnicity did not arise because the 
nature of their relationship usually did not involve competition over resources. Access to food 
and other vital resources was quite secure; even if these were not always as superabundantly 
available as one would always want, the basic needs of the community were nearly always 
satisfactorily met. Their interactions were based on complementarity of interests, or 
superordination and subordination, not on competition. Anytime a pre-colonial host 
community employed migrant labourers, there was often a non-verbal mutual understanding of 
the host community’s dominance, and the labourers’ subservience or subordination. This 




prevented, when dominated or outcompeted, from accessing vital human needs. It was only in 
the colonial urban settings where vital resources were not only scarce, but fiercely competed 
for, that people aligned along communal lines to maximise their chances of winning (Nnoli 
2008). So, the development of ethnicity requires the existence of a high concentration of 
different ethno-linguistic groups in a specific geographical area. Colonial urban settings in 
Nigeria were this type of territory.  
This section has shown that ethnicity gradually became salient in the colonial urban setting as 
individuals aligned themselves along ethnic-linguistic lines to favourably compete for access 
to highly sought-after but limited resources, opportunities and positions of authority. It simply 
became politicized.  
 
Politicisation of Ethnicity in Nigeria  
Ethnicity is said to be politicised when peoples’ belief in their imagined collective origin, based 
on a set of common attributes such as language, culture, physical appearance or history 
relevantly influences the state’s political processes and outcomes. Ethnicity must enter the 
formal realm of politics to count as politicised (Weber, Hiers and Flesken 2016). This section 
briefly explores how modern Nigerian ethnicity, whose foundation was laid in the colonial 
period, continues to be salient in post-colonial Nigeria’s political processes, in the distribution 
of state’s values and resources, and its implication for violent ethnic mobilisation. The aim is 
to demonstrate, contrary to the views of some of my interview respondents, that ethnicity did 
play a significant role in the spiralling of ethnic violence in the Niger Delta and continues to 
do so.   
That the inter-communal relations between different linguistic groups migrating to colonial 
urban centres were not smooth has already been mentioned. It was fraught with favouritism for 
one’s own ethno-linguistic group in employment and access to political positions as individuals 
aligned themselves along ethnic lines in order to further strengthen their ability to overcome 
the alienation and challenges of the colonial urban settings. These alignments mostly led to the 
formation of ethnic unions and associations whose members were mutually supportive (Nnoli, 
2008). The internal cohesion of these ethnic assemblages impeded them from merging, or 
creatively interacting with others in the colonial urban centres for there existed some sort of 




could be trusted and collaborated with. This covert distrust of others partly accounted for why 
individuals formed alliances mostly with those of a similar ethno-linguistic background. 
Aligning with them felt like a return to, or rather, a recreation of the more secure, familiar and 
gratifying type of life they had led in their respective traditional societies prior to their 
migration to the ‘jungle life’ of colonial urban settings (Nnoli 2008).  This way of thinking and 
acting reinforces ethnic boundaries and identities, encourages ethnocentrism and exclusionism. 
Consequently, it hampers interethnic cooperation, nation-building and development in an 
ethnically divided society such as Nigeria. Although Nigeria got her independence in 1960, not 
much has changed with regard to peoples’ tendency to align themselves along ethnic lines, 
especially for the purposes of advancing either their economic, and/or political objectives 
(Ukiwo 2005). In 2019, many years since the formal end of colonialism in Nigeria, nearly all 
the key political appointments of President Buhari (the current president of Nigeria) are still 
from his own ethnic group (Opejobi 2017).  Why he has avoided appointing a significant 
number of peoples from other ethnic backgrounds is partly explained by the view presented 
above. As far as Nigeria is concerned, ethnicity still matters, and continues to intrude into 
politics. Just as in the colonial urban settings, modern Nigerians have also come to believe 
widely, though erroneously, that unless their ‘own people’ are in power, they will constantly 
be disadvantaged in the government’s distribution of the political and economic values of the 
state. They generally share, even if unconsciously, Laswell’s (1936) definition of politics as 
who gets what, how and when. The awareness that political power enables its wielders to 
authoritatively allocate the socio-political and economic values of the state constantly 
motivates ethnic groups to align behind their ‘own members’ to seize political powers, in 
anticipation of being rewarded or favoured in political appointments, and of the award of 
contracts, job offers, and infrastructures. This is simply called ethnic politics. A theme also 
extensively addressed in Berman (1998) is the inward-looking orientation that characterised 
ethno-linguistic groups during and after colonialism, on the one hand, reinforced ethnic groups’ 
internal cohesion and loyalty, but also, on the other hand, increased the exclusion and 
marginalisation of other similar groups (out-groups). Some of the logical consequences of this 
are a massive retardation of the formation and development of collective national 
consciousness, a heightening of unhealthy inter-ethnic competition over access to political 
power and scarce economic resources, the widening of socio-economic and political 
inequalities due to differential access to the state’s values (resources and positions), and finally 
a proliferation of inter-ethnic conflict (both of a violent and nonviolent nature) as groups that 




divisive ethnic tendencies as well as their negative implications for the Nigerian state. He 
therefore advised Nigerians to ‘seek coordination among themselves (disparate ethnic 
formations) in a way that would help build a strong national consciousness’. Despite this 
admonition, and a number of attempts to heed it, politicised ethnicity continues to impact on 
many spheres of Nigeria’s life. As Berman (1998) observes, the influence of ethnicity on 
African politics cannot be reasonably negated.  
It is within the context of such obvious instrumentalisation and politicisation of ethnicity for 
socio-economic and political gains, coupled with the socio-economic inequalities that this 
generates, that one is able to better understand the rise of violent ethnic mobilisation in the 
Niger Delta – a region often making reference to its socio-economic and political marginations 
as the major reason for violent agitation. The next section examines the ethnic dimension of 
the Niger Delta conflict.  
  
Highlighting the Ethnic Dimension of the Niger Delta Conflict   
The Niger Delta region is home to some of the minority ethnic groups of Nigeria. In comparison 
to the so-called majority ethnic groups such as the Igbo, Hausa or Yoruba, the population of 
the Niger Delta region is quite small. As discussed in earlier chapters, the region has a 
documented history of being disadvantaged or marginalised in the distribution of the socio-
economic and political values of the Nigerian state. This is partly because, in Nigerian 
Democracy, where an ethnic group’s numerical strength is vital in pushing through its agenda, 
the interests of minority groups are often not advanced because they lack the numerical strength 
required to push through their ethnic interests at national level (Ogbogbo 2005; 2008). This is 
exactly one of the challenges facing the Niger Delta region. The unequal access of Nigerian 
ethnic groups to the scarce socio-economic and political resources and opportunities of the 
country causes the often-disadvantaged ethnic categories of the Niger Delta to agitate - 
employing both violent and non-violent means.  
The connection between economic inequalities and conflict is well known among scholars of 
ethnic and national violence. The economic inequality theory of ethnic violence, otherwise 
known as reactive ethnicity, is an outstanding scholarly effort to articulate this widely known 
relationship between economic marginalisation or exclusion, and conflict. The reactive 




the result of economic imbalances or inequalities existing between different ethnic blocs within 
an ethnically divided state.  The widening economic gap due to socio-economic deprivation of 
particular ethnic blocs leads, over time, to grievances on the part of the disadvantaged group 
which, when not properly managed, often escalate into violent inter-ethnic confrontation. A 
similar approach was also successfully employed by Bonacich (1972) to explain the onset of 
ethnic conflict due to variations in pay for the same occupation, when people of different ethnic 
origins competed in the same labour market. This is the well-known ‘split labour market 
theory’.  Before Hechter and Bonacich, earlier scholars such as Davies (1962) and Gurr (1970) 
developed models that suggest that an intolerable gap between expected socio-economic goods, 
and what is actually received, increases peoples’ willingness to rebel. So perceived deprivation, 
they argue, inspires ethnic protest and even violent confrontation. In most developing countries, 
structural economic inequalities have been linked to large scale inter-ethnic confrontations and 
revolutions (Russett, 1964; Muller and Seligson 1987, Regan and Norton 2005). Reliable 
research on the causes of ethnic violence in the Niger-Delta often refers to a long history of 
socio-economic deprivation and marginalisation in the region as a major driver of ethnic 
violence in the area (Obi, et al, 2011). All the respondents interviewed in the Niger Delta region 
concurred with this view.  
This widespread belief by the Niger Deltans that their minority status in Nigeria has somewhat 
condemned them to perpetually remain victims of marginalisation within the polity is a 
provocation to violent mobilisation along ethnic lines as a way of forcing the Nigerian state to 
address the injustices (perceived or actual) they suffer as an ethnic group. Surprisingly, ever 
since the Niger Delta region embraced the use of violence as a political pressure tool, the 
Nigerian state has lost a lot of money to oil bunkering, and to destruction of oil production and 
transportation facilities. These losses have forced the Nigerian government back to the 
negotiating table. Today, these issues are among the major subjects discussed and taken 
seriously at the national level. Although the solutions needed have not yet been found and 
violent conflict continues to occur in the region, Niger Delta is no longer absent from the list 
of major issues of the Nigerian state.  
It is noteworthy that to be able to mobilise and challenge the ages-long marginalisation of the 
region, the Niger Deltans had recourse to ethnicity(ethnic myth/symbol complexes). Adunbi 
(2013; 2015) paints a picture of how the Ilaje community of the Niger Delta taps into ethnic 
myths/symbol to successfully mobilize ethnic youths to violence against Chevron oil company 




the South-western part of Nigeria. Their ancestors, following a defeat in war, were forced to 
migrate to the oil producing area of the Niger Delta where they currently occupy. The Ilaje 
people have a number of popular ethnic myth that describe their migration to the oil-rich Niger 
Delta as an act of ‘God’, who had promised to bequeath their ancestors with wealth and fortune. 
The eventual discovery of oil in commercial quantity in the region is mythically understood by 
the Ilaje people as the fulfilment of that promise made by ‘God’ to their ancestors. These myths 
are captured and kept alive in stories, folksongs, symbols, and divination poetry still in use in 
by the people to date. Thanks to these myths and symbolic gestures, the people of Ijaje (and its 
constituent towns such as Ugbo and Mahin amongst others) are able to lay claim to the so-
called ancestral homeland they currently occupy, as well as to all the resources found in it. For 
them, both the land, and oil resources in it, are symbolic – they represent the treasure 
bequeathed on them by both ‘God’ and their ancestors. As observed by Adunbi (2013), this 
ethnic myth/symbol complexes are often reconstructed to mobilize the ethnic population, or a 
portion of it, to violence against the oil companies and the Federal government of Nigeria who 
try to forcefully dispossess them of that which rightly belongs to them – their land and their oil 
resources. The well-known Parabe turmoil in which Chevron, an oil company operating in the 
region, was attacked is an instance of this. The involvement, later on, of the Nigerian military 
forces in the crisis resulted in a number of deaths. In this scenario, one encounters a case of 
how the activation of ethnicity (ethnic myth/symbol complexes) helps mobilize an ethnically 
cohesive population to violence.  
Ethnic cohesion in the Niger Delta is generally quite high. The people of the Niger Delta 
identify more strongly with their ethnic groups than with the political entity called Nigeria. 
This strong sense of ethnic identity and cohesion, as Gurr (1994) observes and as is clear from 
the case of Ilaje described above, is extremely important for the mobilisation of an ethnic group 
to collective action. Ethnic myths, passion and cohesion were the elements tapped into by Niger 
Delta elites to successfully stir the ethno-regional population of the Niger Delta to violent 
uprising against both the Nigerian government and the oil companies. As observed by one of 
my interview respondents (a traditional ruler interviewed in Port Harcourt, Rivers State ), it 
was ethnic passion and solidarity that motivated individuals to generously avail their 
communities of the finance and resources needed to challenge the Nigerian government over 
the socioeconomic and political injustices of the region. There is therefore no doubt that if 
ethnic myths, solidarity and cohesion were missing, the violent ethnic mobilisation currently 




remains, the organising principle of collective violent action there. Membership of the 
numerous violent ethnic militias in the region is also on the basis of ethnicity. In fact, the Niger 
Delta violent mobilisation cannot be fully explained without reference to ethnicity.   
So, when modernist (constructivist and instrumentalist) scholars such as Fearon and Laitin 
(2003), and some of my interview respondents downplay or entirely negate the contribution of 
ethnicity to the generation and sustenance of violent conflict, it simply betrays a poor 
understanding of the dynamics of ethnic violence.  While this thesis agrees with Fearon and 
Laitin (2003), and other scholars of the constructivist and instrumentalist tradition mentioned 
in earlier chapters, that there is an economic dimension to the Niger Delta conflict, the latter 
cannot be fully understood without considering the important role of ethnicity in the emergence 
and persistence of that ethno-regional violence. This position is also evident in the work of 
Estaben et al. (2012) who argue that the widespread understanding that economic inequality is 
a driver of conflict is rational for it is quite natural to anticipate that the poor may harbour 
strong antagonisms against the rich. These antagonisms or resentments are, however, only part 
of the story. For a sustained violent conflict to occur, these antagonisms need to be channelled 
into organised actions, often a herculean task when economic powers or strength are so 
disparate, and the poor are faced with the challenge of financing such actions. Effectively, 
while economic inequalities breed grievances and resentments, the very poverty of the have-
nots is a real obstacle that militates against successful and sustained violent mobilisation and 
attacks on the rich. It is for this reason that Estaben et al. (2012) conclude that although violent 
conflict may originate from economic motivations, they find expression through the cleavages 
generated by ethnicity, religion, or national origins. These cleavages are effective bases for 
mobilising for collective action. The same applies to the violent conflict in the Niger Delta. In 
the absence of ethnic identity, ethnic myths, ethnic passion, ethnic cohesion and solidarity, the 
ethnic groups of the Niger Delta would not be able to sustainably mobilise violently against 
either the federal government or the oil companies. The poverty of the region would have 
seriously militated against their sustained violent confrontation with the exceptionally rich and 
influential multinationals and the Nigerian government. The role of ethnicity as a motivational 
and mobilisational tool in the Niger Delta violent conflict cannot be negated or dismissed with 
a wave of hand.  
So Kaufman (2001), whose ethno-symbolic theory has been the guide for this project, is correct 
in his claims that violent ethnic conflict requires the following preconditions: ethnic myth 




have been able to demonstrate how these elements dynamically interact with one another to 
generate and sustain the violent ethnic conflict that currently ravages the Niger Delta region. It 
is the position of this thesis that any attempt to resolve the conundrum of the Niger Delta 
conflict must take into consideration the impacts of the aforementioned factors. Otherwise 
complete resolution of this regional turmoil will continue to be elusive.  
  
Class Struggle?: On How not to Evaluate the Niger Delta Conflict  
Class struggle as a source of conflict is one of the core themes addressed by Marxism. One of 
the conclusions reached by Schmidt (1977) in his work: A Marxist theory of Class Struggle is 
that class divisions and struggles still constitute an important and relevant framework for 
examining social conflict, violent or otherwise, in the contemporary world. This assumption 
was clearly on the mind of a colleague who during a conference in which an aspect of this 
thesis was presented, wondered why the Marxist notion of class struggle, as well as its possible 
causal impact on violent mobilisation in the Niger Delta has not been elaborately discussed in 
this project. His observation provoked the need to clarify the question of the possible role of 
class in the Niger Delta violent conflict – since other Marxist readers of this document may 
have the same question. The following pages therefore outline an understanding of Marx’s 
conception of class division and its implication for conflict in capitalist societies, and consider 
whether or not the Marxist theory of class is appropriate for understanding and explaining the 
phenomenon of violent mobilisation in the Niger Delta region.  
 
From the writings of Marx, one learns of the extraordinary existential importance of economics 
(the mode of production), which according to him, is the foundation of both political and social 
life. A society’s economic structure underlies and shapes it social, political, and legal systems 
(Marx 1848). However, to fully appreciate the epistemological import of this assertion, some 
degree of conversance with Marxist anthropology is needed. Marx’s understanding and 
interpretation of the nature of man starts with ‘human needs’. In his Economic and Philosophic 
Manuscripts of 1884, he writes that man, a natural and living being, is on one hand endowed 
with natural powers -  appetites that are intrinsic to him. On the other hand, however, the objects 
of these powers or appetites (that is, the material things required to meet human needs) exist 




Human history therefore becomes a continuous attempt or effort to satisfy certain primary 
needs, actualising natural human potentialities in the course of which, humans discover 
themselves as productive beings, who through their labours meet their needs and become fully 
human. Viewed from this angle, human labour becomes a source of liberation and fulfilment.  
This, however, is not the case in a capitalist society, which according to Marx alienates 
individuals from the fruits of their labour. This alienation originates from Marxist 
understanding of the capitalist society as divided into two antagonistic classes: the bourgeoisie 
and the proletariat locked against each other in perpetual conflict of interest. The bourgeoisie 
are the owners of the factors and means of production, while the proletariat are the workers. 
The latter own nothing except their own labour which they provide to the bourgeoises in 
exchange for wages that barely meet their needs, thus rendering them dependent on the 
exploitative whims and caprices of the bourgeoisie. The harder the proletariats work to break 
free and be fulfilled, the more the bourgeoisie utilise every possible avenue (especially 
institutional) to perpetuate the cycle of domination and exploitation existing between the social 
classes. The socio-political and legal institutions of capitalist society are, according to Marx, 
instruments of bourgeois domination and exploitation of the proletariat (the have nots). Within 
the capitalist economy, human labour, rather than being a source of liberty and fulfilment, 
becomes torturous and enslaving. The proletarian realisation of their own exploitation 
eventually causes them to revolt against the bourgeoisie. This, in other words, is the class 
struggle which, according to Marx, is at the origin of conflict, violent or otherwise, in capitalist 
societies. The end of this class struggle and its associated conflict is seen in a classless society 
ushered in by a proletarian revolution.  Whether there will ever be a classless human society, 
as Marx predicted, is very doubtful, and certainly not supported by what is known about the 
natural human propensity to accumulate wealth and dominate others as evident in the 
Hobbesian theory  of a state of nature (Hobbes 1651). 
That there exists some correlation between exploitation (by the bourgeoisie) and conflict 
(caused by the proletarian reaction to bourgeois exploitation) is supported by verifiable 
historical facts. The French revolution is an example. Although the causes of French revolution 
are very complex, historians are nonetheless unanimous on the view that the scandalous 
privileges enjoyed by the upper class or the bourgeoisie of French society, as well as the 
enslaving and exploitation of the proletariat certainly constituted a major trigger of that 
rebellion. It was hoped that through that rebellion, a more liberal and humane French society 




egalité, and fraternité (Dunn 1999; Tombs et al., 2007). Although the French revolution did 
eventually bring an end to the Ancien Régime, facilitating the country’s embrace of democracy 
in which people had a say over how they are ruled, nothing suggests that as a result of the 
revolution, France became a perfectly egalitarian society devoid of class conflict and 
exploitation. Semblances of the French revolution portraying the correlation between 
antagonistic social class divisions in the capitalist system have also been seen around the globe. 
Class division, an obvious feature of a capitalist society, does constitute, as Marx argued, a 
source of social conflict.    
However, any attempt to analyse social conflict in Africa using the Marxist theory of class 
ought to be done very carefully- for there is always a difficulty in exporting Marxism to Africa. 
Some scholars, especially if they are unfamiliar with the socio-political issues and events in 
Africa, are too quick to examine violent conflict on the continent using the Marxist theoretical 
framework.  Diamond (1988), one of the most erudite scholars to have written on the Nigerian 
political conflict, employed the notion of class quite frequently in describing and analysing 
politically salient violent conflict in the country. In Chapter nine of his work Class Ethnicity 
and Democracy in Nigeria for example, he intermittently made reference to either the political 
“class” or the working “class” as though this Marxist terminology accurately captures Nigeria’s 
socio-political relations. Although one can reasonably imagine the basic information he tries 
to convey, that is, the need to demonstrate that Nigerian society is not an egalitarian one devoid 
of power imbalance and exploitation, his use of the term Marxist term ‘class’ to explain the 
country’s socio-political relations could be misleading. It should be emphasised, first of all, 
that class as understood by Marx forms in relation to the means of production (Thomson, 2004: 
83). The world that Marx examined was the European capitalist society and economy, which 
according to him was partitioned into two antagonistic classes: the bourgeoisie and the 
proletariat. It was not the African continent and certainly, neither Nigeria nor the Niger Delta. 
Africa has not been fully penetrated by the capitalist mode of production, and there has been 
no real industrial revolution on the continent. To this effect, the classical notion of class 
associated with the capitalist mode of production is also absent (Thomson, 2004: 85). This 
explains why the Marxist term “class” as used by Diamond to describe social relations in 
Nigeria is not very appropriate.  
Social relations and conflict dynamics in Africa and Nigeria are much more convoluted than 
the way they are presented by some Marxist scholars.  They are usually a complex mixture of 




2004: 83). The so-called ruling or political class in Nigeria is a hegemonic bloc formed by 
assembling influential individuals and groups who are willing to cooperate with a view to 
seizing the state’s power for personal gains. It has little or nothing to do with class solidarity 
as described by Marx, but rather more to do with the ‘willingness to cooperate with strategic 
allies in order to obtain more of the spoils associated with the state’ (Thomson, 2004: 87). This 
accounts for why admission into the ruling class in Africa, including Nigeria, could easily be 
extended to family members, friends and people of diverse socio-cultural or academic 
background in so far as they are willing to cooperate. In Africa, ‘class’ formation or allegiance 
is very capricious. It keeps changing and shifting as often as a better and more strategic 
coalition for exploiting the state’s resources becomes available. This is exactly what happens 
in the Niger Delta conflict. For instance, some of the ex-militants who made their money 
fighting for ‘justice’ quickly became uninterested in continuing the cause they once 
championed and are now enjoying their spoils in comfort. This reality was captured well by 
one response to the following question: ‘There are speculations that the militants themselves 
have become rich as a result of their activities. If this is correct, do you think that the militants 
would ever want peace to reign since their struggles already bring them some financial 
benefits? His insightful response was as follows:  
Well that is where you have talk about the corruptive influence of the state 
and the oil companies. Rather than address the critical issues that the 
militants are raising, there is an attempt to compromise the key figures in the 
struggle. And so, they award them bogus contracts, make large sums of 
money available to them. These militants become very comfortable and a 
good number of them abandon the struggle. However, there is a pool of other 
militants waiting to take over, because the original issues had not been 
addressed. And so, there is a sense in which you can talk about the militant 
economy, in which it pays harass the state or the oil company and force them 
to settle (make money available to them). The amount of money in question 
is so substantial that militancy becomes more beneficial than going to find a 
genuine type of employment. They have been wrongly socialised, and a good 
number have gotten used to it. (Interview response by a traditional ruler in 
Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, Nigeria; April 2017; int. num. A) 
 Social relations and conflict dynamics in Nigeria and the Niger Delta are not about class, but 
about willingness to cooperate in the informal, albeit highly organised network of looting the 
state’s resources. The Marxist notion of class is therefore not a relevant factor or element in 
understanding and explaining the phenomenon of violent ethnic mobilisation in the Niger Delta 
region. Seeking to understand this regional turmoil from a strictly Marxist perspective is bound 




Having said this, the current research does recognise that the Niger Delta is not a strictly 
egalitarian society, that is, one in which everyone is equal. Some are certainly wealthier than 
others, but generally, the boundaries between the rich and the poor are very unstable and hyper-
fluid, unlike the relatively stable class distinctions described by Marx. In Nigeria, including the 
Niger Delta, having the right political association and network could make one incredibly rich 
within a very short space of time. In the same manner, a previously wealthy person could easily 
become indigent by simply falling out of favor with the political network that supports and 
protects him. In Nigeria, politics is a central focus for rapid wealth accumulation; not 
ownership of the means of production – for capitalism is ill-developed in the country. Again, 
in the Niger Delta, there exist traditional rulers or leaders, as well as the masses, that is, the led. 
This is another form of social stratification in the Niger Delta region. But as stated in the 
background chapter of this thesis, criteria for membership of this upper echelon of Niger Delta 
society is not based on wealth or ownership of means of production as is the case in Western 
capitalist society described by Marx; but rather on the principle of gerontocracy in which 
society is governed by wise elderly people generally considered to be custodians of society’s 
values, customs and traditions. In the Niger Delta, being a traditional ruler is not tantamount to 
being wealthy. In fact, some traditional rulers, including some of those interviewed during my 
fieldwork, are not wealthy people. However, when it comes to the issue of collectively 
challenging the perceived injustices perpetuated against the region by the federal government 
of Nigeria, both rich and poor as well as elites have been involved, perhaps also for some 
slightly different hidden agendas. This mobilisation for collective action cuts across all social 
stratifications. It is a collective exercise in which ethnicity, not ‘class’, has played an important 
role as a principle of mobilisation. There is certainly an economic dimension to this regional 
violence (the region claims it has been marginalised economically), but class distinction hardly 
serves as the basis for mobilisation, unlike the example of the French revolution presented 
above. It is for this reason that this thesis continues to maintain that the Marxist notion of class 
in neither an appropriate nor reliable theoretical framework for understanding and resolving 
the Niger Delta violent conflict.  
 
Conclusion  
This chapter was designed to examine extant theories and debates on the causal role of ethnicity 
(ethnic myth-symbol complexes) in the generation and maintenance of violent ethnic 




during my data collection exercise in the Niger Delta. In the course of performing this task, I 
came to observe that there existed some sort of binary in the opinions expressed by key 
academic contributors to the debate.  For instance, while some, especially the proponents of 
the economy and resource-based theories of ethnic violence such as Fearon and Laitin (2003), 
Collier and Hoeffler (2000) and Muller and Seligson (1987), downplay, or outright negate the 
contribution of ethnicity in the onset of politically salient violent conflict among ethnic groups, 
others, such as Smith (1984), Gurr (1994), Kaufman (2001), and Estaben et al.(2012) 
acknowledge the causal roles of both ethnicity and economy or resources in the spiralling of 
this type of violent conflict. The data obtained from the region during my data collection 
exercise also reflects this bifurcation of views.   
This chapter, having examined both stances very closely and critically, has provided some 
historical evidence that supports the claim that ethnicity (ethnic myth, symbols, solidarity) has 
indeed causally contributed to the violent ethnic mobilisation occurring in the Niger Delta, and 
that without recourse to the instrumentality of ethnicity, the Niger Delta conflict, in the manner 
that it currently occurs, would not exist. This does not however mean that the region would be 
free of conflict, but rather that the character and shape of the conflict, if it occurred at all, would 
certainly be different. As it is, currently ethnicity remains a major mobilisational tool used in 
the Niger Delta. Despite this fact, it is quite astonishing that major conflict resolution 
interventions in the Niger Delta have not been designed to address specifically, for instance, 
the hostile ethnic myths that contribute to the spiralling of regional conflict. Most of the conflict 
mitigation and resolution strategies implemented in the region focus more on the economic 
causes of the conflict. But this does not sufficiently address the problem – for violent conflict 
continues to persist in the region. It is the position of this thesis that any strategy capable of 
resolving the regional conundrum in question should be of a type that also addresses the 
negative impact of ethnicity in the crisis. Ethnosymbolism, this thesis contends, is a good 











This research project was prompted by a very unsettling observation – the fact that violent 
ethnic mobilisation has continued to persist in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria despite 
government efforts to eradicate it. The questions that immediately followed this observation 
were: why have the government’s strategic interventions not been able to eradicate the Niger 
Delta conflict? Are there issues with them? If yes, what are they? What should have the 
government done differently, if anything? These are some of the issues that the current research 
project has had to address to successfully attain its goal. 
To advance a bit more systematically in addressing its research question(s), the thesis started 
by critically appraising existing theoretical explanations of ethnic violence, such as the 
primordialist ancient hatred doctrine, the economic inequality theory of ethnic violence, the 
security dilemma, institutionalism, and ethnosymbolism, among others. The overall aim of this 
was to be able to select a theory, or some combination of theories, that best explains the reasons 
for the occurrence and persistence of violent ethnic mobilisation in the Niger Delta region.  
The first theory examined was the ancient hatred doctrine – a perspective that represents the 
earliest theoretical attempt to explain the phenomenon of violent ethnic mobilisation. It holds 
that ethnic groups fight one another due to some ancient, firmly established, fixed and 
inflexible differences based on biological descent or ancestry (Varshney 2001). Thematically, 
this theory belongs to the primordialist school of thought. The overarching claim of 
primordialism is that ethnic identity is congenitally acquired. It is a given over which an 
individual has no power, as it is supposedly based on the fact of nativity and not on social 
construction. According to the logic of this claim, ethnicity therefore naturally and inevitably 
links people of the same ancestry, separating them and their way of life from those of different 
ancestral stock. These centripetal and centrifugal tendencies are attributed to nature itself, 
rather than to some social engineering or constructivism. As Geertz (1963: 109-10) puts it, one 
is bound to and cares for one’s kinsmen, one’s neighbour, one’s fellow believer as a result not 
merely of interest, or incurred obligation, but at least in great part by the virtue of some 
unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself. This natural tendency to stick 
with and care for those of the same blood relationship (ingroup) inevitably generates the 
awareness of another group (the outgroup) which stands in permanent opposition to the former, 
clashing with it as they pursue overlapping interests. In the final analyses, the basic submission 




inevitable and ineradicable (Geertz 1963).  The current project could not adopt the primordialist 
theory as the framework for analysing and finding solutions to the problem of violent ethnic 
mobilisation in the Niger Delta because of its obvious limitations. The first of these limitations 
has to do with the fallacy of consanguinity. The second concerns its erroneous assumption of 
the fixity and ‘ineradicability’ of ethnic identity and conflict. The third borders on the theory’s 
neglect of the rational calculus involved in ethnic violence. Modern research on the subject of 
ethnicity and ethnic violence now shows that both ethnicity and its related violent conflicts are 
socially constructed. Far from originating purely from natural instinct, violent ethnic conflicts 
are actually rationally constructed to attempt to obtain some pre-conceived objectives or 
interest. So, they are neither fixed nor permanent. They are constantly changing phenomena.  
Having dismissed primordialism as an adequate theoretical foundation for the research, the 
thesis went on to examine whether the ‘economic inequality theory’ could fulfil that objective. 
The economic inequality theory holds that violent ethnic conflicts result from socio-economic 
inequalities existing between different ethnic blocs within an ethnically plural society. This 
unevenness, perceived or actual, generates grievances within a disadvantaged ethnic 
community, and when not properly managed spirals into violence. Some well-researched 
documents on the causes of violent ethnic mobilisation in the Niger-Delta make reference to a 
long-standing economic marginalisation of the region as the main driver of conflict in the area. 
However, this claim does not explain why ethnic violence has not spiralled in other 
economically disadvantaged ethnic groups in the country. Nigeria has over 300 identifiable 
ethnic groups (Salawu 2010), most of which complain of being economically marginalised, yet 
they, unlike the Niger-Delta region, have not mobilised to ethnic violence despite their 
grievances. In view of this, this project assumed from the outset that that there is more to the 
question of violent ethnic mobilisation in the Niger Delta region than can be adequately 
answered using the economic inequality argument. Hence the need for a more robust and 
suitable theoretical framework.  
Manipulative elite theory was the next approach appraised. This theory, as evidenced in the 
writings of Bates (1974; 1983), Hechter (1986); and Chandra (2006) holds that ethnic conflict 
is the outcome of the elites’ instrumentalisation and strategic manipulation of ethnicity for their 
egoistic political and economic ends (Bates 1974; 1983; Hechter 1986; Chandra 2006). In fact, 
elites and ethnic entrepreneurs actively orchestrate violent ethnic conflict to the extent that it 
is politically and economically rewarding for them (Brass 1997: 26). That elites play significant 




especially for their own selfish interests, is not really questioned by scholars. However, it does 
not immediately explain why their followers are drawn into the struggle if benefits flow only 
to the elites (Horowitz 1998). Perhaps the followers, it might be suggested, are not aware that 
they are being manipulated. But again, this needs proof. Some have argued that it abnormal to 
expect rational adults to become part of extreme violent contestations, occasionally at the risk 
of their own lives, without any particular objective or interest. For this reason, elite 
manipulation theory has been criticised for wrongly painting a picture of ‘evil politicians and 
innocent masses’ (Kakar 1996: 150) without taking into consideration the fact that individual 
participants in the conflict might also be doing so for personal gain (Pandey 1992: 41). This 
theory is therefore not a good explanation for the involvement of the masses in the Niger 
Delta’s violent mobilisation. A more comprehensive explanation is needed. A few other 
theories were also appraised, but none of these classical modernist constructivist and 
instrumentalist arguments were found to be convincing or comprehensive explanations for the 
occurrence and persistence of ethnic violence, particularly in the Niger Delta region. Only 
Ethnosymbolism was found capable of offering a more comprehensive and robust explanation 
for why this regional turmoil has continued to persist. The ability of ethnosymbolism to provide 
such an explanation arises from its dexterity in combining the relevant logic of existing theories 
of ethnic violence in order to offer a more comprehensive and adequate response to the question 
of why violent ethnic mobilisation occurs and persist, particularly in the Niger Delta region. 
Ethnic violence is a very complex phenomenon whose explanation requires a more dynamic 
and encompassing approach; and this is exactly what Ethnosymbolism does (Kaufman 2006). 
It is for this reason that it was eventually selected as the theoretical framework for the project. 
Unlike other theories, ethnosymbolism, as used here, recognises that ethnic violence has 
multiple causes that contribute to its occurrence and persistence. The Kaufmanian strand of 
ethnosymbolism that has served as a guiding thread for this project outlines the following 
necessary causal factors of ethnic violence: interest, manipulative elites, and ethnicity (ethnic 
myths/symbols, passion and solidarity). All these together, not one or the other, Kaufman notes, 
must be present and interact with one another in complex ways for ethnic violence to erupt and 
persist. Simply put, ethnic conflict occurs when manipulative elites tap into hostile ethnic 
myths to arouse an ethnic public to violence as an avenue for attaining some pre-conceived 
interests or objectives (Kaufman 2001). This is certainly an improvement on the classical 
modernist constructivist and instrumentalist theories of ethnic violence which tend to ignore or 
entirely deny the relevance of ethnicity in accounting for why ethnic violence occurs and 




writings of Fearon (1994; 2003) who argues that so-called ethnic conflicts are in fact not ethnic, 
but at their very core are contestations over benefits. The latter, not ethnicity, explains why 
violence amongst groups occurs and persists. The implication of this modernist view is that 
ethnicity is not relevant for understanding why ethnic groups are in conflict. This is a very 
powerful argument, but not without limitations. A major problem associated with the modernist 
constructivist and instrumentalist arguments is found in their neglect or denial of the relevance 
of ethnicity (ethnic myths, symbols, passion, and cohesion). Yet, as persuasively explained by 
Estaben et al. (2012), ethnicity does play a major role in the onset and persistence of violent 
ethnic mobilisation.4 Both Gurr (1994) and Kaufman (2001), among other ethnosymbolic 
scholars, recognise and demonstrate the power of ethnicity, particularly ethnic myth-symbol 
complexes in mobilising ethnic groups for collective action, violent or otherwise.  
This notwithstanding, the Nigerian government’s dominant approach to understanding and 
resolving the problem of violent ethnic mobilisation in the Niger Delta has, regrettably, been 
essentially modernist –  for it adumbrates that the pursuit of sectional (regional) interests is to 
blame for the Niger Delta crisis, and that balancing of interests, especially economic interests, 
will lead to the eradication of the problem of violent mobilisation in the region. This explains 
why the government’s conflict resolution policy remedies have been predominantly economic. 
They have been designed in accordance with this modernist conceptual framework which either 
downplays or denies the vital contribution of ethnicity to the spiralling of the regional conflict, 
and on account of that have also failed to make provisions for addressing ethnicity’s possible 
roles in the provocation and maintenance of violent ethnic mobilisation in the Niger Delta 
region. This thesis, however, following the view of some ethnosymbolist scholars such as Gurr 
(1994), Kaufman (2001) and Estaben et al. (2012) amongst others, recognises that both 
ethnicity and manipulative elites, not just ‘interests’, are vital in accounting why violent ethnic 
conflicts occur and persist, especially in the Niger Delta. In chapters 5 and 6 of the present 
document, the contributions of hostile ethnic myths, passion and cohesion in the rise and 
persistence of violent ethnic mobilisation have been extensively and persuasively discussed. 
So, any policy that aims to resolve the Niger Delta violent conflict, but which makes no 
provisions for addressing the often provocative hostile ethnic myths employed by the elites in 
stirring an ethnic population to collective violent action will always remain insufficient and 
incapable of durably resolving the conundrum of violent uprisings in the Niger Delta. Measures 
 
4 This debate has been extensively engaged with in the introductory section of this thesis, as well as in its 




hitherto taken by the government to address the problem of violent mobilisation in the Niger 
Delta have not made any such provisions. These strategies which according to Obi et al (2011) 
may be categorised under repressive military force, improved revenue allocations to the Niger 
Delta area, and the presidential amnesty programme, are in fact, at their very core, 
predominantly economic. For instance, the need to increase the revenues allocated to the Niger 
Delta stems from the government’s understanding of the regional conflict as an agitation for 
economic or distributive justice, and its belief that increasing the revenue routinely allocated 
to the region will resolve the crisis. This way of understanding the regional crisis, is, without 
doubt, a step in the right direction, but it certainly does not address the issue of how to prevent 
chauvinist and manipulative elites from tapping into popular hostile ethnic myths to stir ethnic 
populations to violence. The same is equally true of the presidential amnesty programme. The 
need to provide economic incentives, through the amnesty programme, to the militants in order 
to encourage them to abandon violent militancy is only partially, not entirely, helpful. It again 
fails to address the role of the hostile ethnic myths, cleavages, solidarity and passion tapped 
into by Niger Delta elites to mobilise the militants into fighting for a purportedly ethnic cause. 
Regarding the strategy of military repression, the thesis proposes that, strictly speaking, it is 
not to be considered a meaningful conflict resolution or mitigation strategy. It is tantamount to 
bullying, and should not have been employed in the first instance. This thesis does not therefore 
intend to discuss it further as it is not a healthy strategy worthy of examination.  
What may be discerned from the foregoing is that the government’s strategies for successfully 
addressing the problem of violent ethnic mobilisation in the Niger Delta have to date been 
insufficient and inadequate. They need therefore to become more robust and comprehensive, 
and to be  of a sort that recognises not only the contributory role of ‘interest’, but also that of 
ethnicity and of manipulative elites, in the spiralling and persistence of violent ethnic 
confrontation. Such strategies should be the ones inspired by ethnosymbolic, rather than by the 
classical modernist constructivism and instrumentalism.  More robust than the theoretical 
strands of the modernist constructivist and instrumentalist theories presented above, and which 
in the course of this thesis have been found to be individually insufficient or inadequate to 
account for why violent ethnic conflict occurs and persists, is Ethnosymbolism, and this more 
comprehensive theoretical perspective has served as both the theoretical and the analytical 





Beyond Theories: A Look at the Fieldwork Data  
The project has not been purely theoretical. There is an empirical dimension to it –empirical 
data were obtained during the fieldwork in the Niger Delta region as part of the larger effort to 
address the project’s research question(s) and fulfil its aims and objectives.   
The elite interviews conducted in the Niger Delta yielded some original data that provides some 
useful information about how local elites understand and explain the regional violent conflict.  
Generally, elites are considered important shapers of socio-political affairs in every society 
(including mobilisation for violence or peace). So, their perception or understanding of social 
realities such as ethnic violence has some implications for the sort of conflict resolution policies 
and strategies they are likely to advocate or promote. This assumption was at the root of the 
fieldwork interviews, which aimed to find out what the elites had to say about the reasons for 
the occurrence and persistence of the Niger Delta conflict. Designed in accordance with 
Kaufmanian ethnosymbolic theory, the questions were devised to find out how the following 
factors: interest, manipulative elite, and ethnicity (ethnic myths) may, or may not, have 
contributed to the spiralling and persistence of the regional violent conflict under investigation. 
A total of 16 individuals were interviewed, and the responses they provided (the findings) 
revealed the following:    
a) That competing interests have played a major role in the onset and persistence of violent 
mobilisations in the Niger Delta. All the respondents affirmed this.  
b) That manipulative elites have played major roles in the spiralling and persistence of the 
Niger Delta regional turmoil. All the respondents also affirmed this. 
c) That while some respondents agreed that ethnicity (ethnic myth) is a contributory factor 
to the Niger Delta’s violent conflict, others did not. The number of dissenting views 






 Responses of the interview respondents on the causal roles of interest, manipulative elites, and 
ethnicity in violent ethnic mobilisation in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.     
 
Discussion  
The above findings and bar graph show that all those interviewed (100 %) agreed that 
competing interests, particularly in oil wealth, have played a major role in the rise and 
persistence of the Niger Delta violent conflict. This response corroborates the assertion made 
earlier: that it is unthinkable to anticipate that rational entities would engage one another in 
some pre-meditated and organised violent confrontations were there no sort of interest at stake. 
The role of interest, economic or otherwise, in violent ethnic mobilisation is, in fact, not an 
issue that is reasonably disputed amongst the scholars of ethnic violence. In Kaufman (2001), 
as well as in the writings of the economy or resource theorists of ethnic violence, compelling 
arguments in support of the indispensability of interest in the spiralling and persistence of 
ethnic violence are very well presented. So the interviewees’ responses on the causal role of 
interest in the Niger Delta violence is not only valid, but also tallies with the views of serious 
scholars of ethnic violence, as well as with the ethnosymbolic theoretical framework that 











Interests Manipulative Elites Ethnicity
Yes 16 16 9
No 0 0 7




Similarly, from the above graph and findings, it is also evident that all those interviewed 
(100%) on the contribution or role of manipulative elites in the Niger Delta conflict were 
equally unanimous in their view that manipulative elites have indeed played a major role in the 
rise and persistence of the regional violence under investigation. I learnt from one respondent 
how some elites provided funds, and incited ethnic populations to actively participate in what 
they described as a justifiable ethno-regional mobilisation for justice, but without, however, 
revealing the hidden private agendas or interests they stood to gain from it. The responses 
provided by the interviewees aligned, not only with the  ethnosymbolic theoretical framework 
of the thesis, but also with the widely acknowledged elite manipulation theory of ethnic conflict 
which holds that violent ethnic mobilisation is an outcome of elites’ instrumentalisation and 
strategic manipulation of ethnicity for their egoistic political and economic ends; in other 
words, that ethnic entrepreneurs actively orchestrate violent ethnic conflict in so far as it is 
politically and economically rewarding for them (Brass 1997:26; Bates 1974; 1983; Hechter 
1986; Chandra 2004).  Within the Niger Delta, all those interviewed showed some awareness 
of this dimension of the regional turmoil. Again, there is no gainsaying that this sort of 
awareness would be helpful in developing some more tailored conflict resolution policies and 
strategies for preventing the influence of manipulative elites in the Niger Delta regional 
conflict.   
The last, but certainly not the least of the findings outlined above concerns the role of ethnicity 
in the spiralling and persistence of violence ethnic mobilisation in the Niger Delta.  
Quite frankly, of all the findings already discussed, this is the most controversial. While nine 
out of the sixteen persons interviewed agree that ethnicity has played some relevant role in the 
spiralling and persistence of the Niger Delta’s violent conflict, the rest disagree. The number 
of dissenting voices was significant - nearly half of the total number of participants. This sort 
of bifurcation on the possible role of ethnicity in provoking and sustaining ethnic violence is 
not entirely new. Historically, economy-based modernist scholars of ethnic violence have 
always lopsidedly overemphasised the economic dimension of ethnic violence, suggesting 
thereby that the so-called ethnic conflicts are in fact not ethnic, but are rather conflicts over 
interests, especially economic. Such views are evident in the writings of some modernist 
scholars such as Fearon (2003) and Muller and Seligson (1987), among others, who either 
downplay or deny outright the causal contribution of ethnicity to the onset and persistence of 




Now, without denying that interest causally contributes to provoking and maintaining violent 
conflicts in general, this thesis does, however, observe that those violent confrontations 
involving ethnic groups are more complex in terms of their causalities. In them, ethnicity does 
play some important roles as an organisational and mobilisational principle. In Chapter five, 
an elaborate explanation of how ethnicity, particularly ethnic myths, passion and solidarity are 
strategically tapped into to mobilise ethnic populations for collective action is well presented, 
building on the intellectual traditions of some of the finest scholars of ethnic and national 
conflicts, such as Smith (1984), Gurr(1994),  Kaufman (2001), and Estaben (2012) amongst 
other ethnosymbolic scholars.   
It is therefore the position of this thesis that violent ethnic mobilisation, particularly in the 
Niger Delta, can neither be fully understood nor resolved unless the contribution of ethnicity 
to the crises is acknowledged, and adequate provisions for how this should be addressed also 
made. Downplaying, or denying outright the causal relevance of ethnicity to the Niger Delta 
conflict is a major reason why adequate conflict resolution policies on the crises have not yet 
been formulated. Hence the persistence of the Niger Delta regional turmoil. Ethnosymbolism, 
a theoretical approach that purposively combines the relevant logic of existing theories of 
ethnic violence in order to provide a more comprehensive and robust framework for 
understanding and resolving the problem of violent ethnic conflicts is what this thesis proposes 
to the Nigerian government as a way forward. Policies and strategies formulated in accordance 
with this theory would be comprehensive, robust, and capable of durably resolving the enigma 
of violent ethnic mobilisation that has rocked the Niger Delta region for decades now.  
 
The Final Word 
The foregoing shows that both the Nigerian government and some of the elites interviewed in 
the Niger Delta have inadequate understanding of the causes of the Niger Delta’s ethnic 
violence. This is evident both in the government’s conflict resolution strategies and in the 
responses provided by a significant number of the elites interviewed. Neither camp has shown 
any serious awareness of the causal role of ethnicity to the spiralling and persistence of ethnic 
violence. Their opinions are basically offshoots of the classical modernist constructivist and 
instrumentalist arguments. Classical modernist theories are in the habit of downplaying or 
denying the causal relevance of ethnicity to the spiralling and persistence of ethnic violence. 




in Chapters 1, 5 and 6, ethnicity remains a major contributory factor to the rise and persistence 
of ethnic violence in general, and in the Niger Delta in particular. So, any theoretical attempt 
to solve the problem of violent ethnic conflict, but which either downplays or denies the causal 
contribution of ethnicity in violent ethnic mobilisation will always remain inadequate and 
incapable of yielding a durable solution to the problem of violent ethnic conflict. Classical 
modernist theories of ethnic violence are guilty of this error of negligence or denial, and this is 
why they have been, in the cause of this research project, found to be unable either to account 
for why ethnic violence occurs and persists, or to resolve it.  
Regrettably, this is the approach that has been taken by the government in conceptualising and 
attempting to resolve the regional turmoil. Its approach has been predominantly, and nearly 
exclusively economic. The Nigerian government’s understanding of the Niger Delta’s violent 
conflict as originating from struggles over valuable interest (oil wealth) has led to the 
promotion of policies that aim only to balance interests, or cushion the adverse effects of actual 
or perceived economic inequalities in the region. Increments in the revenues allocated to the 
Niger Delta, as well as the Presidential Amnesty programme have been based on the 
government’s belief that the regional problem is basically an economic one. Because of this 
the government has not bothered to make provisions for addressing the contribution of ethnicity 
to the regional conflict. While this thesis acknowledges that the regional crisis does have an 
economic dimension, it nonetheless holds that the roles of manipulative elites and ethnicity 
(ethnic myth, solidarity, and passion) are equally indispensable contributors to the violent 
turmoil being witnessed in the Niger Delta region.   
Similar to the government, some of the elites interviewed in the Niger Delta are guilty of this 
error of neglect or denial. The data provided above indicates some sort of confusion amongst 
local elites regarding the causal relevance of ethnicity to the spiralling and persistence of the 
Niger Delta violent conflict. They are diametrically opposed in their views. For instance, 7 of 
16 individuals who responded on this issue deny that ethnicity has anything to do with the 
regional conflict. They, like the government, understand it from a strictly economic point of 
view. The position of this thesis, however, is that ethnicity (hostile ethnic myths, passion and 
solidarity) has contributed to the regional crises. Concrete historical examples have been used 
to back up this claim. Although the rest of the respondents (9) agreed that ethnicity has had 
some impact on the regional crises, there is no evidence of any serious advocacy on their part 




strategies implemented in the region. This again leaves one wondering how firm or convinced 
they are of the ethnic dimension of the Niger Delta regional turmoil.   
So, the central and overarching position of this thesis is that existing causal explanations for 
violent ethnic mobilisation and its persistence in the Niger-Delta are incomprehensive and 
inadequate. They are merely narrow and isolating extrapolations of the classical modernist 
constructivist and instrumentalist doctrines which have been judged inadequate to account for 
why violent ethnic mobilisations occur and persist. Logically, any conflict resolution strategy 
that is based on these insufficient modernist doctrines is also bound to be inadequate and this 
is exactly the problem with the Nigerian government’s conflict resolution interventions in the 
Niger Delta region. Its strategies are fundamentally inspired by the by the theoretically lopsided 
classical modernist economy-based theories of ethnic violence which tend to downplay or deny 
outright the causal significance of ethnicity in the spiralling and persistence of ethnic violence. 
On account of that, they have become inadequate and unable to resolve the Niger Delta regional 
conflict. Hence the persistence of violent ethnic mobilisation in the Niger Delta region despite 
government efforts to eradicate it.   
This thesis therefore advocates that any theoretical approach capable of robustly addressing the 
problem of violent ethnic mobilisation in the Niger Delta needs to be complex and 
comprehensive, rather simplistic and lopsided. It has to be the sort that makes provisions, not 
only for how the problem of competing economic interests may be resolved, but also for how 
the negative contributions of both the manipulative elites and ethnicity (hostile ethnic myths) 
in the rise and persistence the regional crisis may be effectively addressed. Ethnosymbolism – 
a theoretical approach that creatively and purposefully combines the relevant logics of existing 
perspectives on violent ethnic mobilisation meets this requirement and should therefore form 
the theoretical basis and framework for understanding, explaining, and resolving the problem 
of ethnic violence, particularly in the Niger Delta region. Ethnosymbolism is what this thesis 
offers to the Nigerian government in its effort to resolve the Niger Delta’s violent conflict – a 
crisis that has destroyed very many lives and properties in the Niger Delta region. 
  
Implications of the Thesis for Policy Making  
Throughout this thesis, and in accordance with the requirements of the Kaufmanian 




that  competing interests, manipulative elites and ethnicity (hostile ethnic myths in particular) 
constitute the indispensable causal factors responsible for the rise and persistence of violent 
ethnic mobilisation in the Niger Delta region. In the pages that follow, I present some major 
implications of this affirmation (findings) for the formulation of conflict resolution policy and 
strategies for the Niger Delta. The aim is to provide some sort of guide, or stimulating 
suggestions to assist policy makers in the formulation of more adequate and robust conflict 
resolution policies and strategies capable of eradicating the Niger Delta conflict. These are as 
follows: 
 (1)   The government should re-examine the context of violent ethnic conflict in the Niger 
Delta and painstakingly identify its real causes and drivers. Socio-political and economic 
exclusion and marginalisation of the Niger Delta area are among the causal factors highlighted 
by respondents as constituting a major reason for violent mobilisation in the region – a view 
also upheld by Obi et al. (2011). It is therefore imperative that these incidents of 
marginalisation or exclusion are carefully identified and corrected through some carefully 
formulated policies aimed at fairly balancing the interests, economic or otherwise, of different 
ethno-regional groups that make up the Nigerian polity. Doing this is very important because 
injustice, understood here in the classical Aristotelian sense as the denial of one’s own or one’s 
people’s due, is always a major reason why individuals or groups harbour grievances and 
eventually mobilise for collective action, sometimes violently, in a bid obtain what they believe 
is rightfully their due.  
(2)    There is also a need for the people of the Niger Delta, or their true representatives, to 
be allowed to participate fully in designing and deciding on the conflict resolution policies to 
be implemented in their region. Exclusion of the people from the deliberative and decision-
making processes on issues that directly affect them is one of the main reasons why they quite 
frequently feel deceived and consequently protest, sometimes violently. On a number of 
occasions, measures have been unilaterally implemented in the region without due consultation 
with the people of Niger Delta. Numerous incidents of brutal military operations in the region 
are instances of this.  As observed by Rousseau, people are generally less likely to wantonly 
flout laws and regulations that they have effectively participated in setting up, for these 
represent their collective opus or what Rousseau refers to as the volonté générale; that is, their 
collective will, in which the will of the individual members of society  is contained and 




deliberations and decisions on how best to resolve the phenomenon of violent uprising in their 
region. Furthermore, in accordance with Rawls (1999)’s trend of thought, this thesis also 
believes that involving Niger Deltans in the process of designing the conflict resolution policies 
for their region is also a way of guaranteeing, at least, that the government is acting fairly and 
without ulterior motives, thus increasing the chances of these policies being fruitfully 
implemented without being undermined. 
(3)    There is also a need to educate the public about how to detect, avoid or resist elite 
manipulation. There is some evidence that manipulative elites, in their shrewd pursuit of private 
interests, have played some smart roles in stirring members of the public to violent conflicts in 
which they, not the Niger Delta public, stood to benefit. Some violent uprisings in the Niger 
Delta have been provoked by manipulative elites as a means of consolidating their grip on 
economic and political positions, or to enable them to obtain other personal advantages 
disguised as the public interest. In Duruji (2008; 2015) one sees how ethnic militias in Nigeria, 
including those of the Niger Delta, have become increasingly transformed as some form of 
pressure group.  
Having said this, I note that it is equally important to make a distinction between genuine efforts 
by noble elites to mobilise people for good causes, such as pulling them together to oppose an 
autocratic government or a dictatorship. Ideals of Democracy and civil disobedience, as evident 
in the writings of Dahl (1998), Skinner (2002) and Rawls (1999), encourage this. However, the 
challenge for the public here lies in being able to detect when mobilisation for collective action 
is either manipulative, or for a noble and heroic objective. It is for this reason that this project 
recommends that the people of the Niger Delta be trained and sensitised to spot the difference. 
It behoves the government to develop programmes on how to actualise all this, especially as it 
promises to curb the damaging impact of manipulative elites in the spiralling and maintenance 
of the Niger Delta violent conflict.    
(4)     Provisions for properly and effectively addressing the negative impacts of ethnicity 
(hostile ethnic myths, passion and ethnocentrism) on violent mobilisation in the Niger Delta 
should be made. 
Ethnicity, just like nationalism, is like a double-edged sword – simultaneously unifying and 
divisive. While ethnicity unites individuals who believe themselves to originate from a 




as points de repères and motivation, the in-group solidarity, pride and impetus that these 
narratives enable have the tendency, when not properly managed, to lead to ethnocentrism and 
preponderance of one ethnic group over another; further exacerbating the ripples of ethnic 
tensions, security dilemmas and eventually full-blown violent confrontation. 
The role of hostile ethnic myths, passion and solidarity in the onset and maintenance of ethnic 
violence is a key subject discussed and affirmed by ethnosymbolic scholars, as well as by this 
thesis. It is, therefore, the duty of the government to develop measures aimed at tackling the 
negative impacts of ethnicity on the Niger Delta violent conflict. All the policies hitherto 
employed by the government in their attempts to resolve the regional problem seem to have 
either vitiated, neglected or  ignored outright that ethnicity is a relevant causal factor in the 
regional turmoil. Ignoring, downplaying or denying this fact does not in any way remove its 
effect, but rather renders the problem intractable, and difficult to resolve.  This is the reason 
why the current project strongly recommends that some well-adapted policy measures for 
addressing the causal impact of ethnicity on the Niger Delta conflict be developed and 
implemented. Without this, the Niger Delta violent conflict, in the manner that it currently 
occurs, cannot be resolved. This is because, ethnicity, as the research findings show, is one 
principle of organisation and mobilisation in the Niger Delta violent conflict. 
 (5)     The government should do more to protect the right of the Niger Deltans to free speech, 
especially when they critically appraise the government’s conflict resolution strategies in the 
region. It is in allowing people the liberty to freely express their opinions without fear of being 
victimised that potentially better alternatives measures for solutioning the regional conflict may 
become available. 
This proposal has been inspired by a number of incidents I observed in the course of the data 
collection exercise in the Niger Delta. Some of the interviewees, for instance, declined to take 
part in the interview process despite having previously agreed to participate. The reason for 
their abstention was initially not entirely clear to me. However, it was later suggested to me 
that this may be not unrelated to the sensitive nature of the research topic. Some of the interview 
questions, for instance, required them to provide information that may be critical of government 
policies in the Niger Delta. In a country like Nigeria where the prosperity of so-called elites 
depends hugely on maintaining cordial patron-client relationships with those who wield 
government power – the ‘big men’ as Chabal and Daloz (1999) refer to them, avoiding 




very. But then, continual abstention from honestly reviewing government policies in the Niger 
Delta, especially when they have not been very effective, only prevents the emergence of better 
alternatives for resolving the problem of violent mobilisation in the region under study. It is 
for this reason that this thesis suggests an increased measure of protection for the right of every 
Nigerian, especially those of the Niger Delta, to freely air their opinions as honestly as possible 
without fear of being blackmailed or victimised.    
 
Original Contributions to Knowledge 
(1)    One major contribution made by this research is the introduction of ethnosymbolism as a 
superior framework for examining and resolving the problem of violent ethnic mobilisation in 
the Niger Delta region. In the course of this project, I observed that most existing causal 
explanations for the occurrence and persistence of the regional crises are a bit problematic –
some are merely narrow and individually isolating  extrapolations of the classical modernist 
constructivist and instrumentalist doctrines such as the economic inequality theory, resource 
curse theory, institutionalism, greed versus grievance theory, and elite manipulation theory, 
which, individually, have been judged inadequate in accounting for why violent ethnic 
mobilisations occur and persist. The inadequacy arises mainly from their ignorance or neglect 
of the important role of ethnicity (ethnic myth-symbol complexes) in the rise and persistence 
of violent conflicts amongst ethnic groups. Although it is fair to recognise that some of these 
weaknesses have been to some extent corrected in the work of Ifeka (2006), Anugwom (2011), 
and Adunbi (2015) amongst others, who have done well in explaining the contributory roles of 
ethnic myth-symbol complexes in violent ethnic mobilisation in the Niger Delta, it is also worth 
observing that they did not go further to explain how these elements synergise with other causal 
factors of ethnic violence to de facto generate the regional crises that currently ravages the 
Niger Delta region. In other words, they have not explained the mechanism of ethnic violence 
in the Niger Delta. It is therefore at this point that this thesis pushes the frontier of the literature 
a bit further by introducing a more englobing, comprehensive, and robust theory of ethnic 
violence - ethnosymbolism. Drawing extensively on the latter, this project has been able to 
creatively combine relevant logics of hitherto existing, valid, but individually isolating, 
explanations of Niger Delta conflict in order to formulate a more robust account that 
compellingly explains why violent ethnic conflict occurs and persists in the region. This 




that is more robust than that produced by each of the individual theories it integrates. This was 
discussed in detail in chapter one. Although ethnosymbolism is now increasingly gaining 
acceptance within the domain of ethnic conflict studies and resolution as a more thoroughgoing 
framework for evaluating and resolving the conundrum of violent ethnic mobilisation, this 
theoretical approach has, prior to this point, not been used to analyse or solve the problem of 
ethnic violence in the Niger Delta region. Yet the complexity of the regional crises requires the 
rigorous and comprehensive intervention that ethnosymbolism provides. 
(2)   The second contribution of this project can be seen in the extra-European validation of the 
universalisability of Kaufman’s ethnosymbolic theory.  In two separate articles published on 
the subject of ethnic violence by Young (2002) and Chaim Kaufmann (2002),   
Kaufman’s Modern Hatred was criticised as an over-ambitious piece of research that seeks to 
formulate a universalisable theory of extreme violent ethno-national conflict. The grounds for 
this criticism originated from the fact that nearly all the data and case-studies obtained and used 
by Kaufman come from a single geographical area – the Balkans. His critics were therefore of 
the opinion that he ought to have diversified and expanded his data  in order to strengthen the 
validity and credibility of his theory – for seeking to formulate a universalisable theory on the 
basis of  a limited and non-diverse data set is a bit problematic. These criticisms are, to say the 
least, valid, and this thesis agrees with them that Kaufman’s work would have benefited from 
widening and diversifying his case studies and data. The criticism does not however nullify the 
validity of Kaufman’s ethnosymbolic theory. It rather contends that the theory ought to have 
been tested in other contexts of ethnic violence. This thesis has now filled that gap, even if just 
partially, by creatively applying Kaufman’s theory in the Niger Delta (Africa). The use of 
Kaufman’s theory to investigate the Niger Delta crisis has been incredibly rewarding, for it 
‘perfectly’ captures and explains the dynamics of  the violent ethnic conflict in the region. As 
can be seen in chapter one, when compared with other extant theoretical explanations of the 
regional conflict, Kaufman’s ethnosymbolic theory proves to be more comprehensive, 
thoroughgoing, and robust. So, the successful, but also creative application of Kaufman’s 
theory in the Niger Delta helps neutralise the criticism levelled against him by both Young 
(2002) and Chaim Kaufman (2002), and in so doing further confirms the universalisability of 
Kaufman’s theory. In some way, therefore, the current research makes up for what is lacking 
in Kaufman’s work. 
(3)   Conceptual clarification is another way in which this thesis has made an important 




been described by Kaufman as necessary factors required to successfully explain the origins of 
violent ethnic mobilisation. These are meaning-laden concepts that are usually subject to a 
plurality of interpretations. Hence the need to clarify the exact sense in which they are used. 
What is however a bit startling is that Kaufman did not bother to provide clear definitions of 
these concepts, or the exact sense in which they were being used his major work: Modern 
Hatreds. Yet, conceptual elucidation is of great importance in avoiding, or at least minimising, 
misinterpretation. What I have therefore done, especially in Chapters one, four and five of the 
thesis, is to go through Kaufman’s major works in order to discern, capture, and communicate 
the senses in which these concepts have been used, as well as how they have been understood 
and deployed in the context of this research project. This is why the current thesis may rightly 
be described, amongst other things, as a “Companion of Kaufman”. This is not because it 
always agrees with all that Kaufman says (quite the contrary); but mainly because it supplies 
some key elements ignored or omitted in Kaufman’s work, including the definition of concepts. 
In doing this, the thesis contributes to enabling and enhancing an understanding of the 
Kaufmanian ethnosymbolic theory. 
(4)    Manipulative elite theory is well-known and frequently utilised to analyse the context of 
violent ethnic mobilisation. Prominent scholars of ethnic violence such as Hechter, Horowitz, 
Bates, and Brass have, for instance, all drawn on this theory in their various explanations of 
the causes of ethno-national violence. For them, there is no doubt that the agency of 
manipulative elites is required to provoke and sustain ethnic violence, especially in view of 
their egoistic ends. Although Kaufman agrees and upholds this view, he goes a bit further to 
explain the mechanism of elite manipulation (how they de facto manipulate) – an aspect not 
sufficiently developed by theorists before him. According to him, in order for elites to 
successfully cause ethnic violence to occur, certain pre-conditions (hostile ethnic myths, 
political space, and the emotion of fear) must exist or be created where they are absent, for they 
are like the raw materials with which manipulative elites fabricate violent conflicts. This thesis 
has found these Kaufmanian pre-conditions for ethnic violence extremely helpful in explaining 
how manipulative elites have been able to successfully mobilise ethnic populations to violence 
in the Niger Delta. The case of the Adaka Boro-led violent ethnic mobilisation in the Niger 
Delta is an instance of this.  This was discussed in detail in Chapter five. On the other hand, 
however, I was able to observe, in the course of my research, that these same Kaufmanian pre-
conditions for ethnic violence were also utilised by Ken Saro-Wiwa – who successfully 




government of Nigeria and the oil multinationals for injustices against his people. Yet, in 
Kaufman’s works, the above-mentioned pre-conditions were only considered in relation to 
manipulative elites. No mention was made of how non-manipulative elites could use the same 
means to mobilise for collective but non-violent ethnic action. This fact, omitted by Kaufman, 
has been rediscovered and highlighted  here. In doing this, the thesis enhances our 
understanding of the Kaufmanian mechanism of elite manipulations to violence.  
 
Research Limitation and Suggestions for Further Investigation 
This project has provided a causal analysis of the context of violent mobilisation in the Niger 
Delta with a view to clarifying why the regional turmoil has continued to persist despite 
government efforts to eradicate it. Through the ethnosymbolic theoretical approach employed, 
the thesis has been able to carefully identify a number of necessary factors that contribute in a 
complex way to the regional imbroglio. It has also been able to make suggestions about how 
to address these issues. However, what is lacking in this project, and is therefore needed for 
the purposes of complementing it, is a well and carefully articulated conflict resolution action 
plan that is inspired both by the current thesis, and constructed in accordance with the demands 
of the ethnosymbolic theoretical approach. In the course of this project, this has been found to 
be the most appropriate framework for a robust and comprehensive explanation of, and 
solutions to, the conundrum of violent ethnic mobilisation in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. 
This is what is partly lacking in the current research (its limitation) and which therefore needs 
to be provided by another line of investigation – a complementary research project that builds 
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